

Deposition Testimony of:

Nick Watson

Date: July 14, 2011

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Page 8:08 to 8:13

00008:08 Okay. Are you still working for
09 Transocean?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. Okay. How long have you worked
12 for Transocean?
13 A. Three years.

Page 9:13 to 9:20

00009:13 Q. All right. Now, when you
14 applied for Transocean to -- I'm sorry. When
15 you applied for a position with Transocean,
16 did you apply for a specific job or was it
17 just applying for any employment?
18 A. Labor job, just a roustabout.
19 Q. All right. Obviously, you were
20 hired.

Page 22:07 to 22:23

00022:07 Q. Now, you -- you -- you
08 constantly said in answering some of these
09 questions that was a long time ago. Are you
10 still a roustabout?
11 A. I'm still working for
12 Transocean. I'm still employed, so . . .
13 Q. Yeah, I know. But are you --
14 are you working?
15 A. No, I'm not working.
16 Q. Okay. So you haven't worked
17 since April?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't -- I
20 didn't understand that.
21 And that's because you've
22 sustained some injury?
23 A. Yes, sir.

Page 70:10 to 70:14

00070:10 Q. You and -- you and -- who's
11 "him"?
12 A. The crane operator.
13 Q. What's his name?
14 A. Dale Burkeen.

Page 74:18 to 74:19

00074:18 Q. Okay. All right. Now, so tell
19 us what happened next that evening.

Page 77:24 to 85:18

00077:24 At this point I stood over by
25 the -- I want to say the Oceaneering, by
00078:01 their -- by their lab or their equipment.
02 And I noticed maybe what I thought was rain
03 at one point. And I looked up, and I just
04 thought it was raining. And I noticed -- I
05 saw it getting a little bit thicker, so I
06 looked up again, and I saw that it was mud.
07 And so I said, Hey, Dale. And he said, you
08 know, Come on, Boo, because just -- we was,
09 like, pretty good close friends. And he
10 said -- and I said, Man, it's mud coming up
11 from the rig floor. And he stepped off, and
12 he saw that it was coming down.

13 And then it got to the point
14 where I couldn't see anything through my
15 glasses. My glasses was just full of it.
16 And I looked, and Dale was turning the crane
17 around, you know. And that -- then after
18 this you could hear -- you could hear -- you
19 could hear the sound coming from --

20 Q. Do you want a break?

21 A. (Moving head side to side.)

22 I heard a sound coming from the
23 starboard side from the exhaust which
24 normally has barite. And -- and it sound --
25 sounded like (indicating). And these hoses
00079:01 are normally facing toward the ocean floor.
02 These -- these hoses were parallel. There
03 was so much force coming through it. I
04 didn't know what it was, but I felt
05 uncomfortable. And I could see Dale, you
06 know, continue doing his job, swinging the
07 crane around. And I felt uncomfortable right
08 there. It was so much noise there. So I
09 headed over -- I moved toward the -- the
10 bridge, you know. But to go back -- I
11 heard -- when I told Dale that -- that mud
12 was coming down, I didn't know if the
13 bridge -- we was on the -- still on the same
14 channel, and I looked to see if they knew.
15 And I could see the bridge looking up at the
16 rig floor too. So I headed over there toward
17 the bridge, and I stood outside it, and it
18 was coming down heavy.

19 At one point I saw the company
20 man come out. I was standing here at the
21 bridge. You go down this passage, and you
22 come out the living quarters. And the
23 company man came out. He -- there was so
24 much mud, he fell down, and that probably --
25 maybe saved his life from -- I don't -- I
00080:01 can't speculate.

02 The next point, we had a

03 blackout (indicating). The next thing you
04 know (indicating), that blast knocked me
05 down, shook me up. I mean, I had to get
06 myself together. Once I got myself together,
07 I got up, disoriented, looked around. People
08 were running past getting -- you know, stuff
09 falling down.

10 I looked for Dale. I looked and
11 Dale was trying to -- trying to get out of
12 the crane because fire -- the -- the blast
13 came out -- the heat, which I thought
14 engulfed me because I felt it on my neck, I
15 thought was coming my way. I thought I was
16 burned up. But it just came up -- came my
17 way and went up. But where Dale was, where
18 that force was, it shot up like an inferno
19 toward him, and I was just hollering, Dale,
20 get out of there, get out of there.

21 And he was trying to get around
22 the stairs, spiral stairs, where he lost his
23 hat. And, you know, I watched him clear down
24 the stairs until he got below that deck. And
25 I just thought he made it. And I said --

00081:01 once I saw that he -- where I thought he
02 made -- made it, only then I went down those
03 stairs, and I said -- because it was still
04 exploding. I went down the stairs, and they
05 were telling us to get on the lifeboat
06 deck -- on lifeboat. And one of my helpers
07 was saying, you know, Nick, man, let's -- you
08 know, are we going to fight this fire? I
09 said, Man, there's nothing we can do. It's a
10 roustabout's job to suit up and go fight the
11 fire. And I said, Man, there's nothing we
12 can do for that.

13 So we got in the boat. They
14 were telling us to get on. And it wasn't
15 normal, but it was so much chaos, people got
16 on. And then we was told to get right back
17 off of it maybe two or three times, losing
18 valuable time, because the AD would normally
19 be there directing, you know, checking off
20 names, but it was so much chaos. It was
21 just, you know, no order.

22 So people were -- you know, I
23 don't know what was going on outside, because
24 at that point, you know, I was inside.

25 Because you had to go around and fill up
00082:01 every -- every seat, and there was some empty
02 spaces. So, you know, I don't know what was
03 going on, but, you know, it took a while.
04 The explosion was just getting closer and
05 closer to us. And finally people were saying
06 launch the boat. And the personnel from the
07 bridge were -- you know, he was under so much
08 duress from people, you know, hollering at

09 him to launch the boat. And, you know, he
10 asked the AB, because the ABs are -- pretty
11 much on Sundays trained with the AD. So he
12 got up there and helped him and calmed him
13 down. And we prayed. We lowered the boat.
14 We disconnected and made sure the D-ring
15 wasn't attached, and we headed out.

16 I asked did anybody have a radio
17 and called the BANKSTON and headed that way.
18 We finally attached to the BANKSTON. It took
19 forever. We was just bamming against it.
20 The seas were calm, but they were just -- I
21 don't know if the BANKSTON just -- you know,
22 we were just bouncing against it and finally
23 locked up.

24 We had injured people onboard.

25 Us -- people -- you know, there were -- it
00083:01 was so much -- it was so tight in there. You
02 know, I'm sure people were being -- you know,
03 just hurting because you had to try to move
04 them around. You know, I know they were just
05 hurting, you know.

06 We got them -- got -- we were
07 thinking about getting -- I think he was a
08 VIP -- try to get him out first, but it was
09 just -- we knew we was probably just going to
10 hurt this man, so we just -- he was out --
11 taken out last, if I can remember.

12 There was an elderly
13 woman. She worked with the catering crew.
14 She was hurt. She asked me -- you know, she
15 said she couldn't walk, so I helped her off.
16 Helped her up the net to climb that ladder to
17 get up to that boat. It's kind of high, she
18 couldn't do it.

19 And behind me those
20 guys were helping that VIP off, you know.
21 They got him up. And we got on the boat.
22 And I got up there. And, you know, my -- the
23 other -- the other crane operator said, You
24 know -- you know where Dale?

25 I said, You know,
00084:01 I -- he was in -- he's in that lifeboat. He
02 was in your lifeboat. Because I'm in No. 1,
03 and he would be in the other one. Because
04 that's the only reason I went down, because I
05 thought he just made it safe.

06 He said, No, I hadn't
07 seen him yet. So I didn't think nothing of
08 it and then started -- you know, I started
09 looking around. And I went over to the side,
10 you know, see what's -- you know, to see
11 where -- maybe he was in the other lifeboat,
12 because there was some more people. And
13 everybody was aboard.

14 And I -- I think, if

15 I can remember the chief mate, you know, he
16 told me that he saw him on the deck dead, you
17 know, so . . .

18 He said that --

19 Q. Go ahead.

20 A. He said that he tried to get
21 him. You know, I said, I wish I had known.
22 I would have tried to help you.

23 So after that pretty much our
24 crew just spaced out. We watched that rig
25 burn. You know, guys on there just watching
00085:01 them burn, so . . .

02 And the Coast Guard came. You
03 know, fly -- people started flying overhead.
04 You can see boats coming in.

05 And, you know, we was just, you
06 know -- I just was in my -- you know, just --
07 just some -- another world.

08 And people wanted -- the Coast
09 Guard dropped a guy in the water. He came
10 aboard. He -- from the back he went up there
11 and talked to the boat captain and -- I'm not
12 sure what was said. And then they started
13 taking off injured people, you know, mangled
14 or whatever.

15 And from that point we sat there
16 and just watched -- watched that rig burn.
17 You know, that was rough. You know,
18 everybody just sat there.

Page 128:22 to 129:23

00128:22 Q. All right. Okay. So I'll ask
23 you about another sentence on this document.
24 You see down towards the bottom where it says
25 QHSE?

00129:01 A. Yes, ma'am.

02 Q. And, again, this is
03 Exhibit 3928. There's a statement,
04 "Participate in emergency drills and respond
05 to emergency situations as per designation
06 on" the "station bill"; is that correct?

07 A. Yes, ma'am.

08 Q. Did you participate in emergency
09 drills?

10 A. On Sundays. Everyone did drills
11 every Sunday.

12 Q. Okay. Did -- did you have any
13 role in emergency response?

14 A. No. Like you said, that station
15 bill tells you what your job bills, your
16 tasks and who -- the people that are in
17 charge, what are their jobs as well.

18 Q. Okay. So did you have any role
19 in firefighting?

20 A. Firefighting --
21 Q. You did?
22 A. -- as a roustabout, you would be
23 required to fight the fire.

Page 136:08 to 138:22

00136:08 Q. Did you ever -- did you -- did
09 you feel comfortable reporting safety issues
10 to your supervisors?
11 A. Yes, ma'am.
12 Q. Did you ever feel pressure not
13 to report a safety issue?
14 A. No, ma'am.
15 Q. Did you ever fear any
16 consequences if you were to report a safety
17 issue either to a Transocean employee or to
18 be a BP employee?
19 A. No, ma'am.
20 Q. Now, the sentence right below
21 that on Tab 1 says, "Attend the weekly safety
22 meetings. Actively participate in all
23 pre-job meetings as required."
24 Now, these weekly safety
25 meetings, are those the drills that we were
00137:01 talking about earlier or is it something
02 different?
03 A. Well, you have -- I don't
04 understand. I can't say what that meant.
05 But on our rig we had as a crew a safety
06 meeting amongst ourselves -- that might be
07 that weekly one -- to discuss issues or
08 incidents, whatever we may have seen or go
09 over incidents around the fleet and just
10 learn from those problems as a group. Daily,
11 just, you know, morning safety meetings.
12 Q. Okay. Getting back to the --
13 the possibly weekly safety meetings that you
14 just mentioned, who conducts those meetings?
15 A. We do it as a group. Anyone --
16 it can be myself or anyone can -- you know,
17 the crane operators sit in. They act as like
18 overseers. They let us, you know, take
19 charge. They just sit back, and they may
20 come in on an incident around the fleet, and
21 we just go and get incidents from off the
22 board and find what happened, bring it in
23 there. And we would read over them just to
24 learn from mistakes that may have happened.
25 Q. Okay. Who would attend these
00138:01 meetings?
02 A. Crew members, crane operators.
03 And the deck foreman could, you know, come in
04 there at -- you know, if it was day or night.
05 Sometime it would be nighttime, you know.

06 Q. Okay. You just talked about
07 getting incidents off the board. What --
08 what does that mean?

09 A. Things that may have happened
10 around the fleet or -- you know, it depends
11 on what happened. So, you know, whatever
12 happened. RSTC would put them on the board,
13 and we would just see what happened. We
14 would go over those same incidents in the
15 meeting -- daily meetings also. But we would
16 just get those off, go over them, talk about
17 them. In our paperwork the OIM would read
18 over them, and this would go probably to
19 the -- you know, from my understanding, even
20 the rig manager in town would, you know, see
21 that we went over those alerts or whatever
22 problems.

Page 154:04 to 156:08

00154:04 Q. Okay. All right. I'll turn you
05 to Tab 14. I will mark this as Exhibit 3933.
06 (Exhibit No. 3933 marked for
07 identification.)

08 EXAMINATION BY MS. BRANSCOME:

09 Q. This is actually a few documents
10 together, but if -- we'll look at the last
11 page first. It goes in -- in sort of reverse
12 order, so if you'll look at the last page of
13 the documents.

14 And this is an e-mail on
15 February 1, 2010, from John Guide to
16 Paul Johnson; is that correct?

17 A. Yes, ma'am.

18 Q. And this is talking about a
19 bonus that was awarded to the HORIZON rig
20 crew for safe delivery of the Kodiak well; is
21 that right?

22 A. Yes, ma'am.

23 Q. And in this e-mail from
24 John Guide, it talks about BP wanted to
25 reward both safety and performance. Do you
00155:01 see that?

02 A. Are you talking about the
03 \$2,000?

04 Q. Yes.

05 A. Yes, ma'am.

06 Q. And the last sentence of that
07 first paragraph, John Guide writes, "I am
08 extremely pleased with the HORIZONS
09 operational performance on Kodiak #2, more
10 over, the safety culture has taken the next
11 step to ensure every task is incident free."

12 Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, ma'am.

14 Q. And you received a \$2,000 bonus
15 from BP?

16 A. I received a lot of bonuses. I
17 can't really say. I mean, if it's here I
18 guess it's true.

19 Q. Well, sure. If you'd like to
20 look, it's on -- the page ending in 638,
21 about three-quarters of the way down, still
22 in the same tab.

23 A. So we're -- okay.

24 Q. And you understood when you
25 received that bonus from BP that they were
00156:01 awarding safe operations at the Kodiak well;
02 is that correct?

03 A. Yes, ma'am.

04 Q. And that the bonus could be
05 reduced if there were any safety violations
06 that occurred while you-all -- all were on
07 the Kodiak prospect; is that right?

08 A. Yes, ma'am.

Page 161:11 to 162:05

00161:11 Q. I just have a few more questions
12 for you, Mr. Watson.

13 When you were on the rig, do you
14 understand that you had the authority to stop
15 a job if you were to see anything that was
16 unsafe about that job?

17 A. Yes, ma'am.

18 Q. Do you understand that to be an
19 obligation, that you actually should stop a
20 job, not just that you have the right to do
21 it?

22 A. I can't say I heard it in that
23 phrase, but I just know I have the right to
24 stop it.

25 Q. Well, I'll ask you personally.
00162:01 If you were to see a job being done and there
02 was any safety concerns in your mind about
03 the way the job was being done, would you
04 stop that job?

05 A. Yes, ma'am.

Page 168:08 to 169:12

00168:08 Q. If I told you, sir, that the --
09 the -- the letters "TOFS" stood for "time out
10 for safety," does that sound like it's
11 something that would stand for to you, sir?

12 A. It does now.

13 Q. Okay. And you've heard the
14 phrase "time out for safety"; is that right?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. And I think you were just asked

17 some questions about the authority to stop a
18 job?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. And that's referred to as a time
21 out for safety on the rig; isn't that right?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. And that was a policy on the
24 rig, wasn't it, Mr. Watson?

25 A. Yes, sir.

00169:01 Q. That was something that you and
02 everybody else was empowered to do. If you
03 saw something was unsafe, you could call that
04 timeout for safety; isn't that right?

05 A. Yes, sir.

06 Q. And you had seen that be -- been
07 done by other people; isn't that true?

08 A. Yes, sir.

09 Q. And if you saw something unsafe,
10 you wouldn't hesitate to call a timeout for
11 safety; isn't that right?

12 A. Yes, sir.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: OIL SPILL) MDL NO. 2179
BY THE OIL RIG)
"DEEPWATER HORIZON" IN) SECTION "J"
THE GULF OF MEXICO, ON)
APRIL 20, 2010) JUDGE BARBIER
MAG. JUDGE SHUSHAN

VOLUME 1

Deposition of JAMES ANGUS
WATSON, IV, taken at Pan-American Building,
601 Poydras Street, 11th Floor, New Orleans,
Louisiana, 70130, on the 19th day of
December, 2012.

1 THE STATE OF LOUISIANA :
 2 PARISH OF ORLEANS :

3 I, PHYLLIS WALTZ, a Certified Court Reporter,
 4 Registered Professional Reporter, and
 5 Certified Realtime Reporter in and for the
 6 State of Louisiana, do hereby certify that
 7 the facts as stated by me in the caption
 8 hereto are true; that the above and foregoing
 9 answers of the witness, JAMES ANGUS WATSON,
 10 IV, to the interrogatories as indicated were
 11 made before me by the said witness after
 12 being first duly sworn to testify the truth,
 13 and same were reduced to typewriting under my
 14 direction; that the above and foregoing
 15 deposition as set forth in typewriting is a
 16 full, true, and correct transcript of the
 17 proceedings had at the time of taking of said
 18 deposition.

19 I further certify that I am not, in any
 20 capacity, a regular employee of the party in
 21 whose behalf this deposition is taken, nor in
 22 the regular employ of his attorney; and I
 23 certify that I am not interested in the
 24 cause, nor of kin or counsel to either of the
 25 parties.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, on
 this, the 19TH day of DECEMBER, 2012.

Phyllis Waltz

PHYLLIS WALTZ, RPR, CRR
 TEXAS CSR, TCRR NO. 6813
 Expiration Date: 12/31/13
 LOUISIANA CCR NO. 2011010
 Expiration Date: 12/31/12
 NEW MEXICO CCR NO. 610
 Expiration Date: 12/31/12



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I, JAMES ANGUS WATSON, IV, have read the foregoing deposition and hereby affix my signature that same is true and correct, except as noted above.

James A. Watson, IV

JAMES ANGUS WATSON, IV, VOLUME 1

STATE OF ~~LOUISIANA~~)
PARISH OF *Dist of Columbia*

Before me, _____,
on this day personally appeared JAMES ANGUS WATSON, IV, known to me, or proved to me under oath or through *Govt ID* (description of identity card or other document)), to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.

Given under my hand and seal of office on this, the *25* day of *JANUARY*, *2013*.

Cheryl V. Brown

NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

My Commission Expires:

CHERYL V. BROWN
NOTARY PUBLIC
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: MARCH 14, 2013

Name of Deponent	Title	Date	Vol	Citation	Statement	Correction
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	13:19-20	He is currently attorney at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters.	He is currently <u>an</u> attorney at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	21:16-17	No. I was -- I was two jobs for part of that time.	No. I was -- I was <u>holding</u> two jobs for part of that time.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	43:9-11	The -- there -- the NIC received some authorities, not all, that were assigned by the Secretary of Homeland Security.	The -- there -- the NIC received some <u>FOSC</u> authorities, not all, that were assigned by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	46:11	also placed the <u>FOC</u> in charge of	also placed the <u>FOSC</u> in charge of
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	54:16-17	It's -- it's hard for me to say any.	It's -- it's hard for me to say any <u>important decisions</u> .
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	57:16-17	-- of any RP, not including BP	-- of <u>a RP, including BP</u>
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	59:11-12	there <u>was</u> different priorities and different resources	there <u>were</u> different priorities and different resources
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	62:8-9	incident commander <u>in</u> the FOSCR	incident commander <u>and</u> the FOSCR
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	65:21-22	His <u>was</u> similar to my duties as deputy.	His <u>duties were</u> similar to my duties as deputy.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	78:25-79:4	I can recall there <u>was informal discussions</u> , but I can't re- -- that <u>ultimately didn't</u> result in resources, but I don't recall specifically what they were right now.	I can recall there <u>were informal discussions that ultimately didn't</u> result in resources, but I don't recall specifically what they were right now.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	85:7-8	There <u>is</u> probably a couple of reasons that come to mind.	There <u>are</u> probably a couple of reasons that come to mind.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	85:14-17	And I had recently participated in an exercise that early spring <u>as the National Incident Commander in the National Incident Commander</u> role during the exercise.	And I had recently participated in an exercise that early spring <u>in the National Incident Commander role</u> during the exercise.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	94:12:00	There <u>was</u> a lot of people	There <u>were</u> a lot of people
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	123:10-13	because there <u>was</u> situations that occurred on a periodic basis in which it was the only method that we -- we had to deal with an oil slick.	because there <u>were</u> situations that occurred on a periodic basis in which it was the only method that we -- we had to deal with an oil slick.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	134:9-13	There was a <u>concerned</u> expressed by the parish presidents, and it was also a -- an interest of, I think, the deputy secretary that we establish better communications with the parish presidents.	There was a <u>concern</u> expressed by the parish presidents, and it was also a -- an interest of, I think, the deputy secretary that we establish better communications with the parish presidents.

Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	135:9-16	Well, there -- there was an interest in making sure that the parish presidents were not surprised by media news, and so by this time there had been established that -- that liaison network to -- it was -- evidently I was requesting him to set up a telephone conference call, to use that structure to <u>communication</u> that information that night.	Well, there -- there was an interest in making sure that the parish presidents were not surprised by media news, and so by this time there had been established that -- that liaison network to -- it was -- evidently I was requesting him to set up a telephone conference call, to use that structure to <u>communicate</u> that information that night.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	152:6-8	Well, we were always interested in having <u>a</u> end state where the well was sealed.	Well, we were always interested in having <u>an</u> end state where the well was sealed.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	165:20-22	We were, you know, also concerned about what -- you know, <u>having single</u> means of failure.	We were <u>also</u> concerned about having <u>a single</u> means of failure.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	176:6-11	well, primarily the government people overseeing that developed usually fairly thick pages of thick booklets, a lot of them came <u>in in</u> binders like this, which were very detailed procedures that would ultimately get up to the FOSC level	well, primarily the government people overseeing that developed usually fairly thick pages of thick booklets, a lot of them came <u>in</u> binders like this, which were very detailed procedures that would ultimately get up to the FOSC level
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	177:19-21	we got concerned that we -- that what was provided <u>previous</u> was based on a lower flow estimate	we got concerned that we -- that what was provided <u>previously</u> was based on a lower flow estimate
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	183:1-3	I don't know specifically, but the overall intent of all the federal actions <u>were</u> to stay coordinated.	I don't know specifically, but the overall intent of all the federal actions <u>was</u> to stay coordinated.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	193:15-20	Well, as I -- as I described before, I -- my concern was that we -- we stick to a Unified Command type of a -- of a process that <u>involved de- -- deliberate</u> planning and sequence of -- that the engineers were already involved in.	Well, as I -- as I described before, I -- my concern was that we -- we stick to a Unified Command type of a -- of a process that <u>involved the deliberate</u> planning and sequence of -- that the engineers were already involved in.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	200:12-20	and you say in this email, <u>my initial read... to come up with anything</u> . Did you see that?	and you say in this email, " <u>my initial read... to come up with anything</u> ." Did you see that? (quotes added)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	201:20-21	paragraph, I had hoped... kill line.	paragraph, "I had hoped... kill line." (quotes added)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	207:11:00	<u>were</u> 't thinking	<u>were</u> thinking
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	215:7-8	At some point in time, yes, I <u>do</u> .	At some point in time, yes, I <u>did</u> . (The question was in past tense)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	220:21-23	And after some questions and <u>answered</u> , I felt like the -- the risks were acceptable.	And after some questions and <u>answers</u> , I felt like the -- the risks were acceptable.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	221:22-25	Well, I think that that goes into <u>a whole nother</u> level of analysis as to whether you actually were going to use the capping stack to shut in the well.	Well, I think that that goes into <u>a whole other</u> level of analysis as to whether you actually were going to use the capping stack to shut in the well.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	224:21:00	<u>that, had</u> been proposed	<u>that which</u> had been proposed
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	227:22	I don't <u>think so he</u> overtly	I don't <u>think he</u> overtly

Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	233:8-9	Well, there was -- there <u>was</u> two reasons.	Well, there was -- there <u>were</u> two reasons.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	237:12-14	Well, this was probably a -- one of -- I did -- we had a lot of <u>correspondents</u> about dispersants.	Well, this was probably a -- one of -- I did -- we had a lot of <u>correspondence</u> about dispersants.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	244:3-7	paragraph, <u>My approval...into the GOM</u>	paragraph, " <u>My approval ...into the GOM</u> " (quotes added)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	245:16-18	It was just <u>mixed in the with</u> the air -- it was a surface dispersant application.	It was just <u>mixed in with</u> the air -- it was a surface dispersant application.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	246:24:00	<u>FOC</u>	<u>FOSC</u>
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	248:24 - 249:4	There -- there were constant improvements to our processes, and the quantity thing more had to do with -- with process and communications than -- Q. What do you mean by that? A. -- any kind of <u>deliberate or misapplication</u> .	A. -- any kind of <u>deliberate act or misapplication</u> .
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	249:14-15	there was <u>a</u> over application beyond the final approval.	there was <u>an</u> over application beyond the final approval.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	254:2-3	And I would make a <u>decision communication</u> that back to Houma.	And I would make a <u>decision and communication</u> that back to Houma.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	256:20-22	Not on every application, but on a certain percentage of the applications there <u>was</u> boats.	Not on every application, but on a certain percentage of the applications there <u>were</u> boats.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	265:6-9	I had conversations with the incident commander, and I was assured that there <u>was</u> protocols in place on the quantity of dispersants.	I had conversations with the incident commander, and I was assured that there <u>were</u> protocols in place on the quantity of dispersants.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	267:20-21	I don't <u>know</u> I would characterize it.	I don't <u>know how</u> I would characterize it.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	270:22 - 271:2	And then sometimes they realized that they had used up their limit earlier in the day for some other operation and then were -- and then were -- had shut down, but couldn't <u>sustain that without the VO -- they saw the VOCs going up.</u>	And then sometimes they realized that they had used up their limit earlier in the day for some other operation and then were -- and then were -- had shut down, but couldn't <u>sustain subsea dispersants being shutdown without the VO -- they saw the VOCs going up.</u>
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	327:23-24	A. And I'm sure there <u>is</u> many others.	A. And I'm sure there <u>are</u> many others.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	358:17-19	There <u>was</u> other VoOs that might have been used just as a single vessel working with, say, in situ burning.	There <u>were</u> other VOOs that might have been used just as a single vessel working with, say, in situ burning.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	401:20	taking <u>anything</u> you said	taking <u>anything</u> you said
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	471:18-19	A. Oh, the incident command posts <u>was</u> at Houma and Mobile.	A. Oh, the incident command posts <u>were</u> at Houma and Mobile.

Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	495:7-12	This -- this was an area that there <u>was</u> people that were very dedicated to getting dispersant applications right because it was a -- an issue that involved trading off environmental damage, basically.	This -- this was an area that there <u>were</u> people that were very dedicated to getting dispersant applications right because it was a -- an issue that involved trading off environmental damage, basically.
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