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Exhibit No. _____
Worldwide Court
Reporters, Inc.

Interviewing Form

Interviewee Name:	Paul Meinhart
Job Title:	Motor Operator
Company:	Transocean
Contact Details:	
Work Address:	1311 Broadfield Suite 400 Houston, Texas
Work Telephone:	713-232-7500
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	
Home Telephone:	
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	John MacDonald Stephanie Butefish
Date:	21 June 2010
Start Time:	8:40 am
Stop Time:	11:00 am
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	Y – personnel file
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	Y – GA Drawings
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	
Details of documents, drawing, photographs	

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or other supporting materials taken to interview.	
Interview Plan Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:	
<p style="text-align: center;">Interview with Paul Meinhart June 21, 2010</p> <p>Paul Meinhart drove to the interview from his home in Cypress, Texas. The interviewer, John MacDonald, explained the reason for this interview, which is to see what worked and what did not work, and to find out what happened. Basically to paint a picture of what happened.</p> <p>Paul has been with Transocean for almost one year. He has had no previous oil field experience. In the past, he was a diesel mechanic for two years. He was on the rig when the incident happened.</p> <p>He did attend the memorial. In his opinion, the real truth about what happened will not be released on the news.</p> <p>When asked for his opinion of the safety protocols on the rig, he said that some were good, and that some were just overkill. He stated that 'you can only do so much, and that the last man who was crushed (not during this tragedy) was sitting next to a bumpstop for a crane. All the start cards didn't help him.'</p> <p>He has seen his job description 'probably one or two times.' In his opinion, he does not work for Transocean—he works for whatever rig he is on (he has only worked on two Transocean rigs), and that not one rig is similar to the other as far as how things are done. For example, he stated that the Captain or OIM has an HSE book and says 'we will use it word by word. One of his supervisors says 'no problem.' The book says permit is good for 24 hours; however, the OIM says it will be good for only 12 hours.' He does not know if there is anything in the HSE manual that says you can exceed standards.</p> <p>When asked if he knows what the training requirements are for his position, he responded that yes, he is familiar with the world wide matrix. He was working on getting his motor man operator OJT filled out.</p> <p>He had filled in for a mechanic on the DD1 for four hitches. The first half of his career (outside of Transocean) was as a mechanic. He is comfortable doing the work, but had to work under someone.</p> <p>When asked if he thought that training matches his job requirements, he said it was 'hard to tell; it comes down to who you are working for.'</p>	

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When asked if he was getting support from shorebased managers, he said 'some yes, some no.'

When asked if there were any limitations on the training available to him, he said that he was not there long enough. He was going to go to engine classes, but that probably will not happen now.

When asked if he knows where he will be going next, he said that they don't send people like him overseas. He meant people at his position or level. There are about 6 operators from that rig and that others will be placed before him. (He and one other operator were hurt in the explosion).

He was asked what he thought of the quality of the OJT on the DWH. Paul said that it could use some improvement. The quiz in the back of the book showed some wrong answers. He also said that not much of the actual information in the book pertains to a motor operator on a rig. He does not know if his supervisor has reported this up the chain. He has done a test and an online 'thing' and the operator 'thing'.

His next position could be mechanic or he could go up to the engineering side. He does not know what he will be doing now. Does not know if a motor operator will be sent overseas. He is in a wait and see mode.

When asked if he has had an appraisal in the last year, he said 'no,' that he has not been there long enough, and was not working in a position matching his job title.

When asked if he noticed a lot of new people in his department, he said no, there were not.

When asked about the quality of the training of new employees on the DD1, he mentioned that he had a mentor who was very knowledgeable and safety conscious. He further stated that if he ever goes offshore again, he wants more training on the safety systems, like using the manual davit to deploy the life raft. He believes that some people were given more training than others. When he was working nights, he was woken for training drills with the general alarm, and shown what to do while sleepy. Next time, he wants to be trained specifically. At this point, he stated that he was one of the last 10 people off the rig, and that he had jumped. He was with the Captain Curt, Yancy (SDPO), Andrea (DPO), the mechanical supervisor, Chad, and an electrician. He tried to help operate the davit but was told to get out of the way so that the marine personnel could prepare the davit, which they did after he moved. His training was with about 100 other people, and he is the type who needs to see it, do it, and then memorize it.

Safety & Survival Training - He has taken BST and Huet.

When asked if it was adequate for what he had to go through, he said that the main thing he used was the jump off the rig—in training, they were told not to look down, but overall, yes, his training was helpful.

When asked if he knew his position on the station bill, he said it is to assist as directed. He goes to the lifeboat in an emergency.

When asked who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect, he said that it would be anyone at the equipment.

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Safety Culture – When asked if he believes the company lives up to its core values, he said that he doesn't know enough about the company, but from what he does know, 'yes.'

He does not know his colors, because they had stopped using that system just before he came on, and later it was reinstated, so he is in that 'gap' of personnel who did not take the assessment.

When asked to name three positive safety issues on the DWH, he said that he likes the Think Plan process, because it gets people together to discuss what is to be done.

TOFS – If you have enough understanding of what is going on, and you see someone doing something unsafe, you should stop them.

Regarding whether mentorship was positive for safety, he said it was ok, and it did give feedback to questions.

Negatives – Start Cards – He said that no matter what, a routine is a routine, and people will get complacent on a routine; for specific incidents, it is fine. He did the one start card per day because it was required. The last time he did a start card was some time ago. They (people in his position) do not get around the rig much, as they work in a secure area. The people he worked with were safe and high quality.

Management of Change – he said that if there is a set process and if you have a better way of doing something, that would be an example of management of change.

Bonuses – he received a bonus from Transocean once. When asked if a BP bonus would affect safety or how something would be done, or cause people to rush, he said 'no.'

Regarding formal emergency response training, he has had basic firefighting training through TOPS.

His supervisor was Brent Mansfield or Sean McGowan. When asked if he could reach a muster point, he said yes. He does not recall if the lights were working. He does recall that the consoles were lit.

Paul does not know what happened with the engines. After the explosion, there was no power. He does not know what exploded. He believes that the first explosion came from number 3 engine. He thinks an air vent system may have brought gas into the engine room and caused the engine to overspeed. The second explosion may have come from gas in the mud pump room. He did hear both explosions and was in the engine control room at the time. He was injured.

The first explosion blew off a door and hurt Brent; it cut Paul's elbow. (At this point, Paul pointed to a drawing). Paul had been standing where it is noted on the drawing, and it moved him to the left. Brent was at a desk which was L-shaped and in the center of the room. In the first explosion, Paul was pushed left between a wall and console. At the second explosion, he was hit by a door that opens out (points to drawing, and says drawing is wrong about which way this door opens). The door was blown off its hinges. Paul suffered bruising and two broken ribs, all on his left side. It is a computer room, really the ECR (Engine Control Room). The floor tiles were blown out. A desk, cabinet and water cooler were gone. Paul thinks the bulkheads were still intact at that point. Most

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of the explosions came through the doors. In the second explosion, the ceiling tiles blew out, and Paul believes that this second explosion may have come from an area on the rig where the air ducts were, so that may be when the ceiling then blew out.

The sack room is above the mud pump room, so Paul thinks the second explosion came from this area. The mud pumps were on the same deck with the engines. The mud pumps were all on the same deck; two were set to fit with a lower roof line. One particular area was open to two floors.

Back to second explosion – According to Paul the second explosion came from the sack room or mud pump room, down the hallway, through the HVAC room between the ECR and the mud pump room. After the second blast, he recalls Chad Murray came through with bleeding from his head. Paul was sitting, and was hurt. Paul heard Brent in a starboard aft corner of the room; he was moaning and was covered in debris. Paul pulled debris off Brent. Willie Stoner came in and helped Brent up to walk. In this ECR (Engine Control Room), the floor was built up; after the explosion, tiles were missing, and Willie and Brent fell into where the tile had been previously. They went out on the back deck, saw a phone and a sink near a door. Willie tried to call the bridge while Paul tried to wash off blood from Brent at the sink. Willie said they cannot get anyone on the phone—the line was silent and phone was no longer functional. Paul does not recall whether lifeboats were there or not. There was so much damage and fire on the back of the rig, they knew they could not muster at the aft lifeboat station.

At this point, Paul was asked to recount his day. His day had started with installing a pipe on a thruster. Around 10 pm, he sat down in the control room to discuss who would do the next tasks, and then they heard an alarm at approximately 10 pm. The bridge came on the radio and called the Bankston. He heard someone on the radio say that we are in a well control situation, and to move 500 meters away. Less than a minute later, they started getting more alarms. These were gas alarms.

Doug Brown went to the console. (Doug is in the position of 3rd Engineer; his title is Chief Mechanic.) Paul put his hard hat on. Brent said 'don't leave'. About 10 seconds later, they heard the engine speed up. About 15 seconds later, the lights went out. Normally, if the main power is lost, all other standby engines come on. From the time they lost main power to the time of the first explosion was about 10-15 seconds; then 10-15 seconds between the first and second explosion.

Recap by Paul: they were in the dark before the first explosion. After the explosion, Paul tried to help Brent; Chad Murray and Doug B. Were already gone. The time it takes to walk from aft lifeboats to go forward is normally two minutes. They walked port then forward. They could not get anyone on the phone; Brent was incoherent. They tried to get to the bridge, with Willie Stoner, (motor man) took Brent. On the back deck, they wanted to go down stairs (see map) but those stairs were completely destroyed. Lots of debris was on this deck. A piece of steel (he thinks it was a muffler/exhaust from an engine) was laying on the deck, and Paul moved it. They went up another set of stairs to the main deck. Then they walked port then to forward. The whole rig was covered in drill mud about 2 inches deep. Mud was thick along the walkway from the forward side of the riser storage area to the bridge. They went in to the bridge, taking Brent with them. The Captain started looking for a medic; however, medic was taking care others. They looked for life jackets, and put one on Brent. The ET was hit in the forehead. Captain, Steve Bertone, Doug B, and Chad Murray and Brent were there.

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Paul recalls the Captain saying they need a medic. He looked at Chris and asked if we were loose from the well. Paul did not know the time. Chris said 'I pushed the button and the equipment showed we are disconnected.' The Captain said 'we need power.' Paul, Chad and Doug said there is no power. The Captain asked for emergency power. Paul, Chad and Doug went to the generator room, located on the port side midship. According to Paul the standby generator can run one seawater pump and fire pump and heating system to get a main engine started. Paul and Steve B were trying to get the standby generator started. They did not think about gas possibly being in the area because this is a naturally ventilated area. Gas would have had to be on deck for awhile to get in. They did see fire in the moon pool area and the BOP house, which was about 20 feet away. At no time did he believe that attempting to start the generator was unsafe. They tried to start the generator; nothing happened. They read through the procedures step by step in the book. Still no start, and the room they were in was black. Paul had the door open; Steve said to close it. Paul and Chad had flashlights. Paul noticed that they were close to the fire and that there was only one way out, and this could be bad.

Then, five minutes later, they went back to the bridge. No one was there except for Dave Young, Andrea, and the Captain. The Captain then gave the order to abandon rig. They all then went to the lifeboats, but they had been launched and were gone. Paul looked at the deck hatch and ladder to get closer to the water. He saw an injured man on a stretcher and two people were carrying him to the lifeboat deck. They tried to get a liferaft deployed. Eventually, they did get it to deploy. They placed the man in the stretcher into the liferaft. At this point, he could feel heat and smoke coming up from below. Paul tried to cover his face near a wall. Then Andrea was pushed into the liferaft. It had two or three people in it, and was lowered into the water. At this point, there are 5-6 people still on the deck of the rig—Paul, Yancy, the Captain, and 2-3 others.

Paul said that one guy jumped and the Captain jumped from his right. Yancy jumped in front of him. Paul then jumped after Yancy. They were now in the water. The Captain started telling people to get into the raft. They saw the fast rescue craft go over and pick up Andrea from the water.

Paul said that the Captain did an excellent job, and Paul would have no hesitation to work with him again. The Captain seemed to do his part to take in the damage to the vessel, and did a good job. The Captain yelled for the fast rescue boat to pull up; they threw a rope to the raft. They tied up and the Bankston pulled in reverse. They were there about 5-10 minutes. They then began getting people out of the liferafts. At this point, Paul could feel back pain. A crew member from the Bankston had pulled Paul up onto the boat. The Bankston put down a Jacobs ladder and Paul went on deck. A crane was used to lift the injured man on the stretcher and bring him to the deck.

When asked to describe the quality of the drills, such as abandon ship, etc., Paul said they did them each weekend; he has no opinion as to the quality. An example of such a drill would be: an alarm would go off, they would have to stand in hot sun for 15 minutes while someone read how to put on a life jacket. On the DD1, the Captain let the night shift have a note on their doors for the daytime drills. The night shift would then drill at night.

On shore—he was flown to Alabama with Doug Brown, Buddy Trahan, two catering hands and one more person. He was asked to sign some papers for collateral reimbursement. He went to New Orleans, and there he did a Coast Guard interview.

When asked who is the person in charge of the rig, Paul said that when the rig is underway, the

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Captain is in charge. When the rig is drilling, the person in charge is the BP company man for drilling decisions. For Transocean employees, the OIM is in charge, then the Sr. Tool Pusher, then Tool Pusher, and so on down the chain. In an emergency situation, the Captain is in charge, Chief Mate and bridge personnel.

When asked if he felt that if BP told anyone to do something with the well, are they required to do it, Paul responded 'yes', unless the OIM or someone feels that it is dangerous. Paul says he would have no problem stopping someone if he thought they were doing something dangerous.

Shortchange – Paul says it does happen, but they do not do it in his group, however, one time he was shortchanged in his favor to 18 hours instead of 6.

He did not know if the lifeboats had fixed radios in them.

When asked who can issue an order to do an emergency disconnect, he said it is up to whoever is in the area to hit the button. Paul would not have a problem pushing it if he thought it necessary.

When asked who can send a mayday, he replied that he does not know, but thinks it would come from bridge personnel, and they would not have to have the Captain's permission to do it. Paul would do it if he thought it would save a life.


When asked who gives the order to abandon, he said that in general, it is the Captain.

When asked if he had anything to add, Paul stated that the only way aft lifeboats could have been burned and broken is if they got damaged in the explosion. The fire was in the center of the rig. He says there is not anything that he could see that would have damaged the lifeboats after they got into them.

Paul says that he has not been contacted lately by HR. He did receive a call from Ron with Schumann.

Interview concluded.

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