

# Deposition Testimony of:

## **Dustin Johnson**

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Page 7:07 to 7:09

00007:07 DUSTIN JOHNSON,  
08 having been first duly sworn, testified as  
09 follows:

Page 7:12 to 7:15

00007:12 Q. Would you state your full name and your  
13 residence address for the record, please.  
14 A. Dustin Delane Johnson, [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]

Page 8:16 to 9:02

00008:16 What is your current occupation?  
17 A. As in --  
18 Q. What's your job?  
19 A. Oh, it's roustabout. I was with  
20 Transocean. Right now, nothing.  
21 Q. Okay. And so you're not working for  
22 Transocean any longer?  
23 A. No, sir.  
24 Q. And that -- we'll get into this with  
25 greater detail, but you stopped working at the  
00009:01 time of the explosion and fire in April of 2010?  
02 A. Yes, sir.

Page 13:05 to 13:16

00013:05 Q. Now, you have given one written  
06 statement. And I'm going to point out to you --  
07 I have one at Tab 2 -- that is a U.S. Coast  
08 Guard -- if you look at No. 2 under there --  
09 U.S. Coast Guard statement. I'm not really  
10 talking about that. We'll go ahead and mark that  
11 as exhibit next, which is 4551.  
12 (Exhibit 4551 was marked.)  
13 Q. (BY MR. PALMINTIER) And that is the  
14 Coast Guard written statement of Dustin Johnson.  
15 Obviously, you gave this one, correct?  
16 A. Yes, sir.

Page 19:12 to 19:15

00019:12 Q. Did you graduate from high school there?  
13 A. Yes, sir.  
14 Q. What's the name of the school?  
15 A. Florien High School.

Page 19:19 to 20:09

00019:19 Q. What did you do when you graduated from  
20 high school?  
21 A. I did a little construction work on the  
22 side, and then I worked for a construction  
23 company out of Baton Rouge called Yates  
24 Construction.  
25 Q. Okay.  
00020:01 A. And then after that I went to work  
02 offshore.  
03 Q. How did you get hooked up with the  
04 offshore business?  
05 A. Most of my buddies and family and friends  
06 work offshore.  
07 Q. Okay.  
08 A. So I -- you know, they referred me to go  
09 offshore.

Page 20:16 to 21:08

00020:16 Q. Do you remember who it was in particular  
17 that suggested there might be an opening with  
18 Transocean?  
19 A. No, sir. I'd seen it on the Internet.  
20 Q. Okay. And where did you go to apply for  
21 the job?  
22 A. To apply for -- I sent my risumi in over  
23 the Internet, and then I went to Houston after  
24 they gave me a call.  
25 Q. Okay. And did you go to the Transocean  
00021:01 headquarters or did you --  
02 A. Yes, sir. The -- the office in Houston.  
03 Q. Okay. Between the time that you  
04 graduated from high school and the time you went  
05 to apply for the job with Transocean, did you  
06 have any other formal education, like junior  
07 college, trade school, anything like that?  
08 A. No, sir.

Page 21:25 to 23:05

00021:25 Q. When you did get hired, though, how did  
00022:01 you learn about it? Did they call you or write  
02 or what?  
03 A. Well, we had to go to a training school,  
04 and then after the training school, they called  
05 me and let me know --  
06 Q. So --  
07 A. -- what rig I had to go to.  
08 Q. So the training school, was that in  
09 Houston?  
10 A. That was in south Louisiana. I can't  
11 remember exactly where it was.  
12 Q. Okay.  
13 A. Somewhere down here. Morgan City, it

14 might have been.  
 15 Q. All right. And that was a training  
 16 school in which they taught you about being a  
 17 roustabout or --  
 18 A. Yes, sir, pretty much so.  
 19 Q. So it was roustabout training school?  
 20 A. Well, not just roustabout training  
 21 school. It was pretty much just what you'd be  
 22 prepared for on the rig.  
 23 Q. Understood. Did you get a certificate  
 24 from that?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.  
 00023:01 Q. Was this -- did -- have you ever been to  
 02 well control school?  
 03 A. No, sir --  
 04 Q. Okay.  
 05 A. -- I haven't been to well control.

Page 23:12 to 23:15

00023:12 Q. Okay. Were you also required to become  
 13 an able-bodied seaman or get seaman's papers or  
 14 anything like that?  
 15 A. No, sir, no seaman's papers.

Page 25:04 to 25:18

00025:04 Q. All right. How long did you work aboard  
 05 the DEEPWATER HORIZON before she sank?  
 06 A. Almost a year, I believe.  
 07 Q. Okay.  
 08 A. A year.  
 09 Q. During that year did they -- when you  
 10 were on the -- onshore, did you take additional  
 11 training or were you planning on taking  
 12 additional training? Tell me about that.  
 13 A. We had -- we were required to take  
 14 firefighting and water survival. So that's -- I  
 15 took those two courses, yes, sir.  
 16 Q. All right. Did you get certificates for  
 17 those as well?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.

Page 26:21 to 27:11

00026:21 Q. Your hitches were 21 days on and 21 days  
 22 off?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. We're going to call that period of time a  
 25 hitch. And then your tour, that is when you were  
 00027:01 actually working, was from 6:00 to 6:00 or what?  
 02 A. It was noon to noon.  
 03 Q. Noon to noon?

04 A. Yes, sir.  
05 Q. Do you remember the date when you first  
06 boarded?  
07 A. No, sir, I sure don't.  
08 Q. But as you say, about a year before the  
09 explosion and fire?  
10 A. Yes, sir.  
11 Q. Okay.

Page 27:13 to 30:02

00027:13 Q. (BY MR. PALMINTIER) Do you remember who  
14 your first crane operator was?  
15 A. On the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
16 Q. Yes.  
17 A. Yes, sir. It was Dale Burkeen and Micah  
18 Sandell.  
19 Q. Can you spell Micah's last name.  
20 A. Yes. S-A-N-D-E-L-L.  
21 Q. Okay. Now, the con -- strike that.  
22 The crew that you worked with was a crane  
23 crew, correct?  
24 A. Yes, sir.  
25 Q. As a roustabout you were assigned to a  
00028:01 supervisor who was a crane operator, right?  
02 A. Yes, sir.  
03 Q. And that first time you went out there,  
04 was it Dale Burkeen or was it Michael Sandell  
05 [sic]?  
06 A. Well, they were both my supervisors. We  
07 worked on the same tour at the same time.  
08 Q. Understood.  
09 A. We had two crane operators.  
10 Q. Because there were like four different  
11 cranes to operate on the rig, correct?  
12 A. Yes, sir.  
13 Q. The starboard and port cranes, and then  
14 there were special smaller cranes. What was that  
15 called?  
16 A. A knuckle boom.  
17 Q. A knuckle boom?  
18 A. Yes, sir.  
19 Q. And then there was a gantry crane of some  
20 kind?  
21 A. Yes, sir, a gantry crane.  
22 Q. Did you work with all four of those  
23 cranes?  
24 A. Yes, sir.  
25 Q. And tell me about the knuckle boom. That  
00029:01 was used for special projects and also as a  
02 backup?  
03 A. Mainly the knuckle boom is just used for  
04 picking up pipe and rearranging pipe. That's it.  
05 Casing, drill pipe, heavyweight, just that sort  
06 of thing.

07 Q. Understood. When you got out there that  
08 first time, then, you had OJT, on-the-job  
09 training, correct?  
10 A. Yes, sir.  
11 Q. And then -- I mean, they taught you  
12 everything from what kind of gloves you should  
13 wear to how to hook up a joint of pipe using pipe  
14 hooks, correct?  
15 A. Yes, sir.  
16 Q. And so in that year that followed up  
17 until the time of the explosion, you were  
18 learning the trade of being a roustabout,  
19 correct?  
20 A. Yes, sir.  
21 Q. All right. Who were your fellow  
22 roustabouts when you first started working?  
23 A. I'm not sure if I can remember all their  
24 names. Nick -- I don't remember his last name.  
25 Q. That's all right.  
00030:01 A. Carlos, and then -- I can't remember any  
02 more who first started working there.

Page 30:04 to 30:18

00030:04 Now, there were two crane operators per  
05 tour, so there were four crane operators,  
06 correct?  
07 A. Yes, sir.  
08 Q. Two for 12-hour shift and two for the  
09 next 12-hour shift?  
10 A. Yes, sir.  
11 Q. How many roustabouts were assigned to a  
12 crew?  
13 A. There were six roustabouts.  
14 Q. All right. And so the two crane  
15 operators would work with three roustabouts?  
16 A. Yes, sir. They would -- we would split  
17 up and be three for each crane operator if we had  
18 multiple tasks going on.

Page 32:01 to 32:13

00032:01 Q. Do you remember generally how many  
02 hitches you made on the DEEPWATER HORIZON while  
03 she was on the Macondo well?  
04 A. Maybe two hitches.  
05 Q. Okay. Let's go to the April 20th date  
06 just for a moment and think back from there. Do  
07 you remember how long you'd been aboard when the  
08 explosion and fire happened?  
09 A. Let's see. Six days, I think. I'm not  
10 sure.  
11 Q. Okay. But you had -- you hadn't even  
12 gotten halfway through your hitch, correct?

13 A. No, sir.

Page 36:16 to 37:06

00036:16 Q. Now, routinely during that year that you  
17 worked -- year or so you worked for TO, did you  
18 have meetings in the mornings or in the  
19 afternoons that you could tell us about?

20 A. Yes, sir. We had -- we had meetings  
21 before we went on tour to debrief on, you know,  
22 what we were going to be doing for the day.  
23 That's about it, really.

24 Q. Who attended those meetings?

25 A. Everybody that was going to be on tour  
00037:01 and the upper management people.

02 Q. Do you remember the BP well site leader  
03 attending those meetings?

04 A. The --

05 Q. The company man?

06 A. -- company man? Yes, sir.

Page 38:07 to 39:05

00038:07 Q. When were your meeting -- go ahead. I'm  
08 sorry. I interrupted.

09 A. Every morning before we'd go on tour,  
10 after we'd eat, and that would be -- I'm trying  
11 to think of the times that we would -- I think it  
12 would be held -- we'd go on tour at -- I think it  
13 would be held at 11:00 o'clock every morning, if  
14 we was working days, 11:00 at night if you was  
15 working nights.

16 Q. Okay. Did you ever work nights?

17 A. Yes, sir. We would do what they call a  
18 shortchange in the middle of the hitch, and  
19 that -- you would -- we would work two weeks  
20 days, one week nights, and we'd have to  
21 shortchange during the middle of the hitch.

22 Q. New meaning to the word "shortchanged."

23 And so you -- on this particular hitch in  
24 April, had you -- do you remember whether you  
25 were working -- you started working nights and  
00039:01 then went to days?

02 A. No, sir, I don't. We was -- from 11:30  
03 in the morning to 11:30 at night --

04 Q. Okay.

05 A. -- is what we started.

Page 45:05 to 45:18

00045:05 Q. And the hitch beginning April 15th,  
06 you-all were very busy, correct?

07 A. Yes, sir.

08 Q. You do remember that, right?  
09 A. Yes, sir.  
10 Q. And do you remember that there was so  
11 much -- there was a great deal of activity going  
12 on with the cranes, right?  
13 A. Yes, sir.  
14 Q. I'm going to ask you some questions about  
15 the specific activities. But among other things,  
16 the cranes were working with a work boat called  
17 the DAMON BANKSTON?  
18 A. Yes, sir. Correct.

Page 46:02 to 47:10

00046:02 Q. Okay. One of the things that a  
03 roustabout does is he gets lowered by the crane  
04 down to the deck of the work boat, correct?  
05 A. Yes, sir.  
06 Q. And he moves pallets around using the  
07 crane, correct?  
08 A. Yes, sir.  
09 Q. He helps to do that, obviously?  
10 A. Yes, sir.  
11 Q. He moves pipe when that needs to be done,  
12 drill pipe, casing, et cetera, correct?  
13 A. Yes, sir.  
14 Q. Helps to move machinery around, all using  
15 the crane, correct?  
16 A. Yes, sir.  
17 Q. All right. Do you remember what the  
18 DAMON BANKSTON and the crane were doing during  
19 that period of time just before the explosion?  
20 A. No, sir, I sure don't.  
21 Q. If I were to tell you that the BANKSTON  
22 was off -- was taking on mud, would that refresh  
23 your memory?  
24 A. A little bit, yes, sir, because they was  
25 on the -- we had a crane shut down at the time, I  
00047:01 believe, and they was -- they had to take mud off  
02 the other side, I guess it was. I was working  
03 with the gantry crane.  
04 Q. What were you doing with the gantry  
05 crane?  
06 A. We was preparing BHA or breaking down  
07 BHA. I'm not sure what it was. I don't  
08 remember.  
09 Q. Okay. Bottomhole assembly?  
10 A. Yes, sir, bottomhole assembly.

Page 49:09 to 49:22

00049:09 Q. Who was working with you on the gantry  
10 crane crew?  
11 A. Micah was the crane operator and Heber.



12 And we had a new guy, and I don't remember his  
13 name.  
14 Q. All right. Micah Sandell?  
15 A. Yes, sir.  
16 Q. Was -- he was up in the crane?  
17 A. Yes, sir. He was in the gantry crane.  
18 Q. The new guy was working with you?  
19 A. Yes, sir.  
20 Q. And one other person?  
21 A. The roustabout. I don't remember his  
22 name.

Page 50:05 to 50:14

00050:05 Q. Now, I understand that part of what you  
06 would do when there wasn't a crane crew specific  
07 task to be done, you would do maintenance work,  
08 correct?  
09 A. Yes, sir.  
10 Q. Chipping, sanding, things like that?  
11 A. Anything that I was directed to do.  
12 Q. All right. Did you ever get involved in  
13 sandblasting and painting?  
14 A. No, sir.

Page 50:25 to 51:21

00050:25 Q. Yes. Now, during drilling operations  
00051:01 were you -- did your job change from what you  
02 normally would do when there was no drilling  
03 actually ongoing?  
04 A. No, sir.  
05 Q. But did you have additional  
06 responsibilities during drilling operations?  
07 A. As far as anything that had to do with  
08 crane work or cleaning or assisting whoever might  
09 have needed some help, that was pretty much it.  
10 Q. Okay. Did you ever get involved with  
11 things like well control monitoring?  
12 A. No, sir.  
13 Q. Did you ever get involved with -- with  
14 things like kick detection or kick control?  
15 A. No, sir.  
16 Q. Did you ever work with the blowout  
17 preventer, the BOP?  
18 A. No, sir.  
19 Q. You ever get involved in the maintenance  
20 of the blue pod and the yellow pod on the BOP?  
21 A. No, sir.

Page 56:18 to 56:22

00056:18 Q. If mud was being offloaded, would you

19 have been participating in that process?  
20 A. No, sir. All we were required to do is  
21 hook up the hose, and the crane would lower it  
22 down to the boat, and then it's out of our hands.

Page 57:01 to 57:07

00057:01 Q. Let me tell you that the evidence does  
02 reveal at this point that they were offloading  
03 mud to the DAMON BANKSTON.  
04 Would you -- would you surmise that maybe  
05 you were not assigned to that task of helping to  
06 hook up the DAMON BANKSTON?  
07 A. I may not have been.

Page 58:03 to 58:14

00058:03 Q. Okay. So simultaneous operations might  
04 be both cranes -- two cranes working at one time,  
05 correct?  
06 A. Yes, sir, that's what we --  
07 Q. Did you ever understand it to also mean  
08 that there might be activity with the crane while  
09 drilling or cementing or other tasks were being  
10 performed?  
11 A. Yes, sir.  
12 Q. Did you ever hear that the use of the  
13 crane during certain sensitive operations could  
14 affect the monitoring of the well?

Page 58:19 to 59:03

00058:19 A. Yes, sir.  
20 Q. Okay. What did you hear?  
21 A. The weight of the crane moving because --  
22 you know, that's just from what my crane operator  
23 explained to me, you know --  
24 Q. Yes, sir.  
25 A. -- why we couldn't use the crane at the  
00059:01 specific time, that the crane would, you know,  
02 list the rig. As far as what it had to do with  
03 the well, I had no clue.

Page 60:03 to 60:13

00060:03 And one of the things I thought I'd ask  
04 you out of the gate here is when did you first  
05 realize -- when you were back there working with  
06 the gantry crane, when did you first realize that  
07 something had gone wrong?  
08 A. When I first realized that something had  
09 actually gone wrong is when I seen that we had  
10 took that kick and the mud was, you know, coming

11 up out of the well. And that's -- that's when I  
12 first realized that, you know, all the bad  
13 happened.

Page 61:20 to 62:06

00061:20 Q. Poorly asked question.  
21 What I meant was, what did you see and  
22 where was it coming from so far as what you saw  
23 when you began to see the mud, realizing there  
24 was something going wrong?  
25 A. Well, when I first seen the mud, it  
00062:01 was -- it was shooting as high as the crown, you  
02 know. It was pretty -- it was pretty extreme.  
03 And we kind of backed away from the rig floor,  
04 the area we was standing at, you know, back  
05 towards the aft of the rig. And I realized, you  
06 know, it was a pretty good kick.

Page 62:09 to 62:18

00062:09 Q. And so did you ask someone, What the heck  
10 is going on?  
11 A. No, sir. I kind of knew that that's what  
12 had happened. But as far as -- it was a -- it  
13 was a -- it was a lot of mud coming out of that  
14 well.  
15 Q. And was it raining down onto the deck  
16 where you were working?  
17 A. Yes, sir. It was raining down  
18 everywhere.

Page 63:01 to 63:05

00063:01 Q. Describe the mud.  
02 A. The mud was real thick. And I was  
03 just -- it was coming out by tons. It was  
04 shooting high, you know, getting -- making a mess  
05 everywhere.

Page 63:21 to 65:01

00063:21 Q. Was there a PA system or anything like  
22 that to which you could have listened to hear  
23 warnings about what was going on?  
24 A. Could you be more specific. Like we had  
25 PA systems. But as far as to be able to tell if  
00064:01 there was a warning or not, they'd have to, you  
02 know, go over to the PA system and say something.  
03 But no one was, I mean, saying anything or  
04 nothing like that --  
05 Q. All right. The impression I get, then,  
06 was that you were surprised --

07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. -- obviously?  
09 What did you do in response to the sort  
10 of rain -- raining of mud onto the deck?  
11 A. Well, in response to the mud raining  
12 down, kind of just backed up away from the -- you  
13 know, that area and was thinking to myself, Man,  
14 we've got a mess to clean up now. So -- and  
15 that's pretty much it, and hoping that they shut  
16 it in.  
17 Q. Okay. And then what happened?  
18 A. The mud had quit flowing. And so I --  
19 you know, I thought to myself, Well, they got  
20 it -- the well shut in, you know, I guess. And  
21 then started to have -- heard a real loud hissing  
22 noise, which was the gas, which sounded, you  
23 know, loud, real loud. And then after that the  
24 rig went into darkness, and that's when the  
25 engine exploded. And after that it was just  
00065:01 frantic, you know.

Page 66:05 to 66:16

00066:05 Q. Now, you said, you know, the engines  
06 exploded, but at the time there was no way for  
07 you to know what was exploding. Is that a fair  
08 statement?  
09 A. Yes, sir, that's a fair statement. The  
10 only thing I can recall was just hearing the  
11 engines revving up real loud.  
12 Q. You did hear that?  
13 A. Yes, sir.  
14 Q. How close were you to the engines?  
15 A. I was one deck -- let's see -- one deck  
16 above the engines, so it was pretty close.

Page 70:23 to 71:09

00070:23 Q. Now, did the explosion only involve sound  
24 and percussion, the feeling of it, or was there a  
25 visual component to the explosion?  
00071:01 A. It was just --  
02 Q. Was there a ball of fire or anything like  
03 that, sir?  
04 A. Well, I can remember after the explosion  
05 seeing the -- the well on fire. It ignited the  
06 gas, you know. And then part of the deck that we  
07 was standing on was, you know, kind of peeled  
08 like a banana peel as far as the metal deck  
09 there.

Page 83:19 to 83:19

00083:19 between Exhibits 4553 and 4554, did you -- was

Page 84:06 to 84:19

00084:06 Q. All right. Did the three of you who were  
07 together, the three roustabouts, Hebert, new guy  
08 and you, did you stay together as you -- as you  
09 went from point No. 3 on 4553 to lifeboat No. 1  
10 on 4554?  
11 A. Yes, sir.  
12 Q. You didn't lose anybody along the way?  
13 A. No, sir. We --  
14 Q. Did you gain any -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.  
15 A. We tried to stay together. And we had  
16 another explosion that took us all off our feet  
17 again and, you know, just adrenaline rush. We,  
18 you know, get back up and do what we know to do.  
19 Just keep going.

Page 89:10 to 90:04

00089:10 Q. Yes, sir. Did you see any other members  
11 of the roustabout and crane operating crew arrive  
12 at that -- at that muster station or -- or over  
13 at muster station No. 2?  
14 A. I seen a few, yes, sir. But it was -- at  
15 the time you had -- I mean, you had people that  
16 wasn't even waiting on, you know, muster or  
17 nothing. They was just jumping off the rig.  
18 They --  
19 Q. Tell me about that.  
20 A. They was ready to -- you know, they  
21 knew -- I'm pretty -- everybody on the rig knew  
22 that that wasn't good, and you only had a matter  
23 of minutes before you can get off there or you're  
24 going to lose your life. So...  
25 Q. You saw some man or woman jump overboard?  
00090:01 A. Oh, yes, sir. There was a few people  
02 that didn't even -- didn't take them no time.  
03 You know, they was -- they put on a life -- that  
04 jacket and they -- jumping.

Page 91:10 to 92:04

00091:10 Q. When did you finally get into the  
11 capsule?  
12 A. They were, you know, forcing people into  
13 the capsule.  
14 Q. Who was forcing people into it?  
15 A. Just everybody. You know, everybody was  
16 just frantic, you know. Get in the boat. Get in  
17 the boat.  
18 Q. When we say "capsule" -- and that's my

19 mistake -- the capsule is the lifeboat, correct?  
 20 A. Yes, sir.  
 21 Q. That's the one we've been talking about,  
 22 lifeboat No. 1, correct?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. And so am I fair in characterizing this  
 25 situation as -- the word "chaotic" comes to mind.  
 00092:01 Does that make sense to you?  
 02 A. Yes, sir.  
 03 Q. Things in chaos?  
 04 A. Yes, sir.

Page 104:19 to 105:07

00104:19 Q. Did you climb out of that forward hatch  
 20 and onto the rim of the lifeboat and then get up?  
 21 How did that happen? Can you enlighten us a  
 22 little bit about how you got off.  
 23 A. They had -- the door that you enter the  
 24 lifeboat in, that's the door that we exited out  
 25 of.  
 00105:01 Q. Okay.  
 02 A. If I can recall correctly, we got the  
 03 lifeboat as close to the DAMON BANKSTON as we  
 04 could, and as you exited out, the -- it was just  
 05 a -- you know, a step up. We had to -- you know,  
 06 somebody had to grab you and pick you up and help  
 07 assist you, you know, on the DAMON BANKSTON --

Page 105:15 to 105:23

00105:15 Q. But even in calm seas, was it difficult  
 16 from -- getting from the lifeboat to the DAMON  
 17 BANKSTON?  
 18 A. Yes, sir, it was, because it was -- the  
 19 life raft was bouncing back and forth, you know,  
 20 up against the DAMON BANKSTON.  
 21 Q. You say "life raft." You meant the  
 22 lifeboat?  
 23 A. The lifeboat, yes, sir. I'm sorry.

Page 114:15 to 114:17

00114:15 Q. Now, was it your understanding that BP  
 16 would pay money if there were no reported  
 17 injuries aboard the vessel?

Page 114:19 to 115:07

00114:19 A. As -- as my understanding, that's -- if  
 20 there were no reported injuries, the rig either  
 21 got a reward of some such or I guess they would  
 22 pay us some money apiece, like a -- as long as

23 there was no injuries on the rig that was  
24 reported.  
25 Q. (BY MR. PALMINTIER) Okay. And it's okay  
00115:01 if -- let me ask it this way. Were you aware  
02 that these incentives were in place before the  
03 explosion, in other words, that you would get  
04 money if there were no reported injuries or if a  
05 certain amount of time was saved in the -- in the  
06 performance of the task at hand or any of those  
07 things?

Page 115:09 to 116:01

00115:09 A. I wasn't aware that we were going to  
10 receive that money. I -- from my memory, the rig  
11 was going to receive a certain amount of money,  
12 and they was going to use it as far as materials  
13 on the rig. I didn't -- I didn't know we was  
14 going to receive anything or anything like that.  
15 But as far as that goes, I know that if  
16 you get the job done and do it in a, you know,  
17 specific amount of time and safety, you would --  
18 they would, you know, reward you or whatever.  
19 But I thought it was just going to be for the  
20 rig.  
21 Q. (BY MR. PALMINTIER) And that was BP that  
22 was going to be paying that money, no matter who  
23 it went to, correct?  
24 A. Yes, sir.  
25 Q. And that incentive was, among other  
00116:01 things, to get the job done quickly, correct?

Page 116:06 to 116:17

00116:06 A. Not necessarily. But in a way, you know,  
07 they -- I was -- from what I was taught, you  
08 know, if you get done in a, you know, specific  
09 amount of time, good time, they will reward you  
10 for that and as long as you do it safely, you  
11 know.  
12 But the -- if anybody knew about a bonus  
13 on the rig, they -- it was -- you know, everybody  
14 wanted a bonus or something like that to happen  
15 because more money means more food on the table  
16 for your family and extra bills that can be paid.  
17 So...

Page 118:14 to 118:21

00118:14 Q. Who was the crane operator?  
15 A. Dale Burkeen.  
16 Q. Okay.  
17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. And you'd actually worked for him before,  
19 correct?  
20 A. Yes, sir. I worked for him the whole  
21 time I'd been there.

Page 133:02 to 133:09

00133:02 Q. And on the Transocean rigs, a much bigger  
03 rig, you're also doing a lot of cleaning and  
04 maintenance of the rig itself, right?  
05 A. Yes, sir.  
06 Q. But you're also helping to put tools  
07 together and work with cranes?  
08 A. Yes, sir. A lot -- a lot more crane  
09 work.

Page 134:21 to 135:11

00134:21 Q. And when you're on board the -- when you  
22 were on board the DEEPWATER HORIZON you followed  
23 the instructions of your supervisor, right?  
24 A. Yes, sir.  
25 Q. And your supervisor was -- was the crane  
00135:01 operator, either Dale Burkeen or Micah Sandell,  
02 depending on the shift?  
03 A. Yes, sir.  
04 Q. And I think you've already testified they  
05 reported then to the deck foreman, right?  
06 A. Yes, sir.  
07 Q. And the deck foreman was Bill Johnson?  
08 A. Yes, sir.  
09 Q. Now, all three of those individuals  
10 worked for Transocean, correct?  
11 A. Yes, sir.

Page 136:10 to 136:21

00136:10 Q. Did you -- I think you already said this,  
11 but I just want to be clear for my own  
12 understanding. Did you have much interaction at  
13 all with the driller or the toolpusher on the rig  
14 floor on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
15 A. As in --  
16 Q. As in working with them in operations?  
17 A. No, sir.  
18 Q. Okay. And did you have any reason to  
19 believe that the driller or toolpushers on the  
20 DEEPWATER HORIZON were not competent to do their  
21 job?

Page 136:23 to 137:04

00136:23 A. No, sir, I didn't have no reason to



24 believe they weren't.  
25 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) And no one from  
00137:01 Transocean communicated any safety concerns to  
02 you regarding the activities that were taking  
03 place on the rig, did they?  
04 A. No, sir.

Page 139:15 to 139:22

00139:15 Q. And throughout working with TODCO and  
16 Hercules and then Transocean, you received  
17 training on safety?  
18 A. Yes, sir. Most of my training came from  
19 when I started with Transocean.  
20 Q. Okay. So you received safety training  
21 when you first started with Transocean?  
22 A. Yes, sir.

Page 140:09 to 143:15

00140:09 Q. And from the time you came on board the  
10 HORIZON until right before the incident, you  
11 never felt like your safety was unreasonably at  
12 risk, right?  
13 A. No, sir.  
14 Q. You never felt unsafe in performing your  
15 duties?  
16 A. No, sir. As far as when you -- when you  
17 go to work offshore, you -- you pretty much know  
18 what you're signing on for. I mean, it's a  
19 dangerous job. So everything out there can kill  
20 you just like that, no matter what it is. So you  
21 try to be as safe as possible, you know.  
22 Q. It's a dangerous job, but you do  
23 everything you can to make it safe for you and  
24 your fellow coworkers, right?  
25 A. Yes, sir.  
00141:01 Q. And you've heard the term "time-out for  
02 safety," right?  
03 A. Yes, sir.  
04 Q. You're familiar with it?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. And if you -- it means if you or anyone  
07 raises a safety concern that requires a time-out,  
08 that work on the rig would have stopped, right?  
09 A. Yes, sir.  
10 Q. And if you felt that there was an unsafe  
11 condition aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON that  
12 required work to stop to correct the unsafe  
13 condition, you would have called a time-out for  
14 safety, right?  
15 A. Well, that's also according to what  
16 condition it could be. That's going back to what  
17 I said a while ago. If I don't know about the

18 condition, there is no way I can -- you know what  
19 I mean?

20 Q. Of course. Right. So this would only be  
21 a condition that you would be able to --

22 A. Right.

23 Q. -- know about or identify, right?

24 A. This was mainly -- it was mainly used for  
25 that load is not hooked up right or that shackle  
00142:01 is no good. You know, you've got your hand in  
02 the wrong place. The deck is slippery. Let's  
03 call a time-out, mop it up. As far as the area I  
04 worked in, that's manly what it was used for for  
05 us.

06 Q. And so there were time-outs for safety  
07 used in your experience working on the DEEPWATER  
08 HORIZON?

09 A. Yes, sir, we had -- we had time-outs for  
10 safety, but --

11 Q. And you --

12 A. -- only in our -- you know, our area.

13 Q. And you never felt concern about calling  
14 that time-out for safety when you felt it was  
15 necessary, right?

16 A. No, sir.

17 Q. Because it was important for the safety  
18 of yourself and your fellow coworkers, right?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Do you recall about how many times there  
21 were time-outs for safety during your time on the  
22 DEEPWATER HORIZON?

23 A. The whole time or --

24 Q. Do you know the approximate number the  
25 whole time?

00143:01 A. The whole time I was on there? Oh, no.

02 Q. I mean, are we talking about ten, are we  
03 talking about a hundred?

04 A. I imagine there was lots of time-outs for  
05 safety called. You know, they had to -- we tried  
06 to practice a lot as -- you know, as a group, as  
07 a rig. But sometimes, you know, you didn't have  
08 nothing. Then you didn't -- you know, there  
09 really wouldn't --

10 Q. There wouldn't be a need for calling a  
11 time-out?

12 A. -- wouldn't be a need for a -- to call a  
13 time-out.

14 Q. If there wasn't an unsafe condition?

15 A. Right.

Page 145:13 to 145:17

00145:13 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) Strike that.  
14 Is it your understanding that Transocean  
15 expected every employee to interrupt an operation  
16 to prevent an incident from occurring if they

17 thought that the operation was unsafe?

Page 145:20 to 146:02

00145:20 A. To my understanding, if -- if you thought  
21 the incident was unsafe, they -- you should call  
22 a time-out, you know, and fix it, you know,  
23 whatever the problem is.  
24 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) And that was your  
25 understanding of what was expected on the rig  
00146:01 from everyone?  
02 A. Yes, sir.

Page 146:18 to 146:20

00146:18 Q. You didn't think that there would be  
19 negative consequences to you for stopping the job  
20 to correct an unsafe condition --

Page 146:22 to 147:08

00146:22 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) -- did you?  
23 A. It says that anyone, you know, could stop  
24 the job any time, no matter, you know, the task  
25 or whatever. But as far as that goes, being at  
00147:01 the bottom of the totem pole, you don't want to  
02 just jump up and stop a big task if you don't  
03 know totally what's going on or say you don't  
04 know exactly. It's just according to the  
05 situation. That's a hard question there.  
06 Q. I understand. It depends on what is  
07 going on and what you know about the situation?  
08 A. Right. It's according to what I know.

Page 150:13 to 150:15

00150:13 Q. Did you feel that Transocean provided  
14 adequate safety training for the crew?  
15 A. Yes, sir.

Page 150:22 to 150:24

00150:22 Q. And you didn't recall there being a kick  
23 in the well on March 8th; is that right?  
24 A. No, sir.

Page 151:15 to 151:19

00151:15 Q. So you didn't receive any additional  
16 training or safety drills related to -- to that  
17 kick?  
18 A. To that kick?

19 Q. Uh-huh.

Page 151:21 to 151:21

00151:21 A. Not that I recall.

Page 153:17 to 154:05

00153:17 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) Before your -- before  
18 your -- before going on tour on April 20th, 2010,  
19 you attended your pretour meeting; is that right?  
20 A. Yes, sir.  
21 Q. And that usually takes place around  
22 11:00 o'clock?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. And you go on shift at 12:00?  
25 A. Yes, anywhere between 11:30-something,  
00154:01 12:00 o'clock.  
02 Q. And during the pretour meeting, there  
03 were discussions about what was going to happen  
04 that day or that day's operations?  
05 A. Yes, sir.

Page 155:10 to 156:21

00155:10 Q. Mr. Johnson, I want to refer you to Tab 2  
11 in your booklet. It's the statement that you  
12 made to the U.S. Coast Guard. And you've already  
13 said that this is your handwriting, right, and  
14 you recall making this statement?  
15 A. Yes, sir.  
16 Q. And in fact you signed it, right?  
17 A. It's marked --  
18 Q. I think they may have blacked out your  
19 signature. But is that where you recall signing  
20 this statement?  
21 A. Yes, sir.  
22 Q. You recognize this as your statement,  
23 right?  
24 A. Yes, sir.  
25 Q. I think you've already said that, but I  
00156:01 just want to make clear.  
02 And it looks like you made the statement  
03 at about 4:00 p.m. on April 21st, 2010. Does  
04 that sound right?  
05 A. Yes, sir.  
06 Q. And was it a -- was it a true statement  
07 at the time, from what you recall?  
08 A. Yes, sir. But I was in very -- I was  
09 very upset. My adrenaline was pretty high and I  
10 didn't know, you know, what this was all about,  
11 and I just wrote to the best of my knowledge what  
12 I seen. That's it.

13 Q. That's fair. I think that's all that  
14 could be expected.

15 I just want to ask you about some of the  
16 statements that you made in this -- in this  
17 document. It says first, it -- is it fair to say  
18 that it recounts the events as you remember  
19 them -- or as you remembered it at the time, the  
20 evening of April 20th, 2010?

21 A. Yes, sir.

Page 158:09 to 158:22

00158:09 Q. When you saw mud shooting up from the rig  
10 and suspected that it was a blowout, you said in  
11 your statement that you were pretty sure that  
12 they would have had it shut in in time?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Is that right?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. And "it" in that statement is the well  
17 we're talking about; is that right?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. And the "they" who you expected to have  
20 it shut in were the driller and the toolpusher --  
21 toolpusher on the rig floor; is that right?

22 A. The drill crew.

Page 158:24 to 159:03

00158:24 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) The drill crew.

25 So you expected the drill crew to have  
00159:01 shut the well in by then, by the time you saw the  
02 mud shooting?

03 A. I didn't --

Page 159:06 to 159:13

00159:06 A. I didn't expect it. I just figured, you  
07 know, if everything went as it should, it  
08 would've been, you know, shut in, you know, a  
09 little quicker than what it was.

10 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) And to your  
11 understanding, the shutting in that you're  
12 referring to would -- has to be done by the drill  
13 crew?

Page 159:15 to 159:16

00159:15 A. Anybody that's trained in that area, I  
16 guess.

Page 159:20 to 161:03

00159:20 You stated earlier that you heard from  
 21 the crane operator -- and I'm not sure whether  
 22 you were referring to Dale or Micah at the  
 23 time -- that sometimes crane operations would  
 24 have to be stopped because of something going on  
 25 on the rig floor; is that right?

00160:01 A. Yes, sir.

02 Q. Because sometimes on the rig there's  
 03 going to be simultaneous operations, right?

04 A. Yes, sir.

05 Q. And I think you said that the reason for  
 06 that was that sometimes crane operations could  
 07 affect the ability for those on the rig floor to  
 08 conduct the kind of operations they needed to be  
 09 conducting at the time?

10 A. I'm not sure what operations, but yes,  
 11 sir.

12 Q. And so that's, I guess, what I wanted to  
 13 understand a little better. You don't know what  
 14 kind of activities the crane operator was  
 15 referring to that had to be -- that were more  
 16 sensitive, right?

17 A. The only way I would know is if my crane  
 18 operator told me, you know, if he called me and  
 19 let me know, Hey, that's why we shut down. We'll  
 20 be back up in a minute. Most of the time he'd  
 21 say, We can't use the crane right now due to rig  
 22 floor duties. Y'all go get y'all a drink of  
 23 water or Gatorade or something and then come on  
 24 back.

25 Q. So your assumption there is someone  
 00161:01 higher up was managing various activities and  
 02 would stop one if they needed?

03 A. Well --

Page 161:05 to 161:12

00161:05 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) In order to --

06 A. The -- the crane operators, you know,  
 07 they would report to the deck foreman if -- I  
 08 guess if they needed to shut down an operation,  
 09 they would call the deck foreman, and then we  
 10 would call the crane operator.

11 Q. So your understanding was that someone up  
 12 there was keeping those things in mind, right?

Page 161:14 to 161:18

00161:14 A. As in --

15 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) As in someone --  
 16 someone above the deck foreman's level in the rig  
 17 crew was managing which activities couldn't go on  
 18 at the same time?

Page 161:20 to 161:24

00161:20 A. Yes, sir. It had to be --  
21 Q. (BY MR. TRESSLER) Because word was  
22 coming down?  
23 A. -- it had to come from somewhere. I  
24 mean, I just don't know where.

Page 166:05 to 166:15

00166:05 And you're familiar with the concept of  
06 well control?  
07 A. With just the concept of it, yes, sir.  
08 Q. The concept of well control?  
09 A. Well control.  
10 Q. And well control is not -- was not a part  
11 of your job at any point?  
12 A. No, sir.  
13 Q. You didn't have any role or participation  
14 in the control of the Macondo well, did you?  
15 A. No, sir.

Page 169:07 to 169:22

00169:07 Q. All right. Did you feel in April of 2010  
08 that the training that you received from  
09 Transocean from the time you commenced employment  
10 with them, I believe, in the spring of '09 --  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. -- up until April of 2010, that that  
13 training was of a sufficient and thorough quality  
14 that you knew what you were doing out there as a  
15 roustabout and could perform your job safely?  
16 A. Yes, sir.  
17 Q. Do you also believe that the training and  
18 the on-the-job experience that you had with  
19 Transocean enabled you to identify safety  
20 hazards, at least insofar as your job duties and  
21 responsibilities are concerned?  
22 A. Yes, sir.

Page 172:24 to 173:15

00172:24 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Now, let's turn to the  
25 safety practices and policies of Transocean,  
00173:01 specifically those aboard the HORIZON. Others  
02 have testified that safety was a priority, the  
03 law of utmost importance. Safety was the single  
04 most important thing we did on the rig, just to  
05 name a few.  
06 Do you agree with those characterizations  
07 of Transocean's safety program and practices

08 aboard the HORIZON from the time of your  
09 employment in March of '09 through April 20th of  
10 2010?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. All right. At no time, Mr. Johnson, did  
13 anyone with Transocean ever ask you to put your  
14 safety or the safety of other crew members behind  
15 something else; is that right?

Page 173:17 to 177:17

00173:17 A. As in?

18 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Safety was always first;  
19 is that right?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. All right. Was it -- is it fair to say  
22 that safety was preached 24 hours a day, seven  
23 days a week aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. All right.

00174:01 A. Somewhat.

02 Q. Now, we had talked about earlier safety  
03 meetings that were conducted weekly, correct?

04 A. Yes, sir.

05 Q. And those were conducted by who?

06 A. The tour meetings?

07 Q. No. I'm talking about the weekly safety  
08 meetings.

09 A. Oh, the weekly safety meetings.

10 Q. Let's go back. Do you know what I'm  
11 talking about, a weekly safety meeting where the  
12 whole crew was involved?

13 A. Those were conducted by Transocean's  
14 safety guy.

15 Q. The RSTC?

16 A. The RSTC.

17 Q. All right. Was there a BP representative  
18 present in those meetings as well from a safety  
19 standpoint?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Did both the BP representative and the  
22 Transocean representative contribute  
23 substantively to the safety discussions, lectures  
24 and teachings of that meeting?

25 A. Yes, sir.

00175:01 Q. All right. At -- during those meetings  
02 various topics are covered, from personal  
03 protection, environment, well control, et cetera;  
04 is that right?

05 A. Yes, sir.

06 Q. All right. Now, in addition to those  
07 meetings, I think you also testified that there  
08 are pretour safety meetings, correct?

09 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. And tell us who conducts those and how



11 they differ from the weekly safety meetings.

12 A. The pretour meeting is conducted by the  
13 company man, the OIM and the upper management  
14 guys as far as on the rig, and the safety --  
15 safety guys.

16 And then the crew and -- they're  
17 different from the weekly meetings because of --  
18 in the weekly meetings they go over, you know,  
19 topics that has happened on the other rigs and  
20 things we have recorded during that week or the  
21 time we've been on the rig.

22 The pretour meetings are mostly about  
23 what's going to go on on tour.

24 Q. More the immediate tasks that's facing  
25 you --

00176:01 A. More immediate.

02 Q. -- in the next 12 hours?

03 A. Yes, sir.

04 Q. All right. Now, in addition to that,  
05 when you and your immediate crew, perhaps the  
06 crane operator and the other roustabouts, when  
07 y'all would arrive at your designated work area  
08 aboard the rig, would you sometimes have yet  
09 another meeting just with that small group to go  
10 over what's about to happen?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. And what were those called?

13 A. We would do think plans, and then we'd go  
14 over them together, you know, discuss what we  
15 thought could be hazards in the tasks and all  
16 that. And once we discussed what, you know, we  
17 thought could be hazards or what we was going to  
18 be doing in the tasks, we'd continue on with our  
19 job.

20 Q. All right. Was there any -- are there  
21 any manuals or reference materials, such as disks  
22 and manuals, that you would have access to in  
23 addition to these meetings that would also supply  
24 you and your supervisors with guidance from a  
25 safety standpoint?

00177:01 A. Yes, sir. They had some manuals that you  
02 could go to and look in as far as the way certain  
03 jobs should be done and conducted and stuff.

04 Q. All right. Based upon your 12 months of  
05 employment, approximately, aboard the HORIZON, is  
06 it -- is it fair to say that safety was of the  
07 utmost concern?

08 A. Yes, sir.

09 Q. All right. Do you know what I mean when  
10 you characterize somebody as callous or reckless,  
11 not really caring about something?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. If someone said that the -- the attitude  
14 of those who worked aboard the HORIZON and the  
15 supervisors who worked aboard the HORIZON were

16 careless and reckless towards safety, would you  
17 disagree with that statement?

Page 177:19 to 178:06

00177:19 A. As in -- what are you -- what do you mean  
20 by that question? I mean, as far as --  
21 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) I'm asking, based upon  
22 what you saw and observed from the standpoint of  
23 the training that you went through, the safety  
24 program that you lived and experienced, if  
25 someone tried to say that Transocean did not take  
00178:01 safety seriously and was reckless about safety  
02 and making sure that the rig operated in a safe  
03 manner, I'm asking you if you would take issue  
04 and disagree with that statement based upon what  
05 you, Dustin Johnson, saw with your own eyes and  
06 worked aboard that rig for over 12 months?

Page 178:08 to 179:22

00178:08 A. As far as from me working on the rig and  
09 being on that rig with those guys, you know, you  
10 have to trust one another. So I thought, you  
11 know, everybody worked together, pretty much.  
12 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) You had -- you did not  
13 observe anything or see anything that would cause  
14 you to not trust one of your fellow crew members  
15 from a safety standpoint; is that right?  
16 A. That's correct, yes.  
17 Q. All right. Now, you testified earlier  
18 that there was a, quote, BP safety -- rig safety  
19 person, I think is the way you described the  
20 person, aboard the rig. Did I get the title  
21 right?  
22 A. Yes, sir.  
23 Q. Can you tell us what, in your view, you  
24 saw that person do or what that role was aboard  
25 the rig?  
00179:01 A. The -- the --  
02 Q. The BP rig safety representative.  
03 A. He -- he would come in the meetings, you  
04 know, and he would bring up certain -- certain  
05 subjects that he'd like to talk about or  
06 congratulate us if we've done a good job or --  
07 you know, mostly he -- his -- from what I seen,  
08 his job was, you know, to ensure safety also, you  
09 know.  
10 Q. Okay. Would that person sometimes  
11 interject and make suggestions or changes as to  
12 the way y'all were doing something on the rig  
13 that he thought maybe should be done differently?  
14 Do you remember ever seeing that?  
15 A. Yes, sir. He's -- I remember -- you

16 know, he voiced his opinion about some things,  
17 and if we seen that, you know, it would work  
18 better. We tried it, you know. We done it.  
19 Q. All right. So that person, from your  
20 standpoint, wasn't just there as a figurehead.  
21 They were actively involved in the safety of the  
22 rig; is that right?

Page 179:24 to 179:24

00179:24 A. Right.

Page 181:16 to 181:24

00181:16 Q. Can you describe for us the various  
17 alarms, sounds or verbal notifications that you  
18 personally heard from the time you first  
19 observed -- observed something going awry or  
20 going different until the time that you got on  
21 board the lifeboat.  
22 A. The only alarm I'd heard was the abandon  
23 ship alarm, and that was -- I'm not sure when  
24 that was conducted or turned on or whatever.

Page 186:22 to 187:08

00186:22 Q. All right. Now, I want to go back to  
23 your testimony on the sequence of events. And  
24 I'm not going to walk through it in detail again.  
25 And correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you said  
00187:01 you saw that mud was flowing all the way to the  
02 crown. At some point that stopped. Then you  
03 heard a hissing. And then subsequent to that is  
04 when you heard an explosion?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. Is that, generally speaking, the correct  
07 sequence of events?  
08 A. Yes, sir.

Page 188:25 to 192:07

00188:25 Q. Fair enough. I'd like to talk to you now  
00189:01 about some individuals. First of all, let's talk  
02 about Dale Burkeen, your crane operator.  
03 He was a good friend of yours as well?  
04 A. Yes, sir.  
05 Q. He was a good fellow, a good man?  
06 A. Yes, sir, he was a dang good man.  
07 Q. Did you perform any opinions working  
08 under Mr. Burkeen as to how he conducted himself  
09 and those under him from a safety standpoint?  
10 A. No, sir.  
11 Q. You never did?

12 A. He was -- he's -- he was a good  
13 supervisor, you know. He did his job.

14 Q. Okay. How long did you work under him?

15 A. The whole -- the whole time I was on the  
16 rig.

17 Q. All right. So you -- basically, half of  
18 your life was spent working under Mr. Burkeen  
19 from February -- excuse me -- March of '09 to  
20 April of 2010?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. All right. What I'm asking you is,  
23 during that period of working with him  
24 practically six months solid, did you form any  
25 opinions of what you thought of him as a  
00190:01 supervisor insofar as safety was concerned?

02 A. As far as whether he was unsafe --

03 Q. Yeah.

04 A. -- or whether he did his job --

05 Q. Whether he cut corners and made y'all do  
06 things that were unsafe, or whether he was a  
07 by-the-book, safety-conscious, hard-working  
08 individual?

09 A. No, sir. Dale looked out for his guys.  
10 He believed that safety was, you know, an issue.  
11 He didn't want nobody to get hurt. Dale was --  
12 he was a caring person, you know. He didn't --  
13 he didn't want to see nobody get hurt, so he made  
14 sure, you know, we done it the right way and  
15 didn't try to cut no corners.

16 Q. All right. You would believe that Dale,  
17 for example, would, in any situation, have done  
18 basically whatever he could to prevent injury to  
19 either himself or his fellow crew members; is  
20 that right?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Wasn't somebody to take safety lightly?

23 A. No, sir.

24 Q. Wasn't reckless --

25 A. No, sir.

00191:01 Q. -- insofar as safety was concerned?

02 A. No, sir.

03 Q. All right. Now I'd like to talk about  
04 Mr. Jimmy Harrell. Did you work under  
05 Mr. Harrell -- a few layers below him, but under  
06 his authority aboard the HORIZON from March of  
07 '09 to April of 2010?

08 A. Yes, sir.

09 Q. All right. Did you get to know  
10 Mr. Harrell as a -- as a person as well as a  
11 supervisor?

12 A. No, sir. I talked to him here and there  
13 about a few things. But as far as getting to  
14 know him personally, he was always too busy, so I  
15 really didn't get a chance to --

16 Q. Okay. Let's separate the personal side

17 of it and look at what he did as an OIM and in  
 18 his professional capacity as the OIM aboard the  
 19 HORIZON.

20 Did you see him in action, so to speak,  
 21 in safety meetings, walking around the rig, in  
 22 operations meetings and in a supervisory role at  
 23 various time over the last 12 months before April  
 24 2010?

25 A. Yes, sir.

00192:01 Q. Based upon what you saw, I want to ask  
 02 you the same questions that I asked you about  
 03 Mr. Burkeen.

04 Did you feel that Mr. Harrell was one who  
 05 took safely -- safety aboard the rig and for his  
 06 crew very seriously?

07 A. Yes, sir.

Page 192:09 to 192:12

00192:09 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Did you ever see  
 10 Mr. Harrell do anything or order anyone to do  
 11 anything that would put either his crew, the rig,  
 12 or the environment in danger?

Page 192:14 to 193:06

00192:14 A. I've never, you know, had to really  
 15 experience that with him. I guess could you  
 16 rephrase that question.

17 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Well -- and all I want  
 18 to know is based upon what you saw. I know you  
 19 weren't in every meeting. But everything that  
 20 you saw in his daily activities, how he conducted  
 21 himself as a supervisor and the OIM aboard the  
 22 rig, did you feel as though he would make a  
 23 decision or take an action or ask someone else to  
 24 take an action that would put you, Dustin  
 25 Johnson, in harm's way, for example?

00193:01 A. No, sir, I don't think he did.

02 Q. All right. Do you feel that Mr. Harrell  
 03 would -- like Mr. Burkeen, is the type of  
 04 individual that would do everything within his  
 05 power to ensure that no accidents or injuries  
 06 would occur aboard that rig?

Page 193:08 to 194:10

00193:08 A. No.

09 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Now, did you get to know  
 10 any of the drill crew in any capacity, whether  
 11 personal or professionally? And when I say  
 12 "drill crew," what I'm talking about now is Jason  
 13 Anderson, Randy Ezell, Dewey Revette, Stephen

14 Curtis, and Don Clark, okay, those five  
15 individuals.

16 Let's first talk about those folks. Were  
17 you close to any of those from a personal  
18 standpoint like you were with Mr. Burkeen?

19 A. No, sir, not in a personal standpoint,  
20 but --

21 Q. Did you have interaction with all five of  
22 these individuals on a tour-by-tour,  
23 hitch-by-hitch basis to form an opinion as to  
24 their safety consciousness like you did for  
25 Mr. Burkeen and Mr. Harrell?

00194:01 A. Yes, sir. We worked together.

02 Q. All right. Let's talk about Dewey  
03 Revette and Jason Anderson, in particular.  
04 Mr. Johnson, are you of the opinion that those  
05 individuals were safety conscious?

06 A. As in?

07 Q. Looking out for the safety of the rig,  
08 their fellow crew members, themselves, and the  
09 environment?

10 A. Yes, sir.

Page 194:12 to 194:19

00194:12 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Did you ever see them do  
13 anything, instruct anybody to do anything, or  
14 take any action that, in your view, put the crew,  
15 the rig, or the environment in harm's way?

16 A. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

17 Q. Did you ever see anything that would lead  
18 somebody to say those guys were reckless when it  
19 came to safety?

Page 194:21 to 194:25

00194:21 A. No, sir.

22 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) On the contrary, did you  
23 form an opinion that Mr. Anderson and Mr. Revette  
24 were safety conscious and always working to make  
25 sure that the rig was conducted in a safe manner?

Page 195:02 to 195:09

00195:02 A. From my knowledge, yes, sir.

03 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Did you trust them to be  
04 aboard that rig, living, sleeping, eating and  
05 working 24 hours a day, seven days a week for  
06 multiple times throughout the year? Did you  
07 trust them from a well control standpoint that  
08 you were going to be taken care of in a safe  
09 manner?

Page 195:11 to 195:24

00195:11 A. Really, I had to -- you know, you really  
12 ain't got no choice. You've got to trust your  
13 teammates. You've got to trust them or else, you  
14 know, there ain't much else you can do.  
15 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) Did you ever see  
16 anything that gave you any reason to believe that  
17 those individuals would not do everything in  
18 their power to prevent a well from having an  
19 uncontrolled flow?  
20 A. No, sir.  
21 Q. Do you in your heart of hearts as you sit  
22 here today, knowing those individuals, believe  
23 that they did everything in their power to avoid  
24 what happened out there?

Page 196:01 to 196:06

00196:01 A. Yes, sir, I do.  
02 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) What about Mr. Randy  
03 Ezell, Stephen Curtis and Don Clark? If I asked  
04 you those same series of questions about those  
05 individuals, would your answers be any different?  
06 A. No, sir.

Page 196:08 to 196:17

00196:08 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) And I take it -- you  
09 testified earlier that at least in your work  
10 group people and crew members, if they saw  
11 something unsafe, there was no hesitation or no  
12 repercussion to report that to a supervisor and  
13 say, Hey, let's step back and look at what we're  
14 doing because we need to -- we need to assess  
15 this in another way? You saw that happen in your  
16 group; is that right?  
17 A. Yes, sir.

Page 196:19 to 196:22

00196:19 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) And you never saw any  
20 negative consequences taken against you or any of  
21 your fellow crew members when a person stood up  
22 and said what's right and did that, correct?

Page 196:24 to 197:03

00196:24 A. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.  
25 Q. (BY MR. KALLAM) In fact there were  
00197:01 accolades given at times for those who did that  
02 and actually took control and ensured the safety  
03 aboard the rig; is that right?

Page 197:05 to 197:05

00197:05           A. Yes, sir.

Page 208:17 to 209:06

00208:17           Q. I want to talk a little bit about your  
18 work as a roustabout. I think you categorized it  
19 in two different components.  
20           One was what you kind of considered your  
21 crane work, and that was assisting the crane  
22 operators in placing, you know, drill pipe and  
23 tool joints and casing and that kind of thing,  
24 true?

25           A. Yes, sir.

00209:01           Q. And the other kind of area that you did  
02 was maintenance and cleaning on the rig, and that  
03 was kind of when your crane operator duties were  
04 at a standstill or you didn't have any crane  
05 duties to perform, right?

06           A. Yes, sir.

Page 219:01 to 219:08

00219:01           Q. Okay. I'd like to mark as Exhibit 4558 a  
02 document with the Bates No. TRN-INV 00003413.  
03           (Exhibit 4558 was marked.)

04           Q. (BY MS. ALLAN) And this is a document  
05 that says at the top Confidential Interviewing  
06 Form with the interview name Hebert Morales. You  
07 don't need to read the whole document. I just  
08 want you to have a sense of what this is.

Page 219:12 to 220:21

00219:12           Q. (BY MS. ALLAN) I'll represent to you  
13 that this is a document produced by Transocean  
14 regarding some interviews after the incident with  
15 certain individuals. And I'll be asking you a  
16 little bit about the item on the third page that  
17 ends in 415, the number at the bottom, just at  
18 the top of that.

19           The top of the page that ends in 415  
20 states: Heber looked under the skate and saw mud  
21 like a waterfall. It stopped for three seconds.  
22 The spray started up again and louder. Hebert  
23 was talking to Dustin Johnson, who has worked on  
24 rigs before, and Dustin told Hebert it was coming  
25 out of the degasser.

00220:01           I'm going to stop there. Do you recall  
02 in those moments -- and I know they must have  
03 been very stressful times with mud coming out --



04 do you recall talking to Hebert and saying  
05 anything about coming out of the degasser?  
06 A. Well, he asked where that loud hissing  
07 noise was coming from, and I told him it was  
08 probably coming out of the degasser line.  
09 Q. Do you --  
10 A. That was -- we wasn't talking about the  
11 mud.  
12 Q. Okay. So this is the hissing noise  
13 that --  
14 A. Yes, ma'am.  
15 Q. -- you were thinking of?  
16 A. Yes, ma'am.  
17 Q. And do you recall that conversation?  
18 A. Yes, ma'am.  
19 Q. And is the degasser another term for the  
20 mud gas separator?  
21 A. Yes, ma'am.