

From: Brown, Alicia  
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2010 12:41:54 PM  
To: Watson, James RADM  
Subject: RE: Interview Transcript

Attachments: Watson072910.doc

Corrections made...

V/r,

Alicia

-----Original Message-----

From: Watson, James RADM  
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2010 11:55 AM  
To: Brown, Alicia  
Subject: FW: Interview Transcript

RADM Jim Watson  
Deputy Commander,  
USCG Atlantic Area Command  
(757) 398-6686  
<http://cglantareadirectorofoperations.blogspot.com/>

-----Original Message-----

From: dmsmith74@email.phoenix.edu [mailto:dmsmith74@email.phoenix.edu]  
Sent: Saturday, August 07, 2010 7:49 PM  
To: Watson, James RADM  
Subject: Interview Transcript

Jim


Attached is the transcript of our interview.

If you have any changes, please feel free to make them.

Thanks again for participating.


Mike

Duane 'Mike' Smith  
703-727-3334 (c)



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HCG367-002183



*Interviewer:* Okay, so the recorder has been started. The first thing I wanted to do is to reaffirm that I have your consent to participate in this study?

*Interviewee:* You do.

*Interviewer:* And that you understand that I will maintain your confidentiality.

*Interviewee:* Great.

*Interviewer:* And, last, this is going to be recorded.

*Interviewee:* Okay, good.

*Interviewer:* And what I will do at the end of this is I'll transcribe this interview, and I'll send you a copy of this transcription, and you're free to make any revised extra marks as the good congressman might say.

*Interviewee:* Okay.

*Interviewer:* So, as I indicated before, the purpose of this study is determining a leadership model that is perceived as \_\_\_ effective community control of multi-agents and response operations. So, maybe you could start off with a little bit of a background, just a brief history of your experience in this area.

*Interviewee:* Oh, in the entire area of -?

*Interviewer:* Multi-agency, or direct response operations.

*Interviewee:* So, not, specifically, to Deepwater Horizon?

*Interviewer:* Right. Just an overview of your -

*Interviewee:* Well, it started back in Seattle, I guess, [laughter]. I had pretty much been in technical jobs until then, and arrived there, and we were writing contingency plans post OPA ninety there. I was the OPA 90 planner. And the planning shop in Seattle, and then we had a couple of oil spills, and oil spills by nature - even before OPA 90, I think we're a multi-agency, state, local, federal, multiple federal agencies, and, of course, a responsible party. Then we responded to a few incidents out there. Then I moved onto Savannah, had a couple of flooding cases there, groundings, and then a pretty significant tank farm fire and spill, right before I left the command.

And went to San Diego, where things got interesting because it was such a big navy town, and we wanted to navy up to speed on multiple agency OPA ninety type responses. So, we ran them through an exercise, one of the prep exercises as the sponsoring organization. And then there was a lot of smaller spills there, nothing on the scale that I had experienced in Seattle or Savannah.

And then after that, I got another tour in Miami, and, actually applied a lot of those concepts to port security – homeland security in post 911. I was in Miami in 2001 until 2004. And the model worked pretty well there. There's a fair amount of those concepts also in the hurricane plans that we have, the contingency plans and the types of activities associated with hurricanes. When 911 happened, we actually pulled our hurricane plan off the shelf because we necessarily needed to involve Group Miami as part of an organizational structure and some of the Coast Guard's partners we could put together, which, ultimately became the model we're using today for the sector.

But the external part, I'd say we borrowed the concepts from both the oil spill contingency plans and hurricane plans for really, virtually, the whole four years I was there doing interagency operations, both with other federal agencies, before there was Department of Homeland Security, and then afterwards, and then along side state and local partners. And we had exercises, as well as some real events that were kind of interesting, ships arriving with actual bad guys on them – no terrorist, but there was a turnover of regimes in Haiti, for example, and a lot of the characters hijacked the ship and ended up in Miami. That was one interesting case we dealt with, among others.

Then I ended up in Atlantic Area, some staff assignments in between as director of operations this past year, and the two significant events of this year were the Haiti op following the earthquake there, which I managed from Portsmouth, here, as a supporting command to a kind of a collation, at least a joint operation, I guess from a military perspective. But we had a lot of activity involving the Department of State, U.S.A. ID, other navies and NGOs that were providing humanitarian support to Haiti and tried to coordinate the maritime elements of that with the management of the port, as well as the flow of cargo in coordination with the security and humanitarian response effort in Haiti.

Then shortly after that, it seemed like it seemed like when the Deep Water Horizon event occurred, I went down initially to be

the deputy to Admiral Mary Landry, who was the district commander, got there about a week into it. She had set up a unified area command, the national incident commander did not exist initially when I was there, but came about fairly soon after I arrived. There were already two incident command posts, one in Houma and one in Mobile that were primarily extension of the sectors there. And then June 1<sup>st</sup> came, which is the beginning of hurricane season, so Admiral Landry went back to being the district commander in the event that the district would be involved with two simultaneous disasters, one, being the oil spill; one being a hurricane. We said we'd better divide and conquer.

So I moved up into the federal on scene coordinator role and CG lead for the unified area command. And she went back to district and I stayed in that role until, I think it was the 16<sup>th</sup>, something like that, of July. And we ultimately expanded to having two more incident command posts, smaller ones, but one in Miami, and one in Galveston for the Texas and Florida AORs. So we ended up with four ICPS, one unified area command, and we had a fairly large, I guess, functional command post in Houston for the engineers and technical people, including the coastguard, marine safety center, and center of expertise folks that dealt with the well control activities. So that was kind of our organizational structure, and it was very much inner agency, inner governmental, and a lot of non-governmental organizations, particular, and including BP. So, I'll stop there.

*Interviewer:* Okay. Well, good – good strong background. So as a leader of disaster work response operations, what are those things that you perceive as a key factor or factors, relating to your ability to establish successful and effective command and control structure?

*Interviewee:* Well, the key thing, I think, is to have some common system. We call the incident command system. I think for all of these, although, I guess that Haiti didn't exactly have that, but we used it here, internal to the coast guard. And I think we helped the situation where you have the defense construct in trying to work with The State Department construct, neither of which have the incident command system as their command and control doctrine. But it's so flexible that it seemed to easily bridge the gap and kind of help connect things together. But that's real important.

I think the other thing is to have the legislative underpinnings to cause organizations to feel compelled to work for a unified command. I think if we weren't able to constantly make reference to that, there's going to be a tendency in these trying situations for

a break up of the organization, or splinters, even with legislation that the legislation is always going to be a little bit incomplete, and you have to get some of the participants there because it's in their interest to be there. So I'd say those are the two major things. You know people only do what is in their own interest.

*Interviewer:* But this is really related to your ability more so –

*Interviewee:* My ability, what's my ability? That's good.

*Interviewer:* What are the key factors that relate to your ability to establish that command?

*Interviewee:* Well, I think, you know, probably my toolbox of skills, I've been in a job involving both prevention and response just because of my career path, but has forced me to accomplish the missions that I've had, to get people to go along with a requirement that usually the coast guard has developed. I'm thinking of basic ship design standards, or inspection requirements, or captain of the port laws and regulations. And it involves a lot of just personal skills because most of the people that we deal with are not harden criminals. It's not a cops and robbers kind of a career path. It's more of a compliance and coalition's career path.

And then when the circumstances transition from prevention to response, you're typically dealing with the same population of maritime related people and activities. And, so, I think that bag of tricks that I use for everyday prevention carries over into compelling people to go with a response plan, and it works two ways. I think the unified commander benefits from a wide variety to skill sets that could never be in just one organization. So, you know, I learned that a long time ago too.

So I think those are probably the characteristics that I bring is just that experience, and the confidence that, you know, asking people from outside of my own organization, or using a method of leadership that's not centered on a specific hierarchy based on coast guard ranks and change of command, but having confidence that less than military structured organization is going to actually accomplish the goal even better than if it was a purely military type of response. That's one thing that I'm a firm believer in and I think that definitely helps in these kinds of situations to bring that mindset to the table.

*Interviewer:* Is there a form of command control organization that you see as being effective, and maybe organizations is not the right way to

say it, but you have indicated the military hierarchy was not what you saw as the model to use, so what is the model that you see as the most effective?

*Interviewee:*

Well, I'm a fan of this incident command system, which comes really from the firefighters, which was forced upon them in a way when they have to go to mutual assistance, and they have to bring different fire departments together, which each of which could be considered little militaries, but there's only so much of them. And, so, they have to combine efforts, and then you get into the jurisdictional issues between federal, state, and local. And so we ended up adopting that and it's turned out to be a good decision, I think, since we've done that.

I think the **tense** of that is to – it's got a single set of terminology, and then it's modular, so you can work for a small incident and build up to a gigantic incident like the Deepwater Horizon thing. And, you know, I think there is training available for just about anybody that wants it from any level of government or even there's a lot of contractors, and commercial entities, non-governmental organizations that have ready access to training. So that's, I think, you know, a good structure.

As far as military, I think looking beyond these things that we have domestically, and looking at some of the coalition operations that we've got going worldwide now, say, for piracy, coast guards involved with a lot of different law enforcement activities, and involving fishing enforcement. We're doing things up in the Arctic with the coalitions. I know we've got some operations up above the Arctic Circle in Canada. I was over in Europe.

There needs to be something, I think, in the future, and in fact, right now, for some of these operations, which enables military organizations to do joint operations with each other in non-war fighting scenarios, and, also, to integrate non-governmental organizations that don't have a military, and probably would never would want to have a military structure to them because it would run counter to their purpose. So I think that there's real value in capturing the lessons learned from these natural disasters, or these contingency operations that the coast guard gets involved in, whether it's a hurricane, or an oil spill, or what have you.

*Interviewer:*

So you talked there about those things that allowed you to be more effect as a leader of a multi-response, but those same experiences, what are those factors you identify that would probably adverse the

ability the impact to establish an effective organization, effective community control.

*Interviewee:* Characteristics that I have that add –?

*Interviewer:* Well, not so much characteristics that you have, but characteristics that you see, or things that you consciously, maybe, avoid \_\_\_\_\_ a bad message or something. But I mean some things that you have seen that either you did it and said, "Oh, I'll never do that, again." Or you saw somebody else do it and thought, "Oh, I'll make sure not to do that."

*Interviewee:* Right. Right. Well, there's certainly – you look back on every one of these things and you say, "Boy, there's things I wish I could of rewind the tape and done differently," 20/20 hindsight, you know. But to generalize those things and what categories they fall under –

*Interviewer:* Well, they can be specific, and you know –

*Interviewee:* Probably, one of the things that comes to mind is we learned a lesson in Exxon Valdez that I keep thinking of the message that I got when I was in Seattle shortly after OPA 90 was written and it was the "shoot first, answer questions later," message. And it's kind has always popped up that you don't really ever bring enough to bear early on. Maybe you always are a little bit too optimistic that a bad situation isn't really that bad. So you pull back a little bit and, typically, then you wish you would of had more sooner, and it probably would have been a lot of cheaper, which was usually the reason why you're not – why you're holding back in the first place.

Of course it's difficult to assess these things, and I suppose there's going to be cases where you overshoot, but I'd say most of the cases I've been is we undershot. And it would be easy to answer the questions later, had we brought more, rather than less. So that's one thing that kind of comes to mind across these different incidents. The other, I think, is you definitely need to have the best you can get as far as managing the external messages. You kind of have a focus on the actual mission, the actual task, whether it's recover the oil, or provide humanitarian support to the Haitians, you know, whatever it might be, all the 911 things, and some of the external messaging is a bit of an afterthought, and sometimes you end up playing catch-up in the media, or with the inter-governmental affairs.

And creating a unified command, or using ICS in the first place, definitely helps with the organizations that are participating in the response, but there's always going to be a whole lot more that are very interested, but not directly. And, so, they wind up needing a significant flow of information.

*Interviewer:* So, along those lines, you talked about unified commands. So, from your perspective, how would you define unified command, and how it executes and has affected us?

*Interviewee:* Well, you know, what I envision, first of all, is you typically have at least two, and normally more, commanders – multiple commanders. And most of these things, somebody, one of those two, or three, or four, or however many there are, commanders, is the person that has the – that's where you need the legislation, or you need some higher authority to say, okay, this guy, if you can't decide that this guy has 51 percent vote. But that's sort of the basic constructive unified command. If you have a very small incident, that may be all you need. If you have a larger one, then it grows out from there.

But no matter where it goes, like, in the case of Deepwater Horizon, you have four incident command posts, each one of those subordinate command posts is modeled the same way, which is another unified command just in national on down, and it went down even further than that. So that's basic construct of a unified command. And there's unified commands that are obviously, purely military, you know, we've done a lot of war fighting – with unified commands, you see using a different command and control structure.

*Interviewer:* You raised an interesting point, a unified command, when you think of it in a military sense; the co-COMs are a unified command. The unified command, not unified commanders, they have each of the agencies that have been involved with them provide advice and how to best use those resources, but there's one boss. Do you see that same model translated into the unified command within a NIMS structure, or it is – and that boss says rotate, but if it's effective as an \_\_\_\_ operation, it doesn't say that a four star cook is no longer the boss of the – the leading guy is the boss. So how does that fit within that new structure, from your perspective?

*Interviewee:* Yeah, I'd say the COCOMs have a much stronger hierarchy based leading to a single boss. It's a standing organization, whereas ours is going to be stood up and stood down with the incident. It really

is focused on the incident. I think we almost misuse the concept of NIMS when we try to make a permanent standing organization and say we're going to NIMS as the organizational structure, because that's not the way it was really intended. The word incident is important. And I think that's why you try to actually get the physical location of the unified command outside of a existing standing organization, like, they didn't try to put the deep water horizon unified area command inside district eight. That would have been a mistake, had to be. And it wasn't in any of the organization's facilities. So, I think that's important.

And I think in the case of these instances where the wildfire, the oil spill, or whatever, there's – the different agencies get to retain their authorities for everything outside of actually prosecuting the response to the incident. And they're working together with a daily incident action plan. – I mean it's usually daily, on 24-hour operational period. It can be 48 or longer, but I'm just thinking of the typical kind of start up points are usually 24 hours, so everybody is singing off that sheet instead of their own agency specific one. And, so, that's my construct of unified command.

*Interviewer:* Well, in this you've talked about there's a difference from your perspective of community-establish organizations as opposed to, say, an ad hawk organization, I guess brought together for an incident. So what would you see as those key incidents between those two types of commands?

*Interviewee:* Well, first of all, let me say, I've never been assigned to a standing unified command like a COCOM.

*Interviewer:* Well, just think of it – not as a unified command, but just as a – you know, if you think of it in a sense kind of what you were talking about before is that you put together MSO and group entity. So they were a singular organization, if you would, not really be quite the same as a multi-agency, ad hawk, be more of a singular agency response.

*Interviewee:* Yeah, well, I think I've had enough experiences like that, or based on my exposure to the COCOMs and those kind of standing purple organizations to make a few comments, I guess. But, you know, the main thing that comes to mind is you really think of it as a much longer horizon when you're in a permanent situation. I remember winning out the fact that we actually use the ICS to pull Group Miami and MSO Miami together, and at first we did it exactly like we would in an oil spill, and we found the third location, which was the training room along that base, and was sort

of close between the two units as we could find, and we literally pulled people out of both organizations and stuck them in there.

And then you would do your MSO job over in the MSO, and you'd be one of your unified commanders in a different physical location, and you had the staff, and it lasted for about maybe two, at most, three months, as I recalled. And then you come to a conclusion, "Hey, we just can't go on like this. This is starting to look very much more permanent than a temporary thing. You've gotta have some means to end a response on how much you're using NIMS. I think it just is the way it was designed. Everybody that's a responder, ultimately, goes back to their firehouses where they came from.

And what we did there, was, ultimately, we said, okay, enough is enough, so we'll morph into a more permanent unified command. And we kind of went back to a structure where detailers could do assignments, and facility managers could move walls, and made adaptations to the facility in a more permanent way, and we created an operation center that was joint. You do those kinds of things. You have a tendency to – I guess operation center is probably a pretty good symbolic example of what you do in a more permanent organization compared to ICS, where you have a situation unit. And, so, maybe, one compare and contrast is what is the characteristic of the situation unit verses the characteristics of an op center?

*Interviewer:* Hmm, that would be interesting. So are there certain organizational characteristics that you believe critical to creating an ad hawk organization for responding?

*Interviewee:* Yeah, I think I've touched on a couple of them. I think, you know, you need to have the actual location of it remote from these permanent facilities that support. Even though there's a firehouse that's supporting an organization that's primarily a response organization, your incident command location, organization, is remote from any one of the firehouses. Then I think you need to have that core of it, which is the situation unit. And everybody needs to have a battle rhythm where you have – whatever the cycle is for your incident action plan, your operational period, and they have to get information with consistent reliability and timelessness, and they have to have, you know, planning.

People have to be confident that their equities are being integrated into the plans, and then the operations carried out over that operational period. I think the commanders of it need to be very

familiar with the type of response that they're doing. One of the things that I've experienced is that there's a lot of people that are appointed or elected to positions, where they are perceived in their mind, and I think by their elector, or their boss, that they – by virtue of their position, need to be in charge of things. And I think it's important for these incidences that I've been involved with that the people who are the – that have the training and expertise are the incident commanders.

Now, you can have them report to a – yeah, an elected official or a senior official outside and above the incident command organization, and that's a good thing. Everybody needs to be accountable, but I don't think it would be effective to have the elected officials, or the very senior appointed officials to actually be the incident commanders.

*Interviewer:* Right. So, Bobby Jindl shouldn't of been in charge, huh?  
[Laughter].

*Interviewee:* [Laughter]. No comment.

*Interviewer:* So, along those same things, are there any distinguishing features of a disaster response operation or organization that you think actually impact your ability to function as a leader? I mean you kind of alluded to the one of, you know, a bunch of different people with a bunch of different agendas, are there others along those lines that you think would impact – and when I say impact, it doesn't mean that it makes it go back, it just means that you got to take some sort of action to address that.

*Interviewee:* Well, you know, one of the things that have impacted a number of cases, and I'm looking over a lot of different things that I've been involved with that, typically, there's a law enforcement element. We had cases, certainly, in the oil response arena that you have a very aggressive state attorney, or U.S. attorney. Sometimes, we've had the National Transportation Safety Boards that they have a mission. Of course, this gets into your overall thing of different agendas. There's different – when I was thinking of that, I was thinking, well, there are different agendas right within the response community, which is actually part of the unified command.

But I think that as a rule, you've got to put some sort of firewall between the investigation and the law enforcement aspect of whatever the situation is, and the response part of it. So, that's something that you have to deal with, and other large things like that. I think you've certainly got the business side of things that

you sort of want continuity of ops. We have that with usually anything that's in the middle of the marine transportation system, in the middle of a river, or you know, **thoroughfare**, where commerce has to continue and that needs to be dealt with, obviously, but it can, certainly, interfere with your ability to actually resolve the problem that you're dealing with.

But, you know, sometimes you can shoot yourself in the foot if you do – you can put a safety zone around the whole seaport, or whatever. In the case of homeland security, you can create such tight security; you can't have commerce anymore. So that's a necessary balance there that you need to deal with. And that is one that is maybe more likely to be included in your incident action plan, dealing with that, rather than excluded, like the law enforcement would be.

But I guess when you ask that question, there's other things that I was kind of thinking of that was what are those things that were kind of on that edge that maybe could tip in or out. And that's where, sometimes, you have to negotiate with agencies that have different authorities or different responsibilities. One of the things that came up with Deep Water Horizon were the core of engineers issues with regard to their role with building islands, or barriers, that sort of thing. We, obviously, had a lot of issues that popped up since it was such a long oil spill, just going beyond just the use of booms, and skimmers, and getting into actually using bulldozers, and HESCO barriers, and dredges, and things that were not just temporary floating structures.

So that brings in the core of engineers, so, okay, does that mean that they become a part of your unified command? And they ultimately said no, they don't really need to do that. They could, maybe, pick up the phone and call them, and have regular conversations, even meetings with the core. But some things came in, and some things stayed out on the fringes. So those were some things that come to mind.

*Interviewer:* So you talk a bit about this action plan, and so forth, so what do you see as the role of, say, the commander's intent, or the incident action plan being, for providing effective community control?

*Interviewee:* Well, that's your playbook. That's – the goal is to get everybody focused on the plan of the day, that the priorities, the safety message that is so important, that everybody pay attention to what is the actual situation in terms of what is your over flight see, or what does your intelligence tell you. So, you don't want to have

folks having to create their own, reinvent the wheel. One, because it's inefficient, and, two, because it would start interpreting things differently and responding differently, and probably come into conflict with each other.

So, I think that's a key element, as well as the meetings that you have that you actually look people in the eye, and you do that all the way down through your organization. So, that's something that I think applies to any organization. You've gotta have a sort of mission statement, and the you gotta create your strategic goals, and your operational goals, and your tactical plans that people need to carry out. Everybody's got a particular expertise, and they have some ability to provide a portion of the response, but if you can't get them to align under a single incident action plan, then I don't think you really have a unified command. You don't even have a command. You've just a bunch of miscellaneous people doing stuff.

*Interviewer:*

Along those lines, too, is the issue upfront, not only of the initiations of these events; you are a very fast paced environment. And I'm not sure on how your tempo went down the long straight thing there, but time constraints in terms of making decisions, and so forth, seem to play a role at these kinds of events. How do you as a leader deal with that? And by that, both, how do you deal with the issue of having to make quick timely decisions? And two is, being able to step back, reflect, and think about that on a more strategic level? And then lastly, it can suck into wanting to be more operational in your response, more tactical that you might want to be.

*Interviewee:*

Yeah, that's a really good question. I think that's the one that you're probably get a range of answers that more reflect personal leadership styles. I like to let some amount of stuff bubble up from the good subordinates. And I know not everybody's like that, and sometimes I'm critical of myself for not providing more leadership down. But I think when you got so much going on, that's worked better for me than to try to create a persona that has everybody waiting to hear what I have to say.

So you kind of have to manage many of these leadership styles carefully because they all have pitfalls. And the one that I probably have, the challenge in it is that you would lose people from viewing me as the guy in charge, or, you know, or they would misinterpret that I'm just a repeater of what the different subordinates are actually telling me. But I think it's worked well for me. And I think you can compensate by coming out on an

occasion with some strategic guidance that you're not getting from anybody, and, probably, wouldn't ever get from anybody, but the guy that sort of has the big picture.

And so, you know, when you're in that mode, it tends, for me, to try to – it creates a forcing function to bring me back up to the strategic, if you know what I'm saying. Like, if I were trying to do it the other way around, I would probably be having a forcing function driving me into the tactical. If was I was thinking my primary goal is to be giving everybody guidance on a consistent basis down instead of maybe doing – maybe being the driver of, like, hey, I've gotta have plan for, you know, these things because the next operational meeting is in an hour. And then those guys deliver it, I repeat it out, and away we go. That's sort of my leadership style.

But then every so often, you know, I say that now it's time for this strategic kind of change to occur. I'm trying to think of a good Deepwater Horizon example, but I remember at one point where I said, "Gosh, I am not spending enough time before the 7:00 meeting to be ready with, you know, a command level strategic statement. And, so, I had my aide actually keep people out of my office for about a half hour, and forced myself to think, okay, I got the big picture here, what is that we need to pull ourselves up above the fray, and start thinking about.

And that was when we came out with some of the sort of changes in the – major strategic changes. For example, there was a point where we were doing a lot of skimming, but we weren't coordinating our air ops, and we actually ended up, ultimately, creating a whole different air ops organization at Tyndall Air Force Base. And, so, that was sort of driven from the fact that we need to have – I forget what the terminology was that I used – and you try to think of simple things that can stick in people's mind. Because I'm on a speakerphone, and teleconferencing throughout the whole organization when you say these things.

I remember another time was we kind of gotten so sidetracked on boom, on putting out boom that we weren't focused on oil recovery anymore. So I remember being bias toward recovering the oil, and not just about putting out miles and miles of boom. Okay. So you can get sort of single-minded, and then you have to have somebody change the channel a little bit on what it is that you're there to do. And that timing needs to be right, and it needs to come from the right level of the organization to make it be universal throughout the response.

*Interviewer:* So then do you look back at all of this that you kind you kind rolled through, and you talked a few of them, like the subordination, but what are the leadership traits that you believe are important for a leader of a multi-agency response operation?

*Interviewee:* Well, I think you need to have confidence in yourself. You need to have confidence in the people that support you. I tell you what; it was great to have Admiral Alan. Luckily, I had worked for him for a number of years, and just had a huge amount of confidence in him that he wasn't going to somehow undermine anything that we were doing there. And then, of course, the people that were working for me – some of them I had known before, some of them I hadn't, I think you've gotta have a person that can have a certain amount of trust in organizations to have done the right hiring, and training, and support for their people, such that you can sort of go with a little bit of blind faith going downward.

Some people have trouble with that concept, so they don't have that confidence grounded down in the organization. It's confidence up, with yourself, and then down. Obviously, you've gotta have stamina, all of these things take a certain amount of stamina, which, sometimes, is one of the things that I have the least amount of confidence in the ability to go long hours and day after day, but that's a characteristic that you need. You've gotta be able to be quick to – you can't script out the day. You gotta be very flexible and almost have a sense for change, and I think there are some people that are not able to see the signals, and then react to them even if they do see them. But you need to use them, and – I don't know.

There's a number of days where the plan for the day that was put together at 7:00 in the morning, [laughter], went out the window by 9:00 or 10:00, and we just completely changed, and that was part of the best things that we did were a result of, you know, some indication that, some gut kind of feel in response to a piece of information that said, "All right, we're going to do this now, instead of –," whatever it was that – every day is chalk a block full, and time management is what it's all about. But, you've gotta be very nimble and flexible in that time management. Those are probably the main things, just be able to get along with people. That's just that regular personality traits are important.

I was very appreciative that the other people from the other agencies that I was working closely with, you know, my circle – my inner circle there, they were all good people, they weren't people that had personality quirks. I can accept people coming –

you know, they have a different boss, and I have my oversight organization; they have theirs. So, that's not a problem for me. But I think when people bring baggage with not related to that, you know, that makes it challenging. But we had good people.

*Interviewer:* Well, that's pretty much the questions I had. Is there something that you think is important how the \_\_\_\_ get run, that we haven't kind of gone over from a leadership perspective?

*Interviewee:* Well, you know, I think the interesting outcome – I mean what I'm going to be interested in watching is for the oil spill, the OPA 90 construct, where things might more – regarding the federal verses state and local roles will – you know, right now it's heavy into federal, but there certainly was a lot of interest. We're already seeing another case up in the Great Lakes right now, where the state houses, the governors, are taking more personal interest in an oil spill.

In the past, they pretty much relegated it to an agency fairly far down in the state organizational structure, and the federal government had to believe whether EPA or coast guard – I think that there's been an evolution of infrastructure and, I guess, authority and power as a result of 911 in state emergency operation centers, and so on, that we sort of didn't catch that had occurred. So anything that's an emergency – and I think this is not – just similar from our international experiences.

When you look at – even Haiti, certainly look at where we have been involved with conflicts overseas, or response operations, both humanitarian, and then security. There's been a shift, I guess, from, I think, over other years, especially when you go back to WWII from the big federal head of state kind of thing, to a recognition of the importance of involvement by local authorities. In Afghanistan, they're talking about tribal authorities. I mean these things exist, you can either ignore them, or you can convince them they're not, or just stand by, we'll take care of it, or you can somehow include that into the solution.

One of the first experiences I had with that was we had that oil spill out in Neah Bay, and you had that Makah Indian tribe, that was a very interesting experience for me. And that turned out to be a case where you really couldn't do a response without integrating their unique needs into that whole situation. And they're never going to be ICS trained. Sometimes they're not going to recognize the federal law, [laughter], but they're there, and you're a stakeholder, so you figure it out; you sort of roll with the punches.

But it's probably – the outcome is going to be better to take the time and work them into the solution, as opposed to considering part of the problem.

*Interviewer:* That's good. So, I want to turn the recorder off now.

*[End of Audio]*