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Interviewing Form



Interviewee Name:	William Jernigan
Job Title:	Chief Mechanic
Company:	Transocean
Contact Details:	
Work Address:	
Work Telephone:	
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	
Home Telephone:	
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	John MacDonald Stephanie Butefish
Date:	June 22, 2010
Start Time:	9:45 am
Stop Time:	11:45 am
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	Y
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	Y
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	N
Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to	Drawing of Drill Floor Plan, Main Deck, and Second Deck

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TRN-INV-00002238

TDR037-002238

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interview.	
Interview Plan Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:	
<p style="text-align: center;">Interview with William Jernigan, Chief Mechanic June 22, 2010</p> <p>The interviewer, John MacDonald, explained the reason for the interview—that we are constructing a timeline of events on the night of the incident in order to reconstruct what happened and to have something better going forward.</p> <p>William Jernigan has been with Transocean three years this April. He has no previous oilfield experience. His position is Chief Mechanic. He started as a Roustabout and worked his way up to his current position. He has not seen his job description; he was shown what to do. He is supposed to take water survival before going back to work. Looking at his personnel file, John MacDonald went over some of the items in which William is currently non-compliant. When asked if William believes the training matches the job description, he said yes, and he does believe it is sufficient to do the job. His last training session was SLT at Park 10. He was on the rig at the time of the incident.</p> <p>He believes his rig management and shore-based managers were supportive of training. There were no limitations on the training available to him. He thinks the quality of OJT training on the DWH was good. He thinks his next position may be mechanical supervisor.</p> <p>William had an appraisal in 2009, and believes it was based on workmanship, leadership, and initiative.</p> <p>William did not notice that there were many new crew members on the rig. He believes that the quality of training for new crew members is good. He did have a mentor when he first arrived on the rig. William has completed HUET and BOSIET training. He completed firefighting training as a Roustabout. He did water survival and rigging training also. He did go to TOPS. He is somewhat familiar with the station bill, and he knows what it says for chief mechanic. He was supposed to go to the ECR in back, but it blew up and he could not go there. He knows where the lifeboat and liferaft stations are. His job does not require him to know what steps to take when shutting in a well or upon detection of flow.</p> <p>When asked who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect, he responded that it would be the bridge personnel and the drill floor.</p> <p>Safety Culture Questions:</p> <p>William knew the core values of the company, and also believes that the company lives up to them.</p> <p>His colors are red over blue. He thinks it means that when he has a job to do, he wants to do it, but</p>	

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he checks everything.

When asked to describe the three most positive things that help with safety, he said that the drills on Sunday were helpful; that the Think Plan was a good way to check oneself and others, and TSTP (Task Specific Think Plans) were also helpful.

He does complete a start card every day. They make a person take time out to see if there are any hazards involved in doing a task safely. William's participation in the Think planning process involves doing it every day. He writes a think plan and a TSTP and prompt cards. The prompt cards help him to think, and they do them for each job.

TOFS – He is comfortable calling a time out for safety. He recalls that on his last hitch, he did call a time out for safety while working on mud pumps.

Management of change – William discussed how this process works, and said that it is used in several areas. He said it is used if you have to change how a job is done and the need to make other people aware of it.

Bonuses – William did not receive a bonus from Transocean. He did get a well bonus from BP. While it was nice to get a bonus, he did not believe it made people rush to do a job, nor did it affect the way they did their job.

William was asked to recount the events of the night of the incident:

William's shift is noon till midnight – actually 11:30 am till 11:30 pm.

8:00 pm – he did routine pm's that day, then had supper. He then went to his office and closed pm's on the computer. He went upstairs with the ET (Mike Williams) to help at the starboard crane; they set boom limits, cable and drums with Dale (the crane operator). Dale set the crane in the cradle at about 8:40 – 8:45 pm. Dale stayed with the crane. (Note: during the explosion, William heard Joe (from Haliburton) say that he saw Dale coming down some stairs and the stairs collapsed, and Dale was blown off the crane stairs.)

Discussion of Mike Williams' appearance on 60 Minutes. William said that Mike was possibly hit on his head and may have some of the facts inaccurately. He did see that Mike was pulled up onto the Bankston, and that Mike had a bandage on his head.

9-9:15 pm – William came down stairs on top of the Schlumberger deck. He had come down from starboard crane and he could see inside a retractable door; he said 'hi' to Adam and one other roughneck on the rig floor; he went downstairs near the Haliburton mud unit/log shacks, then downstairs to the drill floor level, then downstairs to the main deck, turned right and went down a walkway to his office. It was breaktime. He began to sweep and mop his floor, which took about 30 minutes.

9:30 – 9:35 pm - He then sat down at his desk. About one to two minutes later, the first explosion happened. He heard a boom, followed by multiple booms. It sounded as though a crane boom had fallen. Next, the lights went out. He was alone in a chair at this point. He then got his flashlight, hat, and gloves, and exited the mechanic shop door, which is an inboard door to the hall. Then, he started to go up the stairs leading to the main deck, but stopped halfway and decided instead to go

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back down, and then opened the door to the living quarters near the break room. He opened the door, and another explosion came and it blew him aft back nearly to the office door near the stairs. He saw 2-3 other people (thinks these two might have been tank cleaners) who were also blown back with him; they were blown back about 12 feet toward the rails. They got up, and saw what appeared to be smoke and dust. It left a taste in his mouth; he thought it might be insulation dust; it was not hot. At this point, William said to go to the lifeboats. The walls were blown and pushed in towards the center of the hall and the ceiling tiles were down. They went straight up the hall and to the right, grabbed life jackets under the stairs, and went straight across the deck to lifeboat #2. William met the off tour AD there, and together they tried to get a muster. The emergency lights worked, but not enough to see to get muster, so they used William's small flashlight. They walked through a door between the cinema room and the galley on the boat deck. William does not recall hearing the general alarm bells, but they could hear an announcement to muster at the galley and at the cinema, but William told people to come out to the deck. He did see people getting into boats instead of going to muster. He also saw Matt Hughes, a Roughneck, climb over the handrail located near the forward lifeboat, but he does not know if Matt jumped.

When asked how long people waited in the boat until it was lowered, he did not know. Some of the people in the boat said they could not see well to fasten their seatbelts, so they tied themselves in some way. William was the last person in the boat. He saw flames go up the starboard side of the derrick, and flames coming out of the diverter line on the starboard side. He saw the top drive and blocks fall, and he could see lines flying.

Next, Steve, the Bosun, got into the boat; William got in behind the driver; Mike Mayfield got in, and William was behind them. Then, the boats were lowered. Note: William believes that if some people knew how to let that lifeboat down, they would have left a lot of people on the deck. When they got into the boat, Steve pulled the handle and they had a smooth ride down. He cranked the engine before it was lowered. Then William opened the back door and grabbed the D-ring off and threw it off the boat. They took off. William left the back door open. He saw the number 1 lifeboat take off behind them. William's lifeboat drove away and then stopped to let the number 1 catch up with them, and they both headed back to the Bankston. William looked for anyone who may be in the water, but saw no one. Meanwhile, the number 1 lifeboat arrived at the Bankston, and then William's number 2 lifeboat arrived at the Bankston. The number 1 boat began to unload, and then the number 2 began to unload. Note: while alongside the Bankston, a line was either tossed from the Bankston to the lifeboat number 2 or from lifeboat number 2 to the Bankston (William does not recall which boat tossed the initial line). They offloaded out of the side door through a rope ladder up to the Bankston. William was one of the last to get off his lifeboat; behind him were Mike Mayfield and Steve. While they were getting off the boat, they saw mud on both the Bankston and the lifeboat. At that point, William had not spoken to the crew of the Bankston.

After about 12-14 hours, they left and went to a platform where the Coast Guard boarded the Bankston there. The crew of the DWH were given supplies, pajamas and coveralls. They sat 'awhile' at this location, then left and arrived at Fouchon around 4-4:30 am. Some of the people asked why they were not leaving sooner, and were told that the Coast Guard said to wait, and that the Bankston was to be the command ship. Daun Winslow talked to the people of the DWH and gave them the news and information as he learned it.

Further note from William – after they looked around, they saw an inflatable liferaft stuck under the rig starboard forward under the galley (he was not sure how well he could see the actual location of

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the raft relative to the rig). The rescue boat went to them and pulled them out and brought the raft toward William's boat, and tied on. William saw Steve Bertone get out and also David Young and Wyman, who was on a stretcher.

When asked who is the person in charge of the rig, William said that under normal circumstances, and when on a well, it is the OIM. When it is underway, it is the Captain. In an emergency, it is the Captain who is in charge, and next in charge would be the Chief Mate, etc., down the chain.

When asked who should give the order to abandon ship, he said it should come from the bridge.

Shortchange – William said they do it in his area. When he gets to the rig, he puts his gear in his room, and relieves the mechanic at 9 am. The other chief mechanic then goes off duty for 6 hours, and comes back to relieve William; William comes back at 11:30.

Further items:

When asked about the quality of the muster, he replied that he and the AD tried their best to get a muster; they tried again on the boat.

He said the coxswain for the lifeboats are: the AB (the Coxswains on the Station Bill are the DPO's), who handles the upkeep; and the DPO, who does the lifeboat instruction drills.

William does not recall if there was anyone on a stretcher on his lifeboat. There was sufficient room in the lifeboat.

All doors were closed on the lifeboat. The sprinklers were not on for lifeboat #2.

When they landed, William left the back door open while it was floating. He saw sprinklers on lifeboat #1 while looking out the back door.

He knew that lifeboat 2 was the fast rescue craft because he had heard Steve say that, so they looked for people in the water while lifeboat 1 was headed toward the Bankston.

When asked if he thought there was enough time that night to take a muster, William said 'no.'

When they lowered the boat, the fire got really big; waiting for 5-10 more minutes would mean they might have been burned.

He heard that Andrea sent the mayday.

He does not know the amount of time that passed from the time of the first explosion till the first boat was lowered.

William does not work on any well control systems.

When asked if he was aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly, William mentioned that mud pump #1 was messed up; it would get back pressure and would not build up pressure in the pump. It was a problem they never figured out.

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
William does not know of any BOP problems. He worked with the crane and rig floor systems only.

William does not have any concerns about maintenance on the rig. He is not aware of any safety systems not operating. He feels that safety on the rig with respect to complete maintenance was very important.

When asked if he has an understanding of the ventilation systems, William said 'no.'

They did a muster on the Bankston. Carl, the radio operator, and 2 others and Allan (AD) worked on getting the muster.

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