

## Interview Summary Form

### Interview Details

Interviewee Name: <u><b>RADM James Watson</b></u>	Date: <u><b>8/30/10</b></u> Time: <u><b>9:00am</b></u>
Interviewee Title: <u><b>2nd FOSC at UAC</b></u>	Interviewee Job Location: <u><b>New Orleans, LA</b></u>
Interviewer Name(s): <u><b>Team</b></u>	Interview Location: <u><b>Washington, DC</b></u>

### Interview Questions

Initial Question1: What was your job/role and how did it evolve (if at all) during the DEEPWATER HORIZON Incident?

- The RADM has a background in marine safety; his permanent position before the spill and currently is the LANTAREA Director of Operations, a new position created in the summer of 2009.
- The RADM was working in Newport on a DOD exercise, and was called back to LANTAREA in Portsmouth, VA when the rig sank.
- His role was to have close relationships with the District Commanders, in this case, RADM Landry in District 8. He closely coordinated with RADM Landry. LANTAREA provided support (USCG forces, flow of information, strategic planning) for the District.
- About a week later, it was determined that RADM Landry needed a deputy, and the RADM was deployed to the UAC in Robert, LA. He served as Deputy FOSC, starting around 29 April. At this time, the NIC was not in place, but there were lots of discussions, and they wondered who it would be. The RADM played the NIC during SONS 2010, but the logic was that it would be the LANTAREA Commander, ADM Papp, not the COMDT. However, the decision was between S1 and the COMDT, and they decided ADM Allen would be the NIC.
- RADM Watson served as the Deputy FOSC through 1 June, and then the FOSC from 1 June – 15 July. RADM Landry returned to her District Commander position to manage hurricane preparations for the upcoming season.
- Served as FOSC 1 June – 15 July (approximately). He realized he needed a Deputy, and brought in Roy Nash immediately.
- Although RADM Landry had a chief of staff; so the RADM was asked to go to the UAC and be the coordinator back to all Federal government agencies and focused on this. They needed to coordinate with DOI, DHS, DOC, DOD, etc. DOD was a big focus at that time.
- At the point when he served as Deputy, RADM Landry was not getting out too much. She was driven by the battle rhythm, and the 2pm press conference. RADM Watson was able to get out a few times, to see the ongoing response. From his experience with oil spills, you need to get out and see what is going on. He went on well overflights, town hall meetings in Mississippi, and command post visits. He also met the strike team personnel, and realized they were pushing them to their limit.
- The RADM became involved in air operations in Houma because of the number of near misses that were occurring. The location was outside the reach of the FAA to coordinate, so CBP began to assist until it could be transferred over to Tindal Air Force Base to monitor the air traffic control over the site.
- RADM Zunkuft came in when there was still a huge need to draw more forces out of the US government (USCG, USAF, etc.). He was more of a direct coordination role/report to the COMDT. ADM Nash stayed on for continuity.
- DOD Resource requirements – why was it interesting?
  - Tapping of the National Guard and getting resources such as C-17s. The process to get the C-17 aircraft was through NORTHCOM, and they coordinated with the DCO present. They were working to draft RFFs and figure out how the process worked. There had never been a process where the funding was coming from a private company. They ended up using the OSLTF, but it was a little different for DOD as they wanted the money up front. (Note: With Navy SUPSALV there is a standing MOU in place.)
  - There were some differences of opinion within the Joint Staff for how to provide C-17s vs. National Guard. They ended up going direct to the National Guard for personnel.
  - Paul Stockton (Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense) was key in this effort. A significant hurdle was that a

signature was needed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to authorize use of short-term use of DOD assets for this emergency. RFFs were passed down to Paul and General Paxton.

- The DOD's past experience with the Stafford Act was different. They were used to having pre-scripted MAs. This was precedence for an NCP response. They might need an MOU for DOD as we have with SUPSALV.
- Universally, once you go beyond agencies that have participated in our exercises or worked with USCG over the years, they were only familiar with Stafford Act, none were familiar with OPA90. So in this case, they thought it was Stafford Act, not the NCP.
- The National Guard normally responds under the Governor (on a Stafford Act declaration, on state orders). They wanted Title 32 orders, which is a federal recall, and needed to have money up front. When running an emergency response, and get the cycle to move the money to meet everyone's expectations, that was a 24hr a day tasker and took many phone calls throughout the night. The NPFC staff was amazing in getting that done.
- They do not know if they would ever want to do that for a Stafford Act; reducing the cycle for Title 32 and quick deployment. It was a 100% cost share, vs. the 75% under the Stafford Act.

Focus Area: UAC	Describe your relationship with the BP representative in the UAC? How frequent were your communications with BP outside of the formal meeting schedule? In your opinion was the UAC truly unified?
<p><b>Question 1:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Doug Settles (BP) was the direct counterpart to the FOSC. He did not have a deputy, but had an executive staff and people would fill in for him if he was out.</li> <li>• There was always a unified command with the RP, FOSC, and SOSC. The weakest link in the UC was the State of LA. It was a complicated situation because of multiple states and ICPs that were involved. The SOSCs needed to be active in Houma and Mobile. State representatives were always there, and they managed the spill as close to the doctrine as possible. They used a consensus system; they did not take votes, but if there was an objection, they would try to resolve those issues before moving on.</li> <li>• BP was located in the room next to USCG in the UAC, with MMS on the other side of them, and then the NOAA SSCs and Environmental Agencies in the next room. There was also a situation unit floor, where the watch standers were located.</li> <li>• They worked according to the Planning P, decided the objectives of the response (this was in place before he arrived). They had merged 2 separate locations into the single location at Robert. Started the battle rhythm (planning cycle) each morning, get updates on yesterday's taskings, discuss the business of the day, direct the staff, and then had an additional meeting in the afternoon for updates and briefings.</li> </ul> <p><b>What were the dynamics of the UAC, where they typical to how we train, with close coordination? Or were the activities more separated?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prior to this event, when the RADM was an FOSC, they were not in the room together all the time. Each of the staff had their own locations to go to and get work done.</li> <li>• In this oil spill, they did not all operate out of 1 room. They were not integrated 24/7, but it did not seem to impact any relationships or coordination. (Note: in SONS 2010, everyone was in 1 room; not like during this spill.)</li> <li>• With respect to the Federal situation, the UAC doctrine says is has to be really tight. However, then the Secretary of DOI said we needed to have the boot on the neck of BP. In that case, how do we coordinate with BP? The state and Governor took the same tact, so we could not be "one team, one fight" with BP.</li> <li>• There was also Stafford Act confusion by the state. By LA state law, Roland Guidry is the SOSC and has a lot of autonomy. However, the Governor did not go along with that, so the only way around it was to reassign Roland. The RADM is not sure what the Governor's goal was. He wanted the LA EOC to be the center of his operations. There was no one in the UAC or IC who had authority to act as a representative to LA, which made the process a little dysfunctional.</li> </ul> <p><b>What was MMS's role early on in the UAC?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This was a unique case, with the source being a well head far below the surface. The first rule in any spill response is to stop the spill. The most frustrating thing was that there was a new spill every day. MMS was critical as they had the oversight of that element of the spill (source control).</li> </ul>	

- We treated them as the 4<sup>th</sup> participant in the UC. They did not take a large role in the surface clean-up. They did have a large role in Houston ICP, in coordination with source control.
- RADM Landry and RADM Watson did not seem to have much involvement with ICP in Houston. They effectively let DOI and some other USCG personnel have the direct coordination with Houston.
- RADM Watson never really had close coordination with ICP Houston; he was more focused on oil clean-up. The RADM does not think any of the FOSCs have enough involvement in well control activities. They let DOI have the lead, and the UAC got briefings every day, but it was not enough information. Given the magnitude, it needed more focus.

Focus Area:  
UAC

**Question 2:** How did the State of Louisiana participate in the UAC and how did their participation/role evolve?

- The State still had some good representation from DEQ and received great advice from them. They had a depth of knowledge from dealing with crude oil wells and the marshes.
- They stopped getting consensus in a formal way from the state, and had to move ahead anyway. One example of this was the dispersant issue. **Describe your involvement in the application subsea dispersants.**
  - Surface dispersants were applied with the guidance provided by the RRT, and using the pre-approvals available. The oil was good, dispersible oil, it was far offshore, and there was more oil than could be pulled up by the skimmers. The system was working well, but it got to the point where a lot of dispersants had been applied, and there was concern over the amount. They wanted to continue to use surface dispersants, and then the subsea dispersant issue came up. They went to the RRT to get approval for further surface dispersant application and approval for subsea dispersants.
  - The RRT got hung up and needed to get state buy-in, even though it was far off of the state waters. The decision was pushed to the NRT. There was a huge level of involvement of the NRT which was an oddity in this type of situation, because the NRT is not operationally functional, as the RRT is. Also, the NRT does not have the background and expertise in the local areas and issues for consideration.
  - The RADM never looked into law or regulations, but with the application of dispersant product, there is a way that the EPA can inject into a decision like this. The Administrator chose to get involved, and information and decisions then went all the way up to the EPA Administrator. Information then skipped NRT and was relayed back down to the UAC. The Administrator had EPA make directives, as opposed to following the consensus model of the NRT. EPA began using directives, which was new for a situation like this.

**Is it your understanding that EPA has sole authority on use of dispersants?**

- The RADM decided that if dispersants were being used as a safety issue, he had authority as the FOSC. If it was an environmental mitigation tool, then EPA Administrator would have the 51% vote and be more in the driver seat. He felt that was appropriate for the role of EPA on dispersants.
- The EPA Administrator wanted to use directives which went outside the RADM's chain of command and undermined the UAC and ICP. He worked through UAC, and pushed guidance out through ICPs. The EPA Administrator used directives, which seemed to leave out the UAC/ICPs and how we would typically provide and receive direction. Directives are more typical for EPA's daily mission activities.
- The FOSC had to co-sign directives. There never was a directive (that he knows of) that was not co-signed. There may have been some sent directly to BP, but he is not sure. Three different elements were put into directives: aerial application, subsea application, and the type of dispersant used on top of well. The third element was what the RADM felt he had the most authority over, as it was used to save the workers.
- A directive about waste management was released later on. USCG (as FOSC) co-signed the Waste Mgmt directive.
- There was a challenge to maintain the process (IC, UAC, use of IAP, etc.), when other agencies were inclined to fall back to how they normally dealt with big corporations.
- USCG maintained flexibility, but they needed to deal with a lot of administrators and secretaries, and realized a NIC was needed to help with agency administrator coordination.

**If LA had been integrated from the beginning, would you have avoided this complexity with EPA/NRT?**

- The RADM believes that if the state was involved, they would have preferred to deal with it without going to Washington,

and maybe some problems could have been averted. But, still it is a huge amount of dispersant. EPA got involved b/c of out of state waters as well, and the amount was so large.

**Was there tension on operating under the state's perception to work this under the Stafford Act, and did it interfere with the response?**

- The tension of operating under the misunderstanding of the Stafford Act or the NCP within the State was a huge issue. It was a matter of people talking past each other. There was not a battle going on about which was better, but dealing with the parishes early on was a comment, that since 9/11 the country has invested a lot of money into EM and EOCs at state level are very powerful and have capacities that exceed the oil spill response community. Managers are closer to the senior level/state reps, and this just popped up, and did not realize what had happened over the last 10 years. This is probably the case anywhere in the country.

**How did the direction to "make the parishes happy" complicate the response?**

- BP gave money to state/parishes (approximately \$25 million each), that was not a NIC decision. This does not typically happen in an oil spill, and this began the slippery slope. State and parishes were very empowered, and it enabled them to buy their own boom, which forced USCG to change the way that they managed the response.
- RADM Watson thinks that the sequence may have been that BP made a decision to provide the money before S2 or the NIC said to "keep the parishes happy."
- LA declared a state of emergency that, combined with the BP money meant they could basically do whatever they wanted. It created the perfect recipe for powerful individuals to take things to do whatever they wanted with them.
- With respect to wetlands restoration, the RADM believes the state had an agenda that they overlaid on top of the spill, using it as a means to achieve the restoration goals. The state is losing wetland acreage daily, due to circumstances not related to oil. It is a serious problem they have been trying to solve for many years. The state's administration had a focus on that which preceded this spill. When Governor Jindal found a replacement for Roland Guidry, it was his lead for Coastal Restoration.

**Did the berm have anything to do with preventing oil from getting into this area?**

- RADM Watson signed the order to have BP set aside \$360 million to build the berms that would help to prevent oil from getting to these wetland areas. This was based on the outcome of a town hall meeting in NOLA with SMEs.
- He checked to ensure that the State got an emergency permit from USACE to build the berms.
- Every technique that is tried has a downside. They used everything we had available to us – berms, dispersants, etc. Any one method used to the extreme was worse than a combination. The RADM thinks some techniques were used to the extreme, especially berms and boom (especially absorbent boom, which does not biodegrade easily). He does not know how much absorbent boom is still in marshes, but it might have done more damage than the oil would have.
- It is a trade-off, but the RADM would have rather over-used dispersants, as opposed to miles of boom that got pushed into the marsh and caused damage that will last longer than the oil.
- There was significant effectiveness of dispersants. Any oil that does not burn has to get degraded by microscopic organisms. There is a great population of these organisms in the Gulf of Mexico, and there may be more than enough to take care of the oil eventually.
- The RADM noted that they could see the success of dispersant application (surface and subsea). They measured it directly at the well site (levels of VOCs), and it was indicating that dispersants were effective.

**Did you experience any tensions from other states?**

- Yes and the biggest difference was the coastal restoration agenda on top of the spill. Other governors also thought that they could work it more effectively through EM than oil spill response organizations.

Focus Area: Cascading Resources	How would you improve your ability to incorporate resources, such as people or equipment, from state agencies (i.e., Maine) and industry if they have specialized knowledge and can support the USCG or other Federal agency in a response?
<b>Question 3:</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The RADM had not thought of bringing in additional state resources to add to the force generation. He thinks that if he had gone down there with the additional guidance to be the force generator, not just using Federal forces, but also state</li></ul>	

resources and expertise, it probably could have been done, and they might have had a better match of capabilities with needs. They grabbed the equipment, but did not really tap the people.

- Instead they tried to make National Guard personnel into oil spill responders. They succeeded in some areas, but if we had spent as much money and gotten the bodies from the other states, they might have gotten more value.
- The NG personnel issue gets back to the Stafford Act issues. There is an appeal to the Governor to use his NG personnel resources when in a Stafford Act response mindset, but this was an NCP response.

**Are you aware of the EMAC process under the Stafford Act, and could it work under the NCP?**

- The RADM did not think putting it together would be hard to do. It can probably be done under the NCP as it exists; they just need to set up agreements with other states. If the RADM had been asked to do this during the heat of the battle, he is sure he could have found a way to do it.

Focus Area:  
Involvement  
of Senior  
Agency  
Officials

**Question 4:** What was the involvement of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DHS in your response organization?

- DHS had a steady flow of people coming down. DHS has a standard information flow that is required. We were providing that through our situation unit.
- One of the big crises we had was when the numbers from the reports did not match. Reports would be contradictory with information on the quantification/flow rate numbers, boom deployed, skimming numbers, and it was hard to keep the numbers totally consistent, which made people not confident in them. They would be briefing the President and did not want to have the wrong or inconsistent numbers in front of them.
- DHS had a lot of involvement in public and governmental affairs which caused problems at the UAC as well as BP. The public affairs staff was as much the DHS public affairs staff as they were the UAC public affairs staff. This resulted in BP having their own public affairs staff.
- The JIC was located at the UAC, but the guidance of the JIC message was mostly from DHS and the White House, not the UAC. If you were going to do an interview, they would get a phone call from DHS to see exactly what they were going to say.

**Reporting requirement from the Liaisons to the S2?**

- The JIC had to start getting out in front of the news, especially with respect to the situations where every night Anderson Cooper would have Plaquemines Parish President Billy Nungesser on his show every night.
- There was a decision by the S2 to reorganize with branches and provide parish liaisons and county liaisons, to give direct sense of what was going from the parish level perspective. CAPTs were put in local EOCs. Reporting went directly to the S2.
- UAC was managing the overall spill, but not concerned with parish boundaries as they were with oil spill response boundaries. They would listen to the daily briefing calls each night, as there was a desire to get specific info from the parishes. Some are still holding calls, once per week. This was not the typical military construct.
- The federal system of empowerment to the county/parish, along with the money from BP was not a good combination. It also bypassed the normal chain of command.

**Did this help the situation?**

- Some of the liaisons were insulted on a daily basis, and publicly, by Parish Presidents. USCG chose local reservists, when available, and found that some of them were still seen as outsiders, as they were USCG, even though they grew up there. Sometimes they had to be moved.
- Once we created the political branches, it ended up being helpful. They ultimately had to put staging areas in all of them, and empower them to make operational decisions. USCG had to deal with fact that they could not move equipment in or out of the parishes.

Focus Area: Dispersants	<b>Question 5:</b> Describe your involvement in the application subsea dispersants, the waiver process and the determination of daily quantity caps
See question 2 above.	
Focus Area: Relationship to the NRF	<b>Question 6:</b> How can the NCP be rationalized with the NRF, the Stafford Act and States acting under their own emergency authorities?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RADM is not sure how to rationalize it, but they did think about it. They could have set up a system that everything up to 3 miles offshore is run under a Stafford Act by supporting state and locals. Then there would be the NCP response when further than 3 miles offshore. There would be an awkward line for the response, and the RADM is not sure how that would work since it would be very confusing.</li> <li>They spoke to FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate about how to manage these things across state lines, and you wind up having competing support elements within the agency responding.</li> <li>One major concern that came up was what if the incident spread into District 7. They had to do a lot of pre-planning and figured out they would ignore the lines between districts for the purposes of this spill, and keep 1 person in charge, not 2. They did not want to turn into 2 separate events because of an arbitrary boundary. The Stafford Act is very focused on individual boundaries and state/county needs. The NCP is far superior to manage this situation.</li> <li>This was a perfect example of why we have a Clean Water Act with Federal government taking the lead.</li> </ul>	
Focus Area: Lessons Learned	<b>Question 7:</b> Did your experience as the NIC in the SONS 2010 exercise prepare you for your role during this response? How would you improve the exercise to bring it more in alignment with your real world experiences?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RADM believes SONS 10 was a helpful exercise. Prior to it, he did not have a good understanding of the NIC role, SONS issues, the issues that arrive when you cross state lines, etc. It was very helpful.</li> <li>The exercise experience was able to help even before going down, when it came to figuring out how to manage across district boundaries.</li> <li>For the next SONS, the RADM would try to involve the cabinet level departments and agencies in the SONS exercise. They were ultimately missing some of the partners in DHS, DOD, DOI, Dept of Commerce, etc. Also, a potential scenario may be one where there is confusion between the response of the NCP and NRF.</li> <li>It is tough, as inside the beltway the main job is policies and resources, and they do not normally engage in operational exercises. But in a SONS, it is unavoidable that they will get involved. The key will be to figure out how to get the attention of these people to plan and play in the exercise.</li> </ul>	
Focus Area: ACP	<b>Question 8:</b> How should the USCG be involved in the determination of a WCD from an offshore oil platform?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If your agency is going to be the FOSC, you should be very involved in the WCD planning. Before a lease is granted, a ship comes in, anything that could potentially cause the event you would have to respond to, if your agency is responsible for the response, you should have involvement in that process. Need involvement before an event happens that you will be responsible for. The organization would hopefully have a say in developing the worst case discharge. Possibly use a tiered system for planning, based on probabilities.</li> <li>Think this is something that definitely needs to be looked at in response to deepwater drilling.</li> <li>There are 33 other deepwater wells. The RADM has no idea about the WCD data from the other wells. They would deal with a spill on one of them just like dealing with the DH incident. Look at scenarios and you come to the point that there are only so many USCG or State resources. There needs to be capability to reach back for further assistance.</li> </ul> <p><b>When should DOD be aware that you may be calling upon them, and how can coordination be improved?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RADM does not know if NORTHCOM or NGB had a notion before this that they would be called for an oil spill.</li> <li>There is only so much capacity within the affected states; typically they go to DOD when out of resources. The RADM remarked that maybe they should go to other states for assistance as well. They figured out how to coordinate with DOD eventually. USCG trained a lot of NG personnel. They were also able to coordinate with DOD the use of the air force base and C17 aircraft resources, as well as mobilizing other resources from parts of DOD with shared missions.</li> </ul>	

- The RADM mentioned that they probably could have mutual assistance from other nations also.
- The RADM says they were not limited in going overseas for assistance. Contrary to the media portrayal, the Jones Act made no difference. They were trying to incorporate the offshore drilling, fishermen, etc. into the oil spill response. They made a conscious decision to try and make VOOs work, since a lot of their work was destroyed by the spill. Looking back, the RADM thinks that maybe they should have done both VOOs and getting international assistance.
- Look at level of effort and we put a lot of effort into DOD, got little return. They did not put as much effort into international assistance, and maybe they should have. It may have been less effort than DOD, and they probably could have gotten more out of it. The RADM believes they put the right amount of effort into the VOO programs.

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Final Question 1: What were the top 2 "best practice(s)" during this incident, from your perspective?

- The UAC and structure below, even down to the branches was successfully set up. They had probably the most challenging external atmosphere that you could imagine, and they kept it together and moved forward.
- The relationship between the government and the RP was good.
- There was good professionalism on behalf of USCG. This was a huge maritime event and they had to mobilize a lot of mariners.
- The response occurred in dangerous conditions, but the safety record was good. No one was killed as a direct consequence of the response operations.

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Final Question 2: What do you assess to be the top 2 "areas needing improvement" (or downright "failures") from your perspective, and do you have any related recommendations regarding these areas?

- It was not realized that at a certain point you cannot stove pipe oil spills, they become larger disasters and cross into the emergency response arena, having a larger impact than just the environmental aspect.
- Political issues start to enter in and cause significant pressure on the response structure. The NIC was supposed to help alleviate this and run interference for the political inquiries. There are expectations that this has been included in planning, but pre-planning is needed that goes over how to deal with that in advance and not be playing catch-up.
  - We should probably design a system that leverages the political demands as part of the solution.
- The NCP and Stafford Act may need to be closer in alignment rather than just winging it. There are best practices from both types of responses. Bringing those things together and taking the best of both worlds would be helpful.

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**NRT reps were pushed aside by their cabinet level/administrators. Is this a clear assessment?**

- The NRT became something different for this spill than what we all understood it to be before.
- Daily NRT calls became updates for the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries. They hijacked the NRT logo for that, but the work got done.
- A question of interest would be: Was there benefit to bring this to the national level? The historic system is to push this down to the region as much as possible, and only discuss what is required at the national level.

**Early in your role as FOSC, you started to send out letters to BP to take a more active role in what they were doing as source control – why did you decide to take that role or was that just a public face on what had already been happening?**

- That was a period where they had been doing a variety of things to kill the well, and there were some real disappointments.
- We were having a lot of trouble explaining our role. We were hoping the interventions worked, and wanted to get more involved. We sent USCG personnel to Houston and the NIC got more involved, as well as Secretaries Salazar and Chu. ADM Allen was able to put together an interagency technical group.
- It was discussed what we could ask BP to do, and how much time to give them to respond. He also received recommendations from Secretary of the Interior. One of the main questions became: do we have the capacity to evaluate what they say they are going to do in response to this letter?
- The RADM changed the wording in the original letters, and then went ahead and signed them; he thinks it was a good outcome, and it changed the relationship between the government and BP. It also increased the level of effort and the

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whole industry became involved in coming up with solutions to try and cap the well.

- Went from being observers of the engineers and reactive to being proactive in response to source control.

**Had you considered going to other oil companies to add to the response organization?**

- OSROs were being tapped into quite regularly for both people and equipment. The moratorium on drilling may actually have helped free up resources.
- In Houston, were using the facilities and preempting competing resources.
- Some people suggested that you could bring in another oil company to take over the well, but we did not think that was ever intended in our regulations or training. The RP was doing what was expected of them, and was responsible to the needs of the response. The RADM does not think that there would have been anything more provided by any other oil company.

**In the UAC, covering multiple states, how did you deal with the state(s) not sending resources to UAC and ICP Houma – how did you make it a UC?**

- They lived with what we could get at the UAC, and pushed the primary state resources to ICP Houma and Mobile. We did a lot of telephone coordination and made visits to their locations.
- When the Governors became the SOSCs, we had to go to them, and make it work.

**Fisheries closures – what are the areas of concern?**

- The RADM brought up fisheries as an area of concern to look at in the future.
- There were a lot of questions on how decisions were reached on closures. It was not tied into the NCP as well as it should be. Closure decisions were made outside of the UAC; done independently by National Fisheries Service and Dept of Agriculture. There was not a good understanding on how those decisions were made. There were large closure areas with very little information released on why. The RADM does not know if this was politically driven, or otherwise.
- Once the fisheries were closed, the reopening was very difficult.
- It was one of those areas where you cannot have everything in the UC, but something with that much of an impact needed to be coordinated in the UAC. OSHA needed to be in the UAC, and they were brought in. Examples of tasks not needed to be coordinated in the UAC:
  - USACE working with their permitting process (worked out fine with having that process outside the UAC);
  - HHS, mental health, and establishment of medical facilities for the communities (could be handled outside)

**Signed a bunch of letters that are attachments to the NIC implementation strategy 4.0. Have had a centralized focus on states and near-shore impacts. If you look at all of the Contingency Plans, they bring in OSROs and they need to have adequate storage for oil. Storage became an issue – can you give us some background?**

- When the Discovery Enterprise was collecting oil with the top hat recovery system, it reached a crisis because we had to offload onto tankers (had limited storage capacity).
- Pulling in the FPSOs tanker systems from the North Sea was an increase in price to BP. There was a point in time that we were concerned when the flow rates were going up, more than we originally assumed, and the Discovery Enterprise was having this capacity issue, and we thought we were going to have to dump the collected oil back into the sea. The letter prompted getting the resources from the North Sea faster.