

EXHIBIT #

1154

WIT: _____

Transcription of Brian Morel interview notes
commenced 1040 hrs 27-Apr 2010

panel: Rex Anderson, Matt Lucas, Jim Wetherbee, Warren Winters

Opening discussion:

prior experience Anadarko Basin (challenge), Mad Dog (challenge), planning Macondo was on rig for cleanout run (Thu), stayed thru Tue AM
at start of prod hole had high FIT (formation integrity test) above OB (overburden)
once drlg prod hole encountered losses, so reduced MW (mud weight) from 14.5 to 14.3 ppg
while drlg a sand zone Geotap showed 14.12, 14.16 ppg formation pressure
while drlg a deeper producing sand Geotap showed 12.6 ppg, originally thought low hence a tool error but later confirmed correct
while drlg a subsequent sand, drlg progress stopped (suspected underreamer failure) while losing 300-400 bbl/hr mud
pumped emergency lost circulation material without improvement
pulled into marine drilling riser, reduced mud weight, pumped Formaset
losses stopped holding 14.0 ppg mud (surface) 14.2 ppg (bottomhole due to compressibility)
ran new bottomhole assembly and drld 100 ft of rathole to provide room for logging tools
downhole ESD 14.16-14.2 ppg
logging went smoothly but rotary sidewall coring experienced differential pressure problems
encountered bridges at 12,272' and 12,280'
recorded 1100 units gas on bottoms-up, eventually decreased to 20-30 units
pumped out of hole and flow-checked at liner top
ran ca. 5800 ft 7" casing crossed-over to 9-7/8" casing
bought 7" casing from Nexen due to short lead-time
the XO came from R&M Machine
circulated, converted float equipment, diverter closed without issue
difficulty converting Weatherford float equipment but Weatherford rep. was not on rig so Allamon rep. recommended procedures to convert
called Houston (J. Guide) thinking reamer shoe was plugged so staged up pumping to clear shoe
1 bpm showed 125 psi, 4 bpm showed 400 psi which seemed low vs. modeled pressures

closed annular, pumped down C&K lines, pumped down DP and things looked okay
decided rig standpipe pressure gauge was incorrect
7bbbls, 20bbbls of 14.3 spacer, 5bbbls cement job, 39 foam, 7 shoe track, 20 bbbls spacer, 2bbbls 4/m
modeled cement job in advance w/EPT assistance
did not see bottom dart release, attributed to calculation error by Allamon
saw top plug release
standpipe pressure and cementing unit pressure agreed but both were several hundred psi below model
saw 7" plug pass thru XO

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WIT: _____

Confidential

BP-HZN-MBI00021304

saw bottom plug land 9 bbl ahead of plan
saw top plug land per plan
bled back and observed normal "no flow" which was actually a trickle attributed to
"lines cleaning up"
next released from Drill Quip hanger/seal assembly
6 turns to right to release
pressure to 4 ksi, then 10 ksi for 10 sec to set seal assembly then held 6.7 ksi
tested for 1 hr vs. 5 min. as planned because pressure was observed decreasing ca. 5
psi/min throughout test
sheared out running tool, pulled 10 ft above wellhead and circulated
stabbed running tool in wellhead, applied 10 ksi for 10 sec, then held 6.5 ksi losing 5
psi/min eventually reducing to 4 psi/min for 10 min.
went to bed, awoke next AM
wrote operations notes on negative test procedure, spoke to WSL & mud engineer
about it for input & understanding
next contact learned rig on fire

Upon later review:

there are questions around the negative test
cementing unit was lined up to drill pipe to observe pressure
flowed back to either choke or kill line
saw 1400 psi on drill pipe so expected pressure or flow to cementing unit (seawater in
line)
did not observe flow so concluded something must be plugged
displaced from 8300' to mudline to set cement plug
to run lockdown sleeve on same run to have at least 100 klb weight below lockdown
sleeve
there was worrying on rig about the next operation (PxA on Nile)
were attempting concurrent activities
were planning riser cleanout run

Inquiry about rig communications culture:

rig is performance driven with strong history & record of safety & drilling performance
some operations are unfamiliar to the rig such as PxA on Nile
TxA is standard having run production casing before
no BP safety rep. on rig anymore
TO safety onboard, did observe that they do tape off before every pressure test, lift
lines operated properly, safety meetings conducted
nothing sensed out of ordinary that day
were pumping and cleaning out mud pits
zero TIR and proud of that
emphasis on staying focused at all times
stop the job mentality, free to ask for clarity
John Guide and David Sims have been instrumental in ensuring uptake of BP safety
culture by 3rd party personnel

Inquiry about nitrified cement job:

normal cement slurry is up to 16.9 ppg but working with fracture gradient of 16.1 ppg
originally thought to be 15.1 ppg
formation was only tested to 14.5 ppg
thought loss zone was at bottom of sands

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DISCUSSION ON CENTRALIZATION w/ 6?

BRETT
COMMUNICATIONS
TO BRIAN

RISK - POSSIBLE CHANGING INTO 97/2 STAGE
→ & POSSIBLE LIT RETURNS w/ ECD AT STAGE.

- VIEW MODEL NOT ACCURATE B/C VERTICAL WELL

BRIAN - NOT AWARE OF HES GAS FLOW

NEXIN - 6 CENT. , REMAIN STAGE, COOKIE CUTTER STAGE
FLOAT EQUIP -
↓
BOTTOM TO GET TO BTM

- FC - NEXIN , BUT WORTHFORD SALE REP (GTW) AS CHAIR (OP)
BRIAN KLAUS (WORTHFORD)

L45 FLOAT w/ CAGED BALL - NORMALLY DRIFT DOWN

- RISK WITH FC? NOT REVIEWED IN RETAIL
- FS usually BUT NOT IN THIS WELL

- FC OPEN HOLE?

- OPEN HOLE - CLOSING DIVERTOR BEFORE OH →
ALWAYS UNCERT B/C BALL TAKES TIME.
- RISK OF QUICK CONVERSION

- DISPENSATION FOR ENTIRE WELL ON AUTO FILL &
(MOST ALL ^{6cm} WELLS RHT w/ AUTO FILL OPER.)

MARK HARRY

- MOC ON LONG STRING?

MOC LINER - DECIDES NOT TO PROCEED

MOC LONG STRING - MARK H. & INCLUDES OPTIMUM

AS ATTACHMENT

- JOHN ^{SPR} ^{SPR}, GARY, JOHN ^{SPR} ^{SPR}, CHRIS & SIMS

TALKED ABOUT LONG STRING

- BRIAN NOT ON FLOOR FOR HANGAR
 - WRAPPED & NOT ABLE TO SEE LEAN ASS.
- 6 5/8 SIDS - 1ST
- 6 5/8 V -
- OPEN HOLE - DIVIDED BALL - BUT NOT CONVERTED
 - ~~NO CURE~~ DIVERTED.
 - STAGES SLOW TAPERS 18 LBS - 125.
 - 5-10 KIPS DOWN
 - PICKED UP BLACK HAWK CAT HEAD
- DECISION TO RHT w/ DIVERTOR OPEN
- R/U N₂ UNIT
- SAFETY MTR, THEN CONVEYING DIV. & ATTEMPTED TO CONVEY FLOATS. NO NOTIFICATION HAND.
 - ALLOWED HAND FARM - AN w/ & TO ROCK FLOAT ↑ & ↓ AP
- BRIAN CALLED JUSTIN GUY & GOT PERMISSION TO GO TO 2200 PSI. ~~STAYED~~ TUN & CALLED DAVID. BRIAN CALLED BRIAN CLAUIN (NORTHMAN). @ 1300 PSI BALL WOULD GO THROUGH w/o CONVERTING FLOATS. FOR NORTHMAN 6000 PSI MAX
- CONVEYED @ 3440 PSI
 - SOMETHING PLUGGED BUT MAYBE STUCK.
- PRESS MUCH LOWER THAN MOD-2.
 - 125 PSI w/ 1 BPM
 - CALLED JUSTIN GUY & RECOMMENDED TO GO UP 4 BPM
 - THOUGH THERE MAY BE A LEAK IN DIVERTOR. SHUT ANNUAL, DOWN DIP w/ KILL. WATCH RISER w/ DIVERTOR ABOVE ANNUAL. → OK

LOWER
LEAKAGE

copy

- Got Pulse while in csg hole Dropped ball for diameter but did not comment.
- Ran into openhole. Had down calculation 18.280 5-10K down.
- That could be helical buckle pipe.
- Run out lines.
- Comment down.
- Attempt to convert "FE", Trolled with 13 floor. Allomms recommended back the floor. Brian called John Gorda, got permission to go to 2300psi John and David Brian called WFT.

1200-1300. Ball should go through slow even if it did not shift.

Collar raised to 6400psi Could go back high Inc. pressure to 3000psi called lower pressure 3140 psi shown down.

Started to circ. 125psi pressure lower that will make. Called John to go to 2300psi still pressure for 125psi in diffusion shut auxiliary open chiller. Think they used lower conversion. Called lower pressure ok. Circ.

Plan was to circ entire down 125psi. Decided in end meeting to just circ above lower. Brian called to measure the call.