



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## Interviewing Form

Interviewee Name:	Stephen Bertone
Job Title:	Chief Engineer
Company:	Transocean
Contact Details:	
Work Address:	Park 10
Work Telephone:	
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	
Home Telephone:	
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	Simon Watson Derek Hart Jana Judkins
Date:	June 24, 2010
Start Time:	8:10am
Stop Time:	10:50am
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	N
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	Yes, handwritten drawing from Stephen.
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	Yes, evacuation routes.
Details of documents, drawing, photographs	

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or other supporting materials taken to interview.	
<b>Interview Plan</b>  Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:	<b>Equipment Questions</b>  1. Did you work with any of the well control or safety systems on the rig, if so which ones  2. Are you aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly or that was out of service. Especially related to the BOP and alarm systems.  3. Were you involved in the BOP between well activity, if so how  4. Were you involved in the Engine safety system tests, specifically the over speeds.  5. Do you know how often the tests were performed.  6. How was the Maintenance on the rig approached, was there a concern over the manning levels or amount of maintenance  7. Were you aware of any safety systems on the rig that were not operating  8. How would you perceive the importance of safety on the rig with respect to completing maintenance  <b>Training and Competency Interview Questions</b>  1. How long have you been with Transocean? 2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience? 3. What is your position? 4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview) 5. What are the training requirements for this position? 6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose? 7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report). 8. Does the training match the job requirements? 9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not? 10. When was your last training session, and what was it? 11. How supportive of training and development was the rig manager-

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	<p>ment? What about shore-base managers?</p> <p>12. Where there any limitations on the training available?</p> <p>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</p> <p>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</p> <p>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</p> <p>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</p> <p>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?</p> <p>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</p> <p>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?</p> <p>20. What safety&amp; survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?</p> <p>21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?</p> <p>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?</p> <p>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?</p> <p><b>Safety Culture Questions</b></p> <p>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</p> <p>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?</p> <p>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?</p> <p>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</p> <p>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?</p> <p>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?</p> <p>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?</p> <p>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</p> <p>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig crews?</p>
<p><b>Stephen Bertone – Chief Engineer</b></p> <p>Stephen started his career with Transocean 12 years ago. He was first onboard the F100 for 3 years and then spent 2 years on the Marianas. Stephen started as an Electrical Supervisor onboard the DWH 7 years ago. One and a half years ago, he was promoted to Maintenance Supervisor/Chief Engineer. Before working offshore, Stephen worked for his father's electrical distribution company, and then went to ITT Electrical College. He received his Journeyman's License and began working for</p>	

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Entex. Stephen was referred to Transocean by a man from Falcon Drilling.

Stephen's worked 6am-6pm. During the morning, he was prepared to meet with Transocean/BP VIPs at 1:30 that afternoon, but his day started out as normal as any other day. He attended a manager's call meeting approximately at 6:30am with Randy Ezell, Jimmy Harrell, Capt. Curt Kuchta, Dave Hackney, Tony Hadley, Paul Johnson and James Kent. There were no well issues discussed on this call, but he mentioned they'd discussed "wrapping up" the well by Friday, April 23<sup>rd</sup>.

After his morning meeting, Stephen returned to his office and prepared for the operations meeting with all of the supervisors at 8:30am. Daily operations were discussed, but again, no mention of well issues. Following the meeting, Stephen continued his ongoing task of preparing the rig for the next rig move. He was putting on the final touches for the between well maintenance for the upcoming rig move and the one following that. He did not attend the 11:00am pre-tour meeting that day, which was not uncommon as he usually attended just 3-4 per week.

Stephen has lunch at approximately 11:30am and then met with the Transocean/BP VIPs at approximately 1:00pm. The scheduled tour, which was attended by Randy Ezell, Jimmy Harrell, Capt. Curt Kuchta, Buddy Trahan, Daun Winslow, and two BP men, started at approximately 4:00pm-4:30pm. Stephen was still on tour, so he had to attend a maintenance meeting first before joining the group for the tour.

Stephen was asked if the crew was distracted by BP's visit or if there was additional preparation in anticipation of their arrival. He said it wasn't a distraction at all and that is wasn't out of the ordinary for different people to visit the rig. The majority of the time the rig was clean and very well kept. Stephen said the work he was doing in preparation for their visit was work he would have been doing anyway.

The tour started on the aft decks, where they looked at the cranes, then made it up to the rig floor at approximately 5:30pm. The group was then lead through the heavy tool storage room. He remembers the mechanics had issues with the iron roughneck earlier in the day. After that, the group went back by the draw works (?) and into the driller's shack. Stephen remembers it was standing room only, as he was the last person to enter. He could not remember if it was Jimmy or Randy, but one of them asked that Stephen continue the tour with Curt and the BP men without them. He was not privy to their conversations, but it seemed to him that there were so many people in the driller's shack, including the BP Company Man, directional drillers, and Transocean drillers.

Stephen then guided the tour to the pipe skate and down the port aft column. They visited the pump rooms, the pontoon, proceeding to the port forward column, and finished at approximately 6:15pm. Stephen then went to eat at approximately 6:30pm and saw Jimmy and Randy in the mess room. There was still no well issues mentioned. Stephen remembers speaking with Buddy Trahan about fuel injectors that had been recently changed to meet new MARPOL requirements. After dinner, Stephen went to the smoke deck and then back to his office to review budget items.

The BP officials and all supervisors attended the 7:00pm meeting. He said the meeting was relaxed, just like every other day. They discussed safety record, status of equipment, yearly budget, 2010 rig goals, plans for the shipyard in 2011, review of upcoming rig moves, but still no mention of well control issues. Stephen said that BP Company Man, Don Vidrine, joined the meeting late and sat down

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without speaking. He said that seemed perfectly normal and there was no indication there was anything wrong at the time.

After the meeting ended between 9:15pm-9:30pm, Stephen and Stan Carden went to his office to drop off paperwork then went to the smoke shack. They saw a red light outside that indicates a no smoke zone, which he very soon learned was because Subsea was venting the tensioners and not because of the presence of gas. He ran into Chris Pleasant, who was coming out of his office, and asked him if the venting was completed. Chris said the venting was complete and that he called the bridge to turn off the red indicator light.

Stephen had a cigarette and went back to his room to shower. He remembered he needed to complete a START Card, so he wrote it before he got in bed. Stephen had just gotten in bed with a book when he heard what he thought was the tensioners bleeding again. He knew Chris said he was finished, so he thought it was strange. The sound of thumping began to increase in speed and volume. It was exceptionally loud in his room because it's near the vent lines and tension exhaust. Stephen said this was approximately 9:45pm. (See map for location of room.)

Stephen said the rig shook with every thump, which continued to get louder and faster. It was then that he heard the first explosion, which blew out the lights in his room. He remembered the hallway had emergency lights, so he opened the door and immediately smelled and tasted fuel. He couldn't tell if there was any damage to his room because it was pitch black. He heard Yancy Keplinger on the PA yelling, "Fire, fire, fire! This is not a drill!" The PA then cut off, but he could still hear the fire bells and see the flashing red lights outside his room. Seconds went by before Stephen saw smoke in the hallway. He saw Jerry Isaac in the hallway while he was still standing in the doorway of his room. The second explosion occurred, which threw Stephen back into his room 10-12 feet. He was not hurt. Stephen said he didn't see fire, and that it was the force of pressure that threw him.

Stephen dressed with boots, hardhat, and lifejacket and ran out the door. He said the hallway was covered in ceiling tiles and insulation and that the emergency lights were still on. Stephen made his way through the hallway to the bottom of the stairwell where he saw 3-5 people looking up at the stairwell and them impassable debris. He yelled for the crew to get to the starboard or port stairwell. (See map for location.)

Stephen went through the port transit room, up the stairs, and to the bridge. He walked in on Capt. Curt yelling at Andrea Fleytas. He said Curt was screaming at her asking why she had activated the EDS and saying they were not in distress. (See drawing of the bridge.)

He ran to his station and pulled up the power stream on the SIMRAD, MCC breakers, engine speed, and power watts, etc., nothing was active just light from the UPS powered screens were lit. He was able to get his screens up because they were on the UPS. The UPS fire and gas panel, purge equipment, and SIMRAD DP systems were all illuminated. When asked about the emergency lights, Stephen said the bridge cannot see illumination at night, and that they use red lenses over the light to maneuver. Stephen did not recall seeing these lights that night on the bridge.

Stephen could see that the engines weren't running, the breakers were open, and the thrusters were down. He said it was dead ship. Stephen immediately called the emergency number 2268 the rings the ECR desk. There was no tone, so he tried again. Stephen had a theory of why the phones

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were dead. He said that the UPS powers the PA system, which is supposed to supply ½ the rig. The ET room had a 2<sup>nd</sup> PA system. He thinks the two engines that came down took out the PA system. The system is not fully redundant, so when one amp is lost the second amp will not pick up. Stephen said the systems are completed separate.

At this point, Stephen thought the top drive was severed at the first explosion. He ran across the bridge and looked up at the rig floor. He saw a solid flame that reached beyond the crown. He wasn't able to see the forward part of the derrick. That's when Stephen realized the well blew out.

Stephen spoke about the engine sequence and said that the set up can be manually designated. When engines go down, 2 more engines will substitute within 20 seconds, even when gas is present. The fire detection system initiates the ventilation louvers in that actual space. Stephen added that he thinks the first explosion was initiated when gas came through the well bore and was sucked into the ventilation system. He said the engines over sped, shut off; the SIMRAD took over and started the next 2 engines.

He was not sure if the damper supply fan closed when gas was detected. Stephen said the SIMRAD might not have recognized gas concentration. He said the engines would have tripped into over speed but not on gas detections. Stephen said that he thinks gas was sucked into the engine space, which then blew the walls out of the pump room, pit house, shaker room, and the handrails. He said that the Inlet and exhaust fans supply the Engine Room, i.e., the engines draw air from the engine room space; there is no direct feed to the engines.

At this point, Stephen had no comprehension of time. He ran back to the panel to see if the next 2 engines in the sequence are starting, but there was nothing happening. Mike Williams came up to the bridge and told Stephen that the engines, pump rooms, and ECR were gone. He was covered with blood all over his face. Stephen ran to the bathroom for a first aid kit, but was only able to find a respirator and toilet paper to assist Mike with his injuries. Stephen was having a hard time believing the engines were destroyed.

Stephen then heard Brent Mayfield say, "Chief, I'm hurt. I'm hurt real bad." He called for a medic and a flashlight and checked Brent's injuries. His head was wounded badly. Stephen said that he could see Brent's skull. Stephen checked the panel again and then saw Chris Pleasant. Stephen asked if they had already activated the EDS, and Chris said that he needed permission first. Daun Winslow said to do it, as Jimmy Harrell was walking in. Stephen asked him if they could activate the EDS, at which point Jimmy gave Chris permission to activate. Stephen said Chris was already at the panel ready to hit the button. Stephen yelled to Chris for verification that he did EDS and Chris confirmed that he had. Chris then confirmed again that he hit the EDS. Stephen then asked Curt if he could start the standby generator.

Doug Brown and Paul Meinhart made their way to the bridge, which was now occupied by Yancy, Andrea, Curt, Jimmy, Daun, Chris, Brent and David Young, who was in and out, and he thinks Pat O'Brien. David handed Stephen a radio before he set out to activate the standby generators. He stood 3 feet away from David, turned the power on, the volume up, selected channel 16 and could not get the radio to work. Stephen said they were dumbfounded that the radios were just dead. However, Yancy and Andrea's radio were working.

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Curt agreed for Stephen to go to the standby generator, so he threw the dead radio down and left the bridge. He was thinking to himself that he knew it was already blown out, the BOP sheared, and fuel in the riser was coming up the rig floor. Stephen's mission was to get to the standby generators and get the fire pumps running. (See map for location.) Mike and Paul joined Stephen to assist. They looked at the deck and saw what looked like "clear and chalky snot" all over the deck. They made their way down the port side and the BOP deck. They looked down into the moon pool, which was totally engulfed in yellow flame.

Once they reached the generator room and got to the engine panel, (see map for location) they tried to get the battery and hydraulics to start by switching from automatic to manual. They hit the start and got nothing. Stephen said Paul was standing in the generator room with the door open. Stephen yelled to him to close the door because the heat from the flames was so overwhelming. Stephen then heard Mike yell, "We've got 24 volts! Why isn't it starting?"

Stephen said they grabbed the laminated start procedures from the wall, which instructed to reset the start buttons and verify voltage, then change the batteries if that did not work. He said the battery should start the hydraulics. The engines still would not turn over. Stephen then ran to the MCC and thought that maybe if they're blown, the electrical system is shorted and telling the standby generator not to start. He said the panel is auto sequence, so he switched it to manual. He tried the generator panel again and got nothing.

Stephen remembers the lights being on in the generator room. He also said that this standby system was checked every week and that he never had any issues getting it started. Stephen added that he's thankful the electrical system wasn't working because had they gotten the standby up and running, the gas probably would have ignited a fire and created another explosion.

The men left the generator room and that's when Stephen said he felt the heat from the fire for the first time. They returned to the bridge and saw that Yancy and Andrea were still on the radios. Stephen's crew had now made it to the bridge. Stephen ran to Curt, who was standing at the water tight door, and he saw that the lifeboats were preparing to leave. Stephen then yelled to the bridge to abandon ship and looked at Yancy and Andrea and said, "Let's go!" (See map for location.)

The four remaining crew members ran downstairs toward the lifeboat/raft deck and saw three men standing over a man on a gurney, who he later found realized was Wyman Wheeler. Stephen ran to the life raft to prepare for abandon ship. He said he got to the davit and remembers looking up and seeing lifeboat 1 was gone. There were no lights working at the time, but the flame from the derrick provided more than enough light to see.

Stephen said that he remembers the hand crank on the life raft being very difficult to maneuver. He said that the cable coming down to the life raft picked out of the cradle and started to swing. (See Stephen's drawing.) He said the rope was so tight that they couldn't disconnect the raft. There was not a pocket knife available to them, and Stephen expressed great concern about this. Stephen did not recall if there was a radio in the life raft.

Stephen said Mike couldn't turn the shackle, but he had a pair of dikes and was able to unscrew the shackle which allowing the life raft to swing off. Stephen said they pulled the painter free and he looked up and saw someone standing on the stairs. He later realized that was probably Mike head-

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ing away from the life raft.

At this point, Stan Carden, Chad Murray and Randy Ezell were attempting to get Wyman's gurney safely into the life raft, but was having difficulty. David Young was already in the life raft with one other person that he does not recall. Stephen had still not loaded the life raft, but had his eyes locked with David. He recalls Capt. Curt saying, "leave him" referring to Wyman. Stephen said, "hell no" and swung Wyman's gurney into the life raft and jumped in after him. He remembers tumbling into the life raft and thinking he was going to die. He said the heat felt like 500 degrees on his skin, even through his gloves. Stephen felt horrible because his weight unbalanced the life raft, which ultimately caused the life raft to develop an angle. It is unsure who if anyone lowered the life raft, or if it lowered under its own weight. He recalls Andrea screaming, "We're going to die!"

Once the life raft dropped, Stephen said the smoke cleared and he jumped into the water with Chad, Paul and Yancy. They started to pull the raft and attempt to swim away while looking up at the rig. He said there was oil and gas everywhere and that the smoke looked like bowling balls.

All of a sudden he saw life vests falling from the rig, and felt terrified that if they landed on the raft he would die. He remembers seeing someone jump from the helipad, which he later learned was Mike Williams. Stephen then heard someone in the life raft yell, "We're still tied to the rig!" Stephen looked up and saw a white rope disappearing into the smoke. It was the painter line still tied to the rig. Chad started to yell for help out at the water. Stephen saw two lights and the Bankston FRC speed up and start grabbing people from the water. Stephen asked for a knife from the Bankston crew, and Capt. Curt grabbed the knife and cut the rope. Stephen continued to hold onto the life raft as the Bankston towed the raft away from the rig.

Once the life raft was tied to the Bankston, the rescue crew grabbed Paul because he was complaining of chest pain. Capt. Curt swam around him and Yancy and got onboard next. Stephen continued to assist in the water, as needed. The lifeboats were empty before the life raft arrived and everyone from the life raft made it onboard the Bankston safely; with the Bankston using a crane to get the gurney with Wyman onboard. Stephen said the first muster took place at approximately 1:15am.

Stephen said they knew almost immediately who did not survive the explosion because of their location on the rig. He said that Dale Burkeen was the only one that the crew was unsure of because he could not be removed from the crane, but David Young had seen him on the deck and was sure there were NVS. He said that Carl Taylor, the radio operator, had taken a muster list from the rig and was the main person on the Bankston that organized getting a muster.

Stephen checked in with his crew, and then he began to look for the injured. He was specifically looking for Brent, since he had tried to assist him with his head injury before they abandoned ship. He found Brent lying on his back next to a gurney and tried to talk to him. That's when Stephen realized for the first time that the man on the gurney he was trying to save was Wyman. (See Stephen's illustration.) Stephen remembers seeing lots of people injured, including Buddy Trahan, who was laying down near Wyman and Brent.

The Coast Guard removed Buddy first because his injuries were so severe. Stephen stayed with the injured men until they were safely removed by the Coast Guard. Stephen approached Mike, who was standing by himself. He asked Mike why he would jump from the helipad, and Mike said that he



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couldn't see, so he wanted to jump from a higher point to avoid landing on anyone. Stephen could tell that his head was badly injured and that he needed to get Mike to the Coast Guard and Medic. Mike was refusing to leave because he was so afraid of falling back into the water when being lifted by the USCG helicopter; Stephen reminded him that he just survived something traumatic and that he owed it to his family to be lifted up and that he couldn't ignore the head injury. Mike agreed to seek assistance.

Stephen and David Young sat on the 3<sup>rd</sup> level and watched the rig burn until sun up. Stephen said at no point did he see Capt. Curt check on his crew. He later saw the Captain in the galley, and that he had showered, rested, and was wearing fresh clothing and sunglasses. Stephen said that Jimmy Harrell propped himself against a wall on the floor and stayed with his crew all night.

At approximately 8:30am, Stephen said the seas were calm and that the crew was watching the rig continue to spin. He said it never got off position. The Sailfish arrived and took away the lifeboats and life raft. They were then taken to the platform. Stephen asked Daun Winslow when they could call home. Daun said that communications were down. Stephen thought that he had his engineering crew that they could get it working again, but instead there was no explanation as to why the phones and TVs weren't working. They knew that they didn't want to induce panic by contacting their loved ones, but thought that a supervised, 2 minute phone call to let people know they were safe would have been reasonable. Someone from Transocean called his wife and said that he was alive, but she was never called again with follow up details. Stephen feels like Transocean and BP failed here.

Their vessel backed up to the platform. He remembers everyone being scared as they looked up at the gig platform over them. Chris Pleasant, Mark Hay and Daun Winslow were taken off the Banks-ton, while additional medical personnel came onboard. The crew was then taken to a second platform. He was standing on the back deck and continued to watch the DWH lean and burn. Stephen said that at no time did anyone from BP or Capt. Curt tell the crew what was happening, or where they were going.

The crew was called into the mess hall to provide Coast Guard statements. Stephen provided three front and back pages, and attributes his ability to thoroughly document the incident to the TOP SET training that Transocean provided.

After Stephen gave his statement, he found a Materialsman that had a cell phone that had no signal. 50 people were lined up to wait for a signal to notify their families that they were being taken to the Crowne Plaza in New Orleans. He said it seemed like the longest boat ride of his life.

Approximately 2 hours before arrival to Fourchon, Capt. Curt informed the crew that they would need to provide a urine analysis as soon as they reached the shore. After providing a urine sample, a van transported them to the Crowne Plaza, where Stephen's wife and father were waiting for his arrival. He had a meeting with Transocean representatives, and then he was allowed to eat and rest. He was told to stay as long as he needed.

After he rested for several hours, Stephen met with the Transocean medical team at the hotel before his wife drove him home. Stephen said that since the incident, two Transocean lawyers have visited his home and he's given his statement again to the Coast Guard, of which he has been pro-

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vided a copy. He has also been contacted by MMS and Marshall Islands officials regarding information about the ventilation and engine over speeds. He's been in touch with Paul Johnson and James Kent several times, along with a Schuman representative that informed him he would be given \$5000 to replace his personal items on the rig. Stephen told Schuman that his lost items could never be replaced because of its sentimental value.

The Coast Guard wanted to know if the engines would draw air from inside the engine or from a space feed. Stephen said the engines gathered air from that actual space. There was stand alone supply and exhaust for each engine, but they could be tied together. He could not identify exactly where the fans to the supply exhaust were on the map. They also wanted to know about the status of the PA systems and fire/gas alarms during the incident.

Stephen was asked if he calls referring to any emergency procedures when he was on the bridge, or if he and the rest of the crew were just acting instinctively. Stephen explained that each person on the bridge had a job to do, and that his was to worry about power. He mentioned again that there was a lot of hollering and that it was "pretty chaotic". He then followed up by saying there were microphones on the bridge and that a beacon was installed above the port forward elevator to record 24 hours a day. He said the beacon looked like a "small red beer keg" and that it was designed with a battery backup and waterproof system.

When explaining his role in between well maintenance, Stephen said that there was a standard checklist reviewed by all departments when the stack was up. The Subsea Supervisors would review their checklist and send to Stephen, and then he would input the information, along with any additional departments that had a checklist to review, into a spreadsheet and send to James Kent, OIMs, Toolpushers, and Technical Field Support then they would collectively discuss.

When the rig move started, Subsea reviewed the spreadsheet with him and addressed problems at the end before closeout. Stephen would go over test records with the Asset Manager, Technical Field Support, Sr. Toolpushers and OIMs, and they all had to sign off. He would ask if critical equipment would pass MMS, render useless, be made a priority, or if not an issue, we'd put on the next checklist. If critical equipment replacement was mandatory, we'd notify the client.

Stephen said he didn't get pushback from anyone at Transocean, and that proper risk was always assessed. They weighed the pros and cons that could potentially present downtime, and then they would order the part or move the repair to the next checklist. Stephen added that it was "an absolute fight" and a "crap shoot" to get BP to allow time to work on the stack up until the two previous wells. As a result, a standardized list was created and sent to the clients for review and approval and that now things worked well between the rig and BP.

Stephen was not on the rig the last time the stack went down, but he was aware of 1 or 2 solenoids on the yellow pod that were not functioning. He was told by Subsea that it wasn't something to worry about and that they'd plan to replace them the next time the stack was brought up.

Stephen was asked about the purge indicator problems on the driller's panel, and if there was any physical change to the BOP when power was lost to the panel. He said there was a software upgrade for this. He remembers this shutting down the "other" panel. (Need some clarification here.) Stephen said the software went to neutral state, or it would give the indication of "vent" state. The

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physical function did not vent to his knowledge. There was a software upgrade to correct this problem roughly 3 years ago. Since then, they tested by opening the panels and checking the state.

When asked who was in charge of getting the BOP back in the water, and he said the Performance Manager, OIM, Sr. Toolpusher and Technical Field Support. The checklist was signed off on and sent to Paul Johnson and Mike Fry.

Stephen said that the two gas alarms were on the same space. (See map for location.) He said the gas alarm sensors were in the sack room, pump room, and engine store room. Stephen said 2 sensors had to be detected in the same zone to initiate the general alarm. The bridge had 5-10 seconds to catch the alarm and inhibit the system. He was unsure if the dampers auto closed, but said that triggering the EDS should have closed the dampers. Stephen said the fire and gas indicators can be seen on any SIMRAD screen by scrolling through the zones. The fixed panel in the UPS room.

