

Deposition Testimony of:

Walter Guillot

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Page 11:16 to 11:18

00011:16 WALTER GUILLOT,
17 having been first duly sworn, testified as
18 follows:

Page 11:21 to 12:19

00011:21 Q. State your name, please.
22 A. Walter Guillot.
23 Q. Mr. Guillot, on April the 20th
24 of 2010, what was BP's standard published
25 written procedure for conducting a negative
00012:01 test?
02 A. BP doesn't have one.
03 Q. On April the 20th of 2010, what
04 was BP's standard published written
05 procedure for interpreting a negative test?
06 A. There isn't one.
07 Q. Now, as I understand the term
08 "negative pressure test" means zero
09 pressure, no pressure. Is that what the
10 negative stands for?
11 A. The purpose of the negative test
12 is to -- you're going to reduce the
13 hydrostatic pressure of the well, yes, sir.
14 Q. So the word "negative" and the
15 term "negative pressure test" means no
16 pressure, zero pressure, right?
17 A. Yeah. I guess -- yes.
18 Q. And if it's not zero, that's a
19 problem, isn't it?

Page 12:22 to 13:02

00012:22 A. It depends on what the -- what
23 the situation is.
24 Q. Well, is there -- if you're
25 conducting a negative test and you're
00013:01 looking for zero pressure, if there's not
02 zero pressure, that's a problem, isn't it?

Page 13:07 to 13:12

00013:07 A. Once again, the negative test is
08 several things that can take place to give
09 you pressures.
10 Q. Right. But if the pressure is
11 not zero when you do the negative test,
12 that's a problem, isn't it?

Page 13:15 to 13:20

00013:15 A. Depending on where you find the
16 pressure coming from could be.
17 Q. Okay. Because it may indicate a
18 loss of well integrity, right?
19 A. Possible.
20 Q. Okay. And that's bad, isn't it?

Page 13:23 to 13:23

00013:23 A. Could be.

Page 14:22 to 15:07

00014:22 Q. Is one of the things you're
23 trying to figure out, or the main thing
24 you're trying to figure out, whether the
25 well lost integrity?
00015:01 A. I'm trying to figure out whether
02 the well has integrity.
03 Q. All right. And you want it to
04 have integrity, correct?
05 A. Yes.
06 Q. And it's bad if it does not have
07 integrity, correct?

Page 15:10 to 15:15

00015:10 A. Yes. It could be.
11 Q. Because if it's lost integrity
12 or if it doesn't have integrity, it may be
13 flowing, right?
14 A. Well, it could be. Maybe.
15 Q. Yeah. And that's bad, isn't it?

Page 15:18 to 15:21

00015:18 A. Well, as long as you can control
19 the flow, it's not bad.
20 Q. But if you don't control the
21 flow, it is bad, isn't it?

Page 15:24 to 16:04

00015:24 A. Yeah, it could be.
25 Q. When you do the negative
00016:01 pressure test, you hope to find that the
02 well has integrity and that the well is not
03 flowing, correct?
04 A. Yes.

Page 16:11 to 16:12

00016:11 Q. Well, you do agree, though, that
12 if the well's flowing, that's bad?

Page 16:15 to 17:01

00016:15 A. If the well's flowing, you got a
16 problem.
17 Q. And if it's not flowing, that's
18 good?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You have integrity, correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And the reason it's bad if -- if
23 the negative pressure test indicates that
24 the well has lost integrity and might be
25 flowing, is that might lead to a blowout,
00017:01 correct?

Page 17:04 to 17:04

00017:04 A. Maybe.

Page 17:12 to 17:25

00017:12 Q. It will tell you though, won't
13 it, if there is a risk of the well flowing
14 and, therefore, if there is a risk of a
15 blowout?
16 A. It will tell you -- it will tell
17 you the well is flowing.
18 Q. Well, to get a blowout, the well
19 has to flow then?
20 A. It has to be uncontrollable
21 flow.
22 Q. All right. You would agree with
23 Mr. Bly when he says that it's the final
24 integrity test that you perform, actual
25 test?

Page 18:03 to 18:04

00018:03 A. The final test performed before
04 we unlatch, yes.

Page 18:16 to 18:20

00018:16 Q. Is it your testimony here under
17 oath today that if one of your trainees
18 came to you and said, can a failed negative
19 test indicate the risk of a blowout, your
20 answer would be no?

Page 18:23 to 19:07

00018:23 A. My answer would be a failed
 24 negative test was flowing can be
 25 controlled.
 00019:01 Q. But if it's not controlled, you
 02 have the risk of a blowout, correct?
 03 A. If it's not controlled.
 04 Q. And a blowout means fire,
 05 explosion, injury, death, catastrophic
 06 environmental damage. All of the above,
 07 doesn't it --

Page 19:10 to 19:10

00019:10 Q. -- that occur with a blowout?

Page 19:13 to 19:14

00019:13 A. They can occur. Not always but
 14 they can occur.

Page 19:23 to 20:14

00019:23 Q. A negative test can tell you if
 24 it fails -- if the well fails the test,
 25 that there is a possibility, there's a
 00020:01 possible risk of people dying through
 02 the -- through a blowout, can't it?
 03 A. A failed negative test -- if the
 04 BOP is to fail, yes, it could.
 05 Q. So it would be fair to say that
 06 the negative test is a safety critical
 07 test, isn't it?
 08 MR. COLLIER:
 09 Objection to form.
 10 A. Yes, it is critical.
 11 Q. So you would also agree,
 12 wouldn't you, that performing and
 13 interpreting a negative test is a critical
 14 operational task?

Page 20:17 to 20:21

00020:17 A. Yes, it is.
 18 Q. What is the extent of your
 19 education?
 20 A. High school and several years of
 21 college.

Page 21:11 to 22:24

00021:11 A. No. No.
 12 Q. And BP has a test, the results
 13 of which can mean life or death to people
 14 on the rig, and they have no criteria at
 15 all in writing anywhere for a pass or fail;
 16 is that right?
 17 MR. COLLIER:
 18 Objection to form.
 19 A. I don't know if there's one, no.
 20 Q. Well, you know there isn't one,
 21 don't you?
 22 A. I've never seen one.
 23 Q. And you looked, didn't you?
 24 A. Yes, I did.
 25 Q. You are a well site leader,
 00022:01 correct?
 02 A. Yes, sir.
 03 Q. You're the company man on the
 04 rig, right?
 05 A. Yes.
 06 Q. And you've been in the Gulf of
 07 Mexico as a well site leader, haven't you?
 08 A. Yes, I have.
 09 Q. You're now in Alaska, correct?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. You're the top BP authority on
 12 the rig, aren't you?
 13 A. When we're drilling, yes.
 14 Q. Okay. And as a well site
 15 leader, you comply with the safety policies
 16 and practices of BP, don't you?
 17 A. Yes, I do.
 18 Q. You don't write them but you
 19 comply with them, right?
 20 A. Right.
 21 Q. If there is a standard written
 22 procedure for conducting and interpreting a
 23 negative test that existed, you would
 24 follow that, wouldn't you?

Page 23:02 to 23:10

00023:02 A. I would -- once again, speaking
 03 for me and myself. If there was a written
 04 procedure, I'd follow -- I'll look at the
 05 procedure, but rig specific has to come
 06 into play into too.
 07 Q. Sure. But as a general rule, as
 08 a well site leader, you follow BP's
 09 policies and procedures, don't you?
 10 A. Yes, I do.

Page 23:12 to 23:24

00023:12 Objection to form.

13 Q. And if they had a policy and
14 procedure, a standard written established
15 policy and procedure for a negative test,
16 you would make it a practice to follow
17 that, wouldn't you?

18 MR. COLLIER:

19 Objection to form.

20 A. It would be part of my procedure
21 for putting together a negative test.

22 Q. Okay. And every well site
23 leader at BP would be expected to do the
24 same thing, wouldn't they?

Page 24:02 to 24:12

00024:02 A. I can't answer for every other
03 well site leader for BP.

04 Q. So you think BP has rules and
05 regulations that -- that some well site
06 leaders follow and some don't?

07 A. I don't know.

08 Q. Given the fact that we've agreed
09 that it's a safety critical test, wouldn't
10 you expect a competent, qualified BP well
11 site leader to follow the procedures and
12 standards set forth by BP to do the test?

Page 24:15 to 25:08

00024:15 A. I can only answer for what I
16 would do.

17 Q. You would, right?

18 A. I would.

19 Q. All right. And you know that
20 Mr. Vidrine and Mr. Kaluza were the well
21 site leaders on the Deepwater Horizon on
22 April 20th, 2010, right?

23 A. Yes, sir, I do.

24 Q. And you know they were charged
25 with supervising the negative test,
00025:01 correct?

02 A. Yes. I know they were out
03 there, yes.

04 Q. And you have no reason to
05 believe, based -- and you were part of the
06 investigation, the Bly investigation,
07 correct.

08 A. As part of the BOP team.

Page 28:23 to 29:02

00028:23 Q. The only place you are in these

24 answers is in the operational area dealing
25 with the negative test, isn't it?
00029:01 A. I spent -- most of my time was
02 in with the BOP team.

Page 29:08 to 30:02

00029:08 Q. Well, we'll talk about the
09 details of that later.
10 But whether you were on the
11 BOP team or not, you know a lot about
12 negative test, don't you?
13 MR. COLLIER:
14 Objection to form.
15 A. I've runned a few.
16 Q. How many years have you been
17 doing it?
18 A. Deepwater about ten.
19 Q. How about before that?
20 A. Well, we run negative test on
21 land jobs with liner tops and things like
22 that, so. As a well site leader, about 20.
23 Q. 20 years? Okay.
24 And you know that
25 Mr. Vidrine and Mr. Kaluza were the folks
00030:01 on the rig that were charged with
02 supervising the negative test, right?

Page 30:05 to 30:10

00030:05 A. I knew they were out there, yes.
06 Q. Do you have any reason to
07 believe, based on anything you learned in
08 connection with this investigation, that
09 they had any interest other than doing it
10 right?

Page 30:13 to 30:20

00030:13 A. I can't comment to what they
14 were doing. I wasn't out there with them.
15 Q. I didn't ask you if you were out
16 there with them. I asked you if you had
17 any reason to believe, based on any
18 information you have, that they had any
19 reason to do it any way but the best way
20 they knew how to do it.

Page 30:23 to 31:05

00030:23 A. Once again, I don't know how
24 they did it.
25 Q. I didn't ask you how they did

00031:01 it.
02 The question is: Do you
03 have any information, any reason to believe
04 that they had any interest other than doing
05 it right?

Page 31:08 to 31:19

00031:08 A. I didn't talk to them, I don't
09 know how they did it, so I can't speak to
10 that.
11 Q. You took statements from
12 Mr. Vidrine, didn't you?
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. Asked him questions about the
15 negative test, didn't you?
16 A. Some, yes.
17 Q. You went to meetings with the
18 investigative group, didn't you?
19 A. Some.

Page 32:12 to 32:17

00032:12 Q. Okay. And there is no reason to
13 believe, as far as you know, is there, that
14 those well site leaders would do anything
15 to put themselves at risk and to put the
16 men and women on the Deepwater Horizon at
17 risk, is there?

Page 32:20 to 32:25

00032:20 A. No. They wouldn't put anybody
21 at risk.
22 Q. No. So whatever they did or
23 didn't do in connection with the negative
24 test, they did or didn't do it because they
25 didn't know any better, correct?

Page 33:03 to 33:07

00033:03 A. I don't know.
04 Q. Well, if they had known any
05 better, they certainly wouldn't have done
06 anything to put themselves at risk and the
07 people on the rig at risk, would they?

Page 33:10 to 33:19

00033:10 A. No, they wouldn't put people at
11 risk.
12 Q. Right. Right. And if BP on

13 April the 20th of 2010 had an established
 14 standard written procedure and a standard
 15 set of criteria for conducting and
 16 interpreting the negative test, it is
 17 reasonable to conclude that Mr. Vidrine and
 18 Mr. Kaluza would have followed it, isn't
 19 it?

Page 33:22 to 34:08

00033:22 A. I don't know. I can't speak to
 23 what they would do.
 24 Q. You don't think that it's
 25 reasonable to conclude that as well site
 00034:01 leaders, if they had a standard procedure
 02 for doing it and interpreting it, you don't
 03 think it's reasonable to conclude that they
 04 would have followed it?
 05 A. I can't make a decision for
 06 them.
 07 Q. We know you would have though?
 08 A. Myself? Yeah.

Page 34:15 to 35:06

00034:15 A. No.
 16 Q. The well site leaders don't
 17 draft and implement the procedures at BP,
 18 do they?
 19 MR. COLLIER:
 20 Objection to form.
 21 A. We implement our procedures for
 22 our rigs and operations that we have.
 23 Q. But overall, globally enforced
 24 rule, regulations, standards, and policies
 25 are generated at the management level,
 00035:01 aren't they?
 02 A. Yes, sir, they are.
 03 Q. They come out of BP Global where
 04 all the policies and procedures are
 05 generated, correct?
 06 A. Yes.

Page 38:24 to 39:25

00038:24 Q. You have safety rules on your
 25 rig, right?
 00039:01 A. We follow the contract per MMS,
 02 yes.
 03 Q. You have to call it sometimes
 04 when folks violate the safety rule, don't
 05 you?
 06 A. Yes, I do.

07 Q. That's what I'm calling the
 08 safety failure, a violation of the safety
 09 rule. A violation of the safety
 10 principles.
 11 Now do you understand what
 12 I'm asking you?
 13 A. I understand what you're asking,
 14 but I just -- I don't write the policies
 15 and procedures.
 16 Q. I know you don't. Those are
 17 written by the executives and the
 18 management of BP, right?
 19 A. Right.
 20 Q. And it's your job to follow it
 21 as best you can, right?
 22 A. We do.
 23 Q. And Mr. Vidrine and Mr. Kaluza
 24 didn't have any to follow, as it relates to
 25 the negative test, did they?

Page 40:03 to 42:15

00040:03 A. We don't have a standard
 04 procedure for negative test.
 05 Q. And if there had been an
 06 established procedure and an established
 07 criteria for a pass or a fail, Mr. Vidrine
 08 and Mr. Kaluza would never have continued
 09 to under balance this well in the face of
 10 1400 psi on the drill pipe, would they?
 11 A. I can't --
 12 MR. COLLIER:
 13 Objection to form.
 14 A. I can't answer that.
 15 Q. But you wouldn't, would you?
 16 A. On my operations, no. But
 17 that's me.
 18 Q. And the last thing you would do
 19 is displace mud with seawater after a
 20 failed negative test, right?
 21 MR. COLLIER:
 22 Objection to form.
 23 A. For jobs that I was on?
 24 Q. Right.
 25 A. Speaking for myself, no.
 00041:01 Q. 'Cause that would be inviting
 02 disaster, wouldn't it?
 03 MR. COLLIER:
 04 Objection to form.
 05 A. Could be.
 06 Q. Not could be. Would be,
 07 wouldn't it? It would be inviting disaster
 08 to displace mud with seawater after a
 09 failed negative test?
 10 A. Could be.

11 Q. So you won't say it would be?
12 A. No, sir, I won't.
13 Q. Now, when you joined the
14 investigation of this disaster, you were
15 unaware that there were no written
16 standards and procedures for the negative
17 test, weren't you?
18 A. It's true.
19 Q. You thought there had to be some
20 somewhere, didn't you?
21 A. I went looking for them.
22 Q. You went looking for them. The
23 reason you went looking for them is because
24 you thought there had to be some somewhere,
25 didn't you?
00042:01 A. I was asked to look.
02 Q. I'll show you an exhibit I'm
03 marking as 92. Would you look that over,
04 please.
05 (Exhibit Number 92 marked.)
06 Q. You've seen that before, haven't
07 you?
08 A. Yes, sir. I wrote it.
09 Q. You wrote it and Mr. Jim Cowie
10 wrote part of it, too, didn't he?
11 A. Yes, he did. He asked me to
12 gather some information for him.
13 Q. All right. And the subject is
14 negative testing, right?
15 A. Right.

Page 43:02 to 46:24

00043:02 A. Yes.
03 Q. And if you look at the bottom of
04 this exhibit, it's an e-mail from Mr. Cowie
05 to you related to negative testing,
06 correct?
07 A. Yeah.
08 Q. And he asked you two
09 questions -- or he asked you to do two
10 things, right?
11 A. Uh-huh. Yes, sir.
12 Q. First, he says, Determine if we
13 have a negative testing procedure or design
14 standard contained within any of our
15 policy, procedure, or ETP documents.
16 ETP is engineering
17 technical practices, right?
18 A. Yes, it is.
19 Q. Or anywhere else you think it
20 may be.
21 That's the first thing he
22 asked you to do, correct?
23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. The second thing he asked you to
25 do is list what reports the Transocean
00044:01 offshore team sent in on a daily basis,
02 right?
03 A. Yes.
04 Q. And within 24 hours, we see your
05 response right above, correct?
06 A. Yes.
07 Q. And you answered Question 2,
08 didn't you?
09 A. Right.
10 Q. You gave him the list?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. But you didn't answer
13 Question 1, did you?
14 A. Couldn't.
15 Q. And -- well, at that point in
16 time, you thought there had to be some
17 somewhere, didn't you?
18 A. Yeah. I really didn't know.
19 Q. You knew that you didn't know
20 there were no standards. Can we agree to
21 that?
22 MR. COLLIER:
23 Objection to form.
24 A. Yes, we can agree to that.
25 Q. Yeah. Because if you had, when
00045:01 you sent the e-mail back the next day, you
02 would have said, there aren't any written
03 standards related to the negative test, and
04 then you would answer Question 2, right?
05 A. Yes.
06 Q. You thought there had to be
07 some, didn't you?
08 MR. COLLIER:
09 Objection to form.
10 A. I wasn't sure but I thought
11 there was some somewhere.
12 Q. You figured there was some
13 somewhere, and that was a reasonable thing
14 to figure since we're talking about a
15 safety critical test, right?
16 MR. COLLIER:
17 Objection to form.
18 A. Talking about a critical test,
19 yes.
20 Q. Yeah. So you started looking.
21 And how long did you look?
22 A. A couple of days.
23 Q. Couldn't find any though, right?
24 A. No, sir.
25 Q. You looked in the drilling and
00046:01 welling -- drilling and well operation
02 procedure manual?
03 A. Drilling and wells, well

04 control, ETPs.
 05 Q. All the logical places you would
 06 look for that procedure, correct?
 07 A. Yes, sir.
 08 Q. And you couldn't find any?
 09 A. No, sir.
 10 Q. And there's no e-mail where you
 11 responded to Mr. Cowie, is there?
 12 A. No, there's not.
 13 Q. But you responded to him, didn't
 14 you?
 15 A. I talked to him.
 16 Q. And what did you tell him when
 17 you talked to him?
 18 A. I couldn't find anything.
 19 Q. Did he say, well, you got to be
 20 wrong, Walter. Go keep looking?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. Did you tell him, you ain't
 23 going to believe this, but I can't find
 24 any?

Page 47:02 to 47:08

00047:02 A. No. I just -- I just told him I
 03 couldn't find anything for the negative
 04 test procedures.
 05 Q. What did he say?
 06 A. He asked me if I was sure. I
 07 said, yeah. I believe we went back and
 08 looked some more.

Page 47:21 to 49:12

00047:21 Q. Did you start asking around and
 22 consult other people?
 23 A. No, I didn't.
 24 Q. You didn't ask anybody else to
 25 look or help you look?
 00048:01 A. No.
 02 Q. Is there a library you went to,
 03 to look in?
 04 A. All our procedures are on the
 05 Internet, on BP website.
 06 Q. So how long did you look before
 07 you realize that you weren't going to find
 08 it and just gave up?
 09 A. After I talked to Jim probably
 10 three more days, on and off.
 11 Q. So a total of five days?
 12 A. Not solid but yes.
 13 Q. Both of you knew that was a big,
 14 big problem, didn't you?
 15 MR. COLLIER:

16 Objection to form.
17 A. I found it kind of strange. I
18 didn't know it was going to be a big
19 problem.
20 Q. Excuse me?
21 A. I found it kind of strange, but
22 I didn't know it was going to be a big
23 problem.
24 Q. Found it kind of strange.
25 Right.
00049:01 And one of the places you
02 looked was in the drilling and well
03 operations practice, E&P defined operating
04 practice, correct?
05 A. Yes.
06 Q. And one of the places you looked
07 would have been in the well operations
08 group practice, BP Group?
09 A. Yes.
10 Q. And another place you would have
11 looked would be in working with pressure?
12 A. Yes. I saw that.

Page 50:08 to 52:18

00050:08 (Exhibit Number 93 marked.)
09 Q. Let me show you what I marked as
10 Exhibit 93. And that's a drilling and well
11 operations practice manual, correct?
12 A. Yes, it is.
13 Q. You're familiar with this,
14 aren't you?
15 A. Yes, sir, I am.
16 Q. Something you used off and on
17 frequently over the years you've been a
18 well site leader?
19 A. Yes, I have.
20 Q. Something that's readily
21 available on the rig to well site leaders?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Let me get you to turn to -- and
24 the Bates on this is
25 BP-HZN-2179MDL00057261. And I'm going to
00051:01 ask you to turn, first, to Page 57273,
02 which is the introduction.
03 Does it say in the second
04 sentence up there under purpose, This
05 document is a segment defined operating
06 practice and is applicable in all areas of
07 the E&P segment of BP?
08 Is that the exploration and
09 production segment of BP?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. That covers the Deepwater
12 Horizon, correct?

13 A. Yes, it does.
 14 Q. All right. And if you look down
 15 at the bottom of the page, do you see the
 16 paragraph that begins, This document
 17 contains the practices?
 18 A. Yes, I do.
 19 Q. This document contains the
 20 practices that have been agreed by BP
 21 management.
 22 Now, BP management is in
 23 the UK, correct?
 24 A. Some of it is, yes.
 25 Q. As current and relevant for
 00052:01 drilling and well operations, these
 02 practices are considered Critical 4.
 03 Did I read that right?
 04 A. Yes, you did.
 05 Q. First point, Achieving the
 06 company's goals of no accidents, no harm to
 07 people, and no damage to the environment.
 08 Did I read that right?
 09 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And the last point, Prevention
 11 of incidents that would have a high
 12 negative economic or reputational impact.
 13 Did I read that correctly?
 14 A. Yes, you did.
 15 Q. And among the practices
 16 considered critical is referred to in the
 17 first part of this, there are no outlined
 18 practices for a negative test, are there?

Page 52:21 to 52:21

00052:21 A. No, sir, there's not.

Page 55:13 to 57:04

00055:13 A. Design and drill, it did.
 14 Q. Do you see where it says below
 15 that, To ensure that we meet these
 16 activities, BP has adopted the operating
 17 management system, which defines our
 18 expectations for identifying and managing
 19 safety, health, environmental, and
 20 operational risks.
 21 Did I read that right?
 22 A. Yes, sir, you did.
 23 Q. The negative test or a
 24 misinterpretation of the negative test is
 25 an operational risk, isn't it?
 00056:01 MR. COLLIER:
 02 Objection to form.
 03 A. A negative test is an

04 operational risk, yes.

05 Q. And OMS, the operating
06 management system at BP, had no criteria at
07 all in writing for this safety critical
08 test, did it?

09 A. It did not have any procedures,
10 no.

11 Q. Turn over to page Bates 57276.
12 The word application at the top. Look at
13 1.4.

14 It says, All staff and
15 contractor personnel engaged in managing BP
16 drilling and well operations shall be
17 knowledgeable of all elements of this
18 practice and associated ETPs -- that's
19 engineering technical practices, correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- and are responsible for
22 conformance.

23 Do you see that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. If there had been an ETP on the
00057:01 negative test, then not only would BP be
02 responsible for conformance, but Transocean
03 would have been required to conform with
04 that ETP, correct?

Page 57:07 to 57:17

00057:07 A. I don't know.

08 Q. Well, that's what it says here,
09 isn't it? Transocean is contractor
10 personnel, right?

11 A. Yes, they are.

12 Q. They're engaged in managing BP
13 drilling and well operations, right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. This requires that they be
16 knowledgeable in all of the ETPs that BP
17 has, right?

Page 57:20 to 57:24

00057:20 A. That's what it states.

21 Q. And if there had been an ETP on
22 the negative test, then Transocean would
23 have been required to conform with it,
24 right?

Page 58:02 to 58:15

00058:02 A. I don't know.

03 Q. Well, that's what it says here,

04 isn't it?
 05 A. That's what it says there, yes.
 06 Q. And if you look at 1.7 it says,
 07 Deviations from drilling and well
 08 operations practices and ETP shall only be
 09 considered in exceptional circumstances and
 10 in accordance with the table below.
 11 So if there had been an ETP
 12 on the negative test, there would have been
 13 no deviation from it, except in exceptional
 14 circumstances according to this rule,
 15 right?

Page 58:18 to 59:06

00058:18 A. Right.
 19 Q. And to get a deviation, you
 20 would have to request it and it would have
 21 to be approved, correct?
 22 A. Be an MOC process.
 23 Q. Look at the next page under
 24 conformance. It refers to periodic audits
 25 being undertaken and conformance being
 00059:01 assured, and it refers to ETPs, correct?
 02 A. Yes.
 03 Q. So if there had been a negative
 04 test ETP, there would have been audits that
 05 would have assured compliance with that
 06 ETP, correct?

Page 59:09 to 59:22

00059:09 A. That's what it states there.
 10 Q. Next page, 57278. Do you see
 11 under general where it refers to priorities
 12 for safety when planning and undertaking
 13 drilling and well operations?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. And the order of importance
 16 first is personnel, isn't it?
 17 A. Yes, it is.
 18 Q. And second is the environment?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And everybody at BP knows that,
 21 don't they?
 22 A. Yes, sir.

Page 59:25 to 60:02

00059:25 Q. Including all the way up to the
 00060:01 highest level of the safety department in
 02 BP PLC in England knows that?

Page 60:05 to 60:19

00060:05 A. I'm assuming they do.
06 Q. Looking at the next Page 3.1.1.
07 All staff and contractor
08 personnel involved in the management and
09 supervision of drilling and well operations
10 for BP shall be knowledgeable of the
11 drilling and well operation practice and
12 associated ETPs.
13 Did I read that right?
14 A. Yes, you did.
15 Q. That means everybody at BP and
16 all of BP's contract personnel would have
17 had to be knowledgeable about an ETP, if
18 one existed, that defined how to conduct
19 and interpret the negative test, true?

Page 60:22 to 61:22

00060:22 A. If there was a written
23 procedure, everybody would have been
24 associated with it.
25 Q. Not just BP but the contractors,
00061:01 correct?
02 A. Yes, sir.
03 Q. 3.1.4. Designated company
04 representatives at every well site.
05 That would be you, wouldn't
06 it?
07 A. Yes.
08 Q. Whether BP employees,
09 consultants, or contractor personnel
10 employed in a capacity of the company
11 representatives are accountable for the
12 application of the drilling and well
13 operations practice and the relevant safety
14 management system.
15 Did I read that correctly?
16 A. Yes, you did.
17 Q. That means you as a well site
18 leader or any other well site leader is
19 accountable for assuring that the safety
20 practices, such as a written procedure for
21 a negative test, would be complied with,
22 correct?

Page 61:25 to 62:16

00061:25 A. If there was one.
00062:01 Q. If there was one.
02 3.1.6. Designated company
03 representatives are accountable for the
04 execution of the approved drilling and well

05 operations programs in compliance with BP's
 06 health, safety, security, and environmental
 07 requirements.

08 That -- again, that's the
 09 well site leader, the designated company
 10 representative, right?

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 Q. And what's -- what this is
 13 stating is that if we have a test, such as
 14 a negative test procedure, that the well
 15 site leader is responsible for compliance,
 16 right?

Page 62:19 to 62:25

00062:19 A. We're in charge of the test
 20 along with the contractor.

21 Q. And you're responsible for
 22 compliance, it says here, doesn't it?

23 MR. COLLIER:

24 Objection to form.

25 A. Yes.

Page 64:09 to 65:15

00064:09 Q. Look at the next page, risk
 10 management. All D&C operations.
 11 Is that drilling and
 12 completion?

13 A. Yes, it is.

14 Q. All drilling and completion
 15 operation shall follow a documented and
 16 auditable risk management process, to
 17 include identification, assessment,
 18 prioritization, and action. The process
 19 will include all risks with either an HSSE
 20 or significant financial impact.

21 The risk of a
 22 misinterpreted negative test is an HSE
 23 impact risk, isn't it, as well as a
 24 significant financial risk, isn't it?

25 MR. COLLIER:

00065:01 Objection to form.

02 A. It has a potential to be.

03 Q. Next page. 4.4. Any
 04 significant changes to a well program shall
 05 be documented and approved via a formal
 06 management of change process, which
 07 includes those on the original approved
 08 list.

09 You referred to that
 10 earlier. That's the MOC, right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And you know that wasn't done

13 with respect to the negative test at the
 14 Macondo, was it?
 15 A. I didn't see anything on it.

Page 67:13 to 67:15

00067:13 Q. Until you identify the existence
 14 of a well control event, you cannot
 15 remediate it, right?

Page 67:18 to 68:09

00067:18 A. No. There are scenarios you put
 19 in place for different failures.
 20 Q. All right. Neither the well
 21 control response guide or the well control
 22 manual addressed the procedure for a
 23 negative test, did they?
 24 A. No, sir, it didn't.
 25 Q. Page 57307 at the bottom, well
 00068:01 control practices.
 02 Kick detection, diverter,
 03 circulating, stripping, and shut-in drills
 04 shall be held regularly.
 05 Do you see that?
 06 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 07 Q. Are there -- or were there, to
 08 your knowledge, any drills held on
 09 responding to a failed negative test?

Page 68:12 to 70:10

00068:12 A. Not none that I saw.
 13 Q. Next page. 15.2.17. A well
 14 control interface bridging document shall
 15 be prepared with the appropriate contractor
 16 to ensure there is a clear understanding of
 17 responsibilities and which reference
 18 documents and procedures will be used in a
 19 well control situation.
 20 Do you see that?
 21 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 22 Q. Okay. There were none in this
 23 case that dealt with the negative test,
 24 were there?
 25 A. I don't know.
 00069:01 Q. Did you ever become aware of any
 02 bridging document?
 03 A. I didn't look for any, no, sir.
 04 Q. If there was not a bridging
 05 document in connection with a negative
 06 test, this rule says there should have
 07 been, doesn't it?

08 MR. COLLIER:
 09 Objection to form.
 10 A. I don't know.
 11 Q. Well, if there had been a
 12 standard written procedure for the negative
 13 test and if Transocean had any different
 14 procedure, any less stringent procedure, a
 15 bridging document would have changed that,
 16 and they would have been required to comply
 17 with BP's procedure for a negative test,
 18 correct?
 19 MR. COLLIER:
 20 Objection to form.
 21 A. Yeah. Whatever one is more
 22 stringent, that's the one you go with.
 23 Q. Look at 57344, working with
 24 pressure.
 25 Does it show at the top
 00070:01 significant risk section?
 02 A. Yes, it does.
 03 Q. And it refers to an engineering
 04 technical practice, GP 10-45, right?
 05 A. Yes, it does.
 06 Q. And if the negative test was
 07 going to be in a written procedure, the
 08 logical place it would be is in this
 09 chapter, wouldn't it, this section, on
 10 working with pressure?

Page 70:13 to 71:21

00070:13 A. It may be. It may also be in
 14 the well control manual too.
 15 Q. First sentence, All pressure
 16 testing and high pressure pumping activity
 17 shall conform to engineering technical
 18 practice GP 10-45 working with pressure.
 19 Right?
 20 A. Yes, sir.
 21 Q. So if it wasn't in this section
 22 of this manual, it would be in the ETP they
 23 refer to here, right?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And then finally 57369. The
 00071:01 addendum. It's a glossary of definitions.
 02 You got that?
 03 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 04 Q. You see safety critical on the
 05 left?
 06 A. Yes.
 07 Q. And the definition is, A safety
 08 critical element is a complete system or
 09 part thereof that could, if it failed,
 10 cause or contribute substantially to a
 11 major incident or accident or is designed

12 to prevent, detect, control, or mitigate a
 13 hazard with a potential to cause property
 14 damage, personal injuries, environmental
 15 damage, or loss of reputation. Correct?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Therefore, we can safely
 18 conclude, as you've already stated, that
 19 the negative test is a safety critical test
 20 by BP's very own definition, right?
 21 A. Yes.

Page 71:24 to 72:20

00071:24 (Exhibit Number 94 marked.)
 25 Q. Let me show you what I've marked
 00072:01 as Exhibit 4 -- correction. 94. And that
 02 is a well operations, group practice?
 03 A. Yes, it is.
 04 Q. And BP Group is the producer of
 05 this group practice, right?
 06 A. Yes, they are.
 07 Q. BP Group is BP UK, isn't it?
 08 A. Along with BP in the U.S. too.
 09 Q. Right. But it's -- when we talk
 10 about the group. It includes BP PLC in the
 11 UK, doesn't it?
 12 A. Yes, it does.
 13 Q. And it's a well operation group
 14 practice. It sets out standards for well
 15 operations, right?
 16 A. Yes, it does.
 17 Q. If you turn over to Page 37 --
 18 3837, the foreword.
 19 Do you have that?
 20 A. Yes, sir, I do.

Page 73:19 to 74:12

00073:19 Q. Okay. Well, I can see it. And
 20 it's in -- every place that there's a black
 21 square it says shall. So just take my word
 22 for it. If it proves that I'm wrong, I'll
 23 let you retract your answer, okay?
 24 Each business unit shall
 25 develop, implement, and maintain a well
 00074:01 operational management system that
 02 recognizes the individual BU well hazards
 03 and risk and is designed to meet the group
 04 HSE integrity management.
 05 Do you see that?
 06 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 07 Q. Not a single business unit at BP
 08 developed a written procedure for the
 09 negative test, did they?

10 MR. COLLIER:
11 Objection to form.
12 A. None that I know of.

Page 75:01 to 75:18

00075:01 Q. Mr. Guillot, turn, if you would,
02 to Page 373839, scope at the top.
03 You have that?
04 A. Yes.
05 Q. Top paragraph says, This GP
06 provides guidance on the critical aspects
07 of well activity that need to be considered
08 when developing documents that will be used
09 to control and monitor well operational
10 activity. It defines the elements required
11 to implement a well operational management
12 system that provides assurance within the
13 context of the IM standard.
14 Did I read that correctly?
15 A. Yes, you did.
16 Q. The scope of this document -- of
17 this document very clearly includes the
18 negative test, doesn't it?

Page 75:21 to 75:24

00075:21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. Well, isn't the negative test a
23 test used in connection with controlling
24 and monitoring well operations activity?

Page 76:02 to 77:01

00076:02 A. For me when I read this, it
03 means more of a well control than drilling
04 operations.
05 Q. Okay. So to you it -- the scope
06 of the well operations section group
07 practice, engineering technical practice
08 that we're looking at here would not
09 include the negative test?
10 A. I don't know. I never seen any
11 of it so I don't know.
12 Q. Well, we know it isn't in there
13 'cause it doesn't exist, right?
14 A. Right.
15 Q. So you just don't know whether
16 or not -- if it did exist, this is the
17 place you would expect to find it?
18 A. Right.
19 Q. All right. Look at the next
20 page. At the bottom. Objectives of this

21 GP on well operations. To ensure all well
22 operational activities from handover of a
23 new well to its abandonment are carried out
24 in a safe and controlled manner.
25 Now, that would include a
00077:01 negative test, wouldn't it?

Page 77:04 to 78:19

00077:04 A. It probably would.
05 Q. All right. Look at the next
06 page, 6.3. Risk assessment.
07 Do you see that section?
08 A. Yes, I do.
09 Q. A: A risk assessment of well
10 hazards and threats shall be performed on
11 each facility or field in order to identify
12 the risk across the complete range of well
13 operational activity.
14 That includes a negative
15 test for sure, doesn't it?
16 MR. COLLIER:
17 Objection to form.
18 A. It includes all risk assessments
19 for running critical -- yeah, I guess so.
20 Q. It would include a negative
21 test, wouldn't it?
22 And then two, the
23 assessment should consider the type of
24 potential failure, for example,
25 catastrophic versus leak.
00078:01 Do you see that?
02 A. Yes, I do.
03 Q. And the type of potential
04 failure with the misinterpretation of the
05 negative test is catastrophic, isn't it?
06 MR. COLLIER:
07 Objection to form.
08 A. Could be.
09 Q. Could be. Right.
10 And three, The consequence
11 of the failure shall be evaluated from the
12 perspective of at least four criteria --
13 safety, environment, economic, and
14 reputation.
15 Do you see that?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. Any of those can be the
18 consequence of a misinterpreted test,
19 right?

Page 78:22 to 78:22

00078:22 Q. A failure in any of those areas?

Page 78:25 to 80:09

00078:25 A. Could be.
 00079:01 Q. Do you know of -- have you seen
 02 anywhere, either before during the time of
 03 this investigation or after, any evidence
 04 that a risk assessment was ever done of the
 05 risk associated with misinterpretation of
 06 the negative test?
 07 A. I wasn't associated with any of
 08 that information.
 09 Q. Have you seen it anywhere,
 10 anytime?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. And this is a BP rule or
 13 regulation that was in effect in April of
 14 2010, wasn't it?
 15 A. Yes, it was.
 16 Q. And it requires a risk
 17 assessment and, very clearly, includes the
 18 subject matter of a misinterpreted negative
 19 test, doesn't it?
 20 MR. COLLIER:
 21 Objection to form.
 22 A. It does include risk assessment,
 23 yes.
 24 Q. And to your knowledge, based on
 25 any information you've had -- and you've
 00080:01 been a well site leader 20 years, right?
 02 A. Yes, sir.
 03 Q. You have no information, that
 04 you're aware of, that BP ever did a risk
 05 assessment on a negative test
 06 misinterpretation, correct?
 07 MR. COLLIER:
 08 Objection to form.
 09 A. Correct. I've never seen one.

Page 81:09 to 81:11

00081:09 Q. Now, we've agreed that the
 10 negative test is a critical -- safety
 11 critical operational task, correct?

Page 81:14 to 83:07

00081:14 A. Yes, we have.
 15 Q. Looking at 7.2.1. Minimum
 16 requirement. Business unit shall identify
 17 and assess the risk that may arise during
 18 well operations. And then the second
 19 bullet point is, Produce written procedures

20 for critical operational tasks.
 21 Do you see that?
 22 A. Yes, I do.
 23 Q. So BP had a rule that required
 24 it to do a risk assessment and to have a
 25 written procedure. And we now know not
 00082:01 only did they not have a written procedure,
 02 but the fact that they didn't have a
 03 written procedure was a violation of their
 04 own rules, right?
 05 MR. COLLIER:
 06 Objection to form.
 07 A. BP as a company didn't have a
 08 written procedure. I don't know if they
 09 did one on the rig or not before they
 10 performed the negative test.
 11 Q. This is an engineering technical
 12 practice; is that correct?
 13 A. Yes, it is.
 14 Q. We've already seen where
 15 conformance with engineering technical
 16 practices is a requirement, isn't it?
 17 A. Yes, it is.
 18 Q. And BP violated their own
 19 engineering technical practice by not doing
 20 a risk assessment and by not having a
 21 written procedure for either conducting or
 22 interpreting the negative test, true?
 23 MR. COLLIER:
 24 Objection to form.
 25 A. As far as the global practice,
 00083:01 yes.
 02 THE REPORTER:
 03 I'm sorry, what's your
 04 answer?
 05 THE WITNESS:
 06 As far as the global
 07 practice, yes.

Page 83:09 to 84:24

00083:09 BY MR. CUNNINGHAM:
 10 Q. Let me show you what I've marked
 11 as Exhibit 95. Title: Working with
 12 pressure.
 13 Do you see that?
 14 A. Yes, I do.
 15 Q. And it appears to be a document
 16 that supersedes GP 10-45, right?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Dated November of 2009 in the
 19 upper left-hand corner.
 20 Do you see that?
 21 A. Yes, I do.
 22 Q. If I can get you to turn over to

23 Page 6 of 17, Bates 353762. See if you
 24 agree with the statement here in the second
 25 paragraph.

00084:01 Working with pressure is a
 02 routine activity for drilling, completions,
 03 and well operations personnel. So common
 04 place is this activity that occasionally
 05 personnel can be become complacent and risk
 06 of working with pressure can be
 07 underestimated resulting in a significant
 08 number of incidents, many resulting in
 09 damages -- damage to facilities or wells,
 10 but more importantly some result in injury
 11 or even fatalities.

12 Did I read that correctly?

13 A. Yes, you did.

14 Q. You agree with that?

15 A. No, I don't.

16 Q. You don't agree with it? What
 17 don't you agree with it?

18 A. I can't speak for everybody else
 19 but myself. I treat working with pressure
 20 as a hazard all the time.

21 Q. Okay. So you recognize that
 22 working with pressure is a foreseeable
 23 hazard?

24 A. Yes, sir, I do.

Page 85:05 to 87:03

00085:05 A. Not necessarily. No, sir.

06 Q. Now, as a well site leader, if
 07 you're in doubt about what's happening,
 08 whatever it may be. Let's say you're
 09 performing a test and you're in doubt, you
 10 got questions about it, who do you call?

11 A. Now, you're referring to myself?

12 What would I do?

13 Q. Who do you call?

14 A. When I have a situation, I call
 15 into the drilling engineer.

16 Q. Is that --

17 A. Or the superintendent.

18 Q. Is that somebody back on the
 19 beach?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Or in town, as you call it?

22 A. Yes, sir, it is.

23 Q. Command center. Is that a fair
 24 description of it. Office?

25 A. Just our office.

00086:01 Q. All right. You call somebody
 02 higher up the line, right?

03 A. Yes, sir, I do.

04 Q. And what you're looking for is

05 sound advice from town, correct?
 06 MR. COLLIER:
 07 Objection to form.
 08 A. I'm looking to bounce off of
 09 what I have and just get some feedback.
 10 Q. You want to talk to some
 11 engineers? Maybe drilling engineers, for
 12 example?
 13 A. That's who we call into.
 14 Q. Managers, managing drilling
 15 engineers?
 16 A. Our operational drilling
 17 engineers.
 18 Q. Okay. But you want to get --
 19 you're calling somebody else because you
 20 want to try to get some sound advice,
 21 right?
 22 A. Yes, sir.
 23 Q. All right. And you want it from
 24 people that you respect and trust and who
 25 know what they're doing, right?
 00087:01 A. Yes, sir.
 02 Q. And that's the way it should be,
 03 shouldn't it?

Page 87:06 to 87:06

00087:06 A. The way I work it.

Page 89:03 to 91:17

00089:03 (Exhibit Number 96 marked.)
 04 Q. I'm handing you what I've marked
 05 as Exhibit 96. Look at the second page, if
 06 you would.
 07 Do you know who John Guide
 08 is?
 09 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 10 Q. Did you meet him and talk to him
 11 during the course of this investigation?
 12 A. No, sir, I didn't.
 13 Q. How do you know him?
 14 A. He's been around BP for a long
 15 time. He's been in well site leader
 16 meetings around the rigs.
 17 Q. All right. At well site leader
 18 meetings around the rigs?
 19 A. At well site leader meetings in
 20 town, and he's been some on the rig.
 21 Q. All right. And what is his
 22 position; do you know? Or what was it in
 23 April of 2010?
 24 A. I think he was the drilling
 25 superintendent over the Horizon.

00090:01 Q. Well, he was a wells team
 02 leader. Is that the same as the drilling
 03 superintendent?
 04 A. I think so.
 05 Q. But he's onshore, right?
 06 A. Yes, sir.
 07 Q. And then he would have people
 08 above him or -- or at the same level as him
 09 that are drilling engineers?
 10 A. Yes, he would.
 11 Q. Okay. All right. I want you to
 12 take a second and look at this e-mail from
 13 John Guide, sent on April 17th, to David
 14 Sims.
 15 Do you know David Sims?
 16 A. I know the name.
 17 Q. If he is a drilling and
 18 completion operational manager, he would be
 19 Mr. Guide's boss, right?
 20 A. Yes, sir, he would.
 21 Q. Another executive in Houston,
 22 correct?
 23 A. Yes, sir.
 24 Q. All right. Take a minute and
 25 look at this e-mail, then I want to ask you
 00091:01 some questions.
 02 Have you read it?
 03 A. Yes, sir.
 04 Q. All right. The first sentence
 05 says, David, over the past four days -- and
 06 he's -- it's to David Sims -- there has
 07 been so many last minute changes to the
 08 operations that the well site leaders have
 09 finally come to their wits' end.
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 12 Q. Now, this is three days before
 13 the blowout, isn't it?
 14 A. Yes, sir.
 15 Q. And the well site leader he's
 16 talking about are Mr. Vidrine and
 17 Mr. Kaluza, aren't they?

Page 91:20 to 92:03

00091:20 A. I don't know who was out there
 21 at that time, but yeah.
 22 Q. And the quote is, flying by the
 23 seat of our pants.
 24 Do you see that?
 25 A. Yes, sir, I do.
 00092:01 Q. Do you know that deepwater
 02 drilling has been compared by Tony Hayward
 03 to traveling into outer space?

Page 92:06 to 93:02

00092:06 A. I've never heard of that, no.
 07 Q. You've never heard of that?
 08 A. No.
 09 Q. Did you meet Captain Wetherbee
 10 when you were on the investigative team?
 11 A. Yes, sir, I did.
 12 Q. The astronaut?
 13 A. Yes, sir, I did.
 14 Q. And do you know that he says
 15 that, in fact, the pressures are even
 16 greater, at deeper depths than in outer
 17 space.
 18 Did you know that?
 19 A. Well, yeah.
 20 Q. You knew that?
 21 A. Uh-huh.
 22 What -- refer back to
 23 pressure, 'cause I may be thinking of
 24 something different.
 25 Q. Capital Wetherbee said the
 00093:01 pressures were even greater at depths than
 02 they are in outer space?

Page 93:05 to 93:24

00093:05 A. Pressure as far as?
 06 Q. Pressure differentials.
 07 A. Oh, okay. Yeah. That's what I
 08 was thinking.
 09 Q. Okay. And he goes onto state,
 10 Moreover, we have made a special boat or
 11 helicopter run every day. Everybody wants
 12 to do the right thing, but this huge level
 13 of paranoia from engineering leadership --
 14 and that's people on the beach, right? In
 15 town at the office, right?
 16 A. I guess so.
 17 Q. -- is driving chaos.
 18 Do you see that?
 19 A. Yes, sir.
 20 Q. The operation is not -- this
 21 operation is not Thunder Horse. Brian has
 22 called me numerous times.
 23 That's Brian Morel. Do you
 24 know who Brian Morel is?

Page 94:02 to 94:23

00094:02 A. No, sir, I don't.
 03 Q. You've never met him?
 04 A. I never met him.

05 Q. Did you talk to him during the
 06 investigation?
 07 A. No, sir, I didn't.
 08 Q. Do you know that he's a drilling
 09 engineer?
 10 A. I know what his title was.
 11 Q. Okay. Brian has called me
 12 numerous times trying to make sense of all
 13 the insanity. Last night's emergency
 14 evolved around 30 barrels of cement spacer
 15 behind the top plug and how it would affect
 16 any bond logging. (I do not agree with
 17 putting the spacer above the plug to begin
 18 with.) This morning Brian called me and
 19 asked my advice about exploring
 20 opportunities both inside or outside the
 21 company.
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A. Yes, sir, I do.

Page 95:14 to 96:02

00095:14 Q. Then he says, What is my
 15 authority? With the separation of
 16 engineering and operations, I do not know
 17 what I can and can't do.
 18 And then the final
 19 sentence, The operation is not going to
 20 succeed if we continue in this manner.
 21 Were you aware that three
 22 days before the blowout that John Guide,
 23 the wells team leader, told his boss that
 24 the operation was not going to succeed if
 25 it continued in that manner?
 00096:01 A. I wasn't aware of it, no.
 02 Q. And it didn't succeed, did it?

Page 96:05 to 96:08

00096:05 Q. We all know that, don't we?
 06 A. The end result.
 07 Q. So he predicted it three days
 08 before and told his boss, didn't he?

Page 96:11 to 96:13

00096:11 A. I don't know if he's predicting
 12 the type of failure like we had, but there
 13 were some issues going on, it sound likes.

Page 96:23 to 97:05

00096:23 Q. Well, if you have the people

24 that you need to turn to when you want
 25 advice back at the beach, talking about
 00097:01 being in a level of paranoia, talking about
 02 chaos and talking about insanity, those
 03 aren't the kind of folks that you think
 04 you're going to get sound advice from, are
 05 they?

Page 97:08 to 97:16

00097:08 A. Once again, I wasn't part of
 09 this -- it's just words on a page to me.
 10 Q. Just words on a page?
 11 A. Yes, sir. I wasn't part of this
 12 conversation, so. I don't know what was
 13 going on.
 14 Q. You don't have to be part of the
 15 conversation to read the words and
 16 understand them though, do you?

Page 97:19 to 97:23

00097:19 A. The context of it.
 20 Q. You can read words like
 21 paranoia, chaos, insanity, and thinking
 22 about quitting and know there's a problem
 23 without being there, can't you?

Page 98:01 to 98:02

00098:01 A. I'm not going to speculate on
 02 it, no.

Page 98:23 to 99:04

00098:23 Q. Turn over to the next page.
 24 This is Mr. Sims, the boss,
 25 responding to Mr. Guide. And you can read
 00099:01 this to yourself, and I'll ask you a couple
 02 of questions.
 03 You read it?
 04 A. Yes, sir.

Page 99:10 to 99:17

00099:10 Q. You got -- you got a boss being
 11 told that the operation isn't going to
 12 succeed, being told it's in chaos, being
 13 told they're flying by the seat of his
 14 pants, and he says he's got to go to dance
 15 practice. That proves -- proves
 16 Mr. Guide's original point that there's

17 insanity around, doesn't it?

Page 99:20 to 100:09

00099:20 A. I don't know.
 21 Q. You don't know?
 22 A. No.
 23 Q. Do you see where it says in the
 24 next paragraph, We need to remind him that
 25 this is a great learning opportunity.
 00100:01 Remind, remind the drilling
 02 engineer -- Mr. Morel is who they're
 03 talking about, right?
 04 A. Yes.
 05 Q. -- that this is a great learning
 06 opportunity.
 07 The drilling engineer for a
 08 deepwater rig like the Macondo isn't
 09 supposed to be engaged in OJT, is he?

Page 100:12 to 100:18

00100:12 A. I don't know what his role was
 13 in the well, if he was lead or not, but,
 14 yeah, he shouldn't be engaged in it.
 15 Q. He shouldn't be engaged in
 16 learning on a deepwater drilling rig. He's
 17 the guy that's supposed to know what to do,
 18 isn't he?

Page 100:21 to 101:08

00100:21 A. Well, I got to admit. I've been
 22 doing it for a long time. I learn
 23 something new every day.
 24 Q. Right. But you don't
 25 characterize your work as a great learning
 00101:01 opportunity, do you?
 02 A. I think every learning is a
 03 great opportunity.
 04 Q. Okay. So just to be clear. You
 05 agree that OJT on a well like this for the
 06 drilling engineer is less than desirable.
 07 You'll agree with that, wouldn't you?
 08 A. Yes, sir.

Page 101:11 to 102:01

00101:11 Q. Then he says, It will be over
 12 soon and that the same issues -- or
 13 worse -- exist anywhere else.
 14 And the issues he's talking
 15 about are insanity and chaos and flying by

16 the seat of the pants. And he says those
 17 same issues exist anywhere else.
 18 Do you see that?
 19 A. I see it.
 20 Q. And do you know that BP is
 21 taking the position that the Macondo was
 22 just an aberration, that the blowout was
 23 just an aberration? But here you have the
 24 boss onshore saying the same things are
 25 occurring elsewhere, the same conditions
 00102:01 exist elsewhere?

Page 102:04 to 102:07

00102:04 A. I see where he's saying it, but
 05 I don't...
 06 Q. You don't want to be on a rig
 07 where those same conditions exist, do you?

Page 102:10 to 105:13

00102:10 A. For myself personally?
 11 Q. Yeah.
 12 A. On a rig like this, you just
 13 shut operations down if you have to.
 14 Q. Exactly. Exactly.
 15 A. That's what I would do. I can't
 16 speak for anybody else.
 17 Q. Exactly.
 18 There is a rule that we've
 19 heard about over and over at the Coast
 20 Guard hearing. Anybody can shut the job
 21 down, can't they --
 22 A. That's right.
 23 Q. -- if they think it's unsafe?
 24 That's from the rig worker
 25 all the way up to the top, right?
 00103:01 A. Right.
 02 Q. And here you have bosses, you
 03 have John Guide and David Sims. And
 04 instead of shutting the rig down, like he
 05 should have done, he says he's going to
 06 dance practice.
 07 MR. COLLIER:
 08 Objection to form.
 09 Q. Isn't that what you see right
 10 here?
 11 A. That's what it says.
 12 MR. COLLIER:
 13 Objection to form.
 14 Q. He should have shut the rig down
 15 until they straighten this mess out,
 16 shouldn't he?
 17 MR. COLLIER:

18 Objection to form.
19 Q. Shouldn't he?
20 A. If John had these concerns,
21 which I -- I don't know the full statement
22 of it, but probably so.
23 (Exhibit Number 97 marked.)
24 Q. Let me show you what I've marked
25 as Exhibit 97. This is an e-mail.
00104:01 Have you seen this before?
02 A. No, sir, I haven't.
03 Q. It is from Brian Morel and it's
04 dated April the 20th. And this is the
05 Brian Morel drilling engineer from the site
06 we just discussed, who authors the
07 temporary abandonment procedure and the
08 negative test procedure, right? Do you see
09 that?
10 A. Yes, sir, I do.
11 Q. It's the same guy?
12 A. Uh-huh.
13 Q. And if you look at four, that's
14 the sum and substance of what he has to say
15 about the negative test in this procedure,
16 isn't it?
17 A. That's what it looks like.
18 Q. Do a negative test.
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. And although he didn't write it
21 here, it -- it is more than obvious to even
22 somebody who knows a little bit about
23 drilling, that if the negative test fails,
24 if the well fails the negative test, you
25 don't go to step five, correct?
00105:01 MR. COLLIER:
02 Objection to form.
03 A. True. If you see pressures and
04 then you determine that it is -- the well
05 trying to flow, yeah, you wouldn't go to
06 step five.
07 Q. You do not open the annular and
08 continue displacement, do you?
09 A. Right.
10 Q. And if you don't open the
11 annular and you don't continue
12 displacement, you don't have a blowout, do
13 you?

Page 105:16 to 106:01

00105:16 A. That, I don't know.
17 Q. Well, you understand that the
18 negative test was misinterpreted and that
19 they did open up the annular and they did
20 continue displacing to seawater, right?
21 A. They did do that, yes, they did.

22 Q. And if they had not opened the
 23 annular and had not continued displacing
 24 the seawater, the well could have been over
 25 balanced and there never would have been a
 00106:01 blowout, would there?

Page 106:04 to 107:09

00106:04 A. Had to do certain action to get
 05 it done.
 06 Q. Sure. Sure. But it's something
 07 you would do, isn't it? You would not
 08 continue to under balance. You would, in
 09 fact, over balance the well until you
 10 figured out what the problem was and you
 11 remediated the problem?
 12 MR. COLLIER:
 13 Objection to form.
 14 A. I know what I would do.
 15 Q. What would you do?
 16 A. In a situation where I have
 17 differential pressure that don't read, I'm
 18 going to secure the well, displace back to
 19 mud.
 20 Q. Okay.
 21 A. That's what I would do. I can't
 22 speak for nobody else.
 23 Q. You're going to secure the well,
 24 displace back the mud. And another way to
 25 say that is that you're going to over
 00107:01 balance it?
 02 A. And put it back to static
 03 condition.
 04 Q. Okay. And the reason you would
 05 do that is because that's what you should
 06 do, right?
 07 MR. COLLIER:
 08 Objection to form.
 09 A. That's what I know to do.

Page 109:08 to 109:11

00109:08 Q. As John Mogford, global head of
 09 safety and operations, S&O, puts it -- and
 10 you -- you met Mr. Mogford before?
 11 A. No, I haven't.

Page 109:16 to 110:06

00109:16 Q. You know he's the head man for
 17 safety for BP, worldwide, right?
 18 A. I know his title but I've never
 19 met him.

20 Q. Okay. And he says, You might
 21 set out to drive safely, but if you do not
 22 know the highway code or do not have a safe
 23 car, you are not a safe driver. And the
 24 same way, if people within our operations
 25 set out to be safe, but the plant has
 00110:01 problems or work processes are incomplete
 02 and staff are not able or empowered to
 03 improve them -- to improve them, it is very
 04 difficult for the individual to be safe
 05 when the system around him is not.
 06 You agree with that?

Page 110:09 to 110:09

00110:09 A. Yes, I do.

Page 111:25 to 112:10

00111:25 Q. Even though we've discussed
 00112:01 those policies today and you've seen the
 02 requirement for risk assessment, you've
 03 seen the requirement for written
 04 procedures, for any safety critical task,
 05 and you've admitted that BP has none of
 06 them?
 07 A. BP has none. True.
 08 Q. You still won't admit that the
 09 Deepwater Horizon, in light of all that,
 10 was avoidable?

Page 112:13 to 112:13

00112:13 A. No, I won't admit that.

Page 112:18 to 113:07

00112:18 Q. Now, we've had ten months go by
 19 since April the 20th of 2010, and you're
 20 still a well site leader?
 21 A. Yes, I am.
 22 Q. Right. You're in Alaska,
 23 correct?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. As of today, what written
 00113:01 standards or procedures for conducting and
 02 interpreting the negative test has BP
 03 management promulgated?
 04 A. I don't know.
 05 Q. Well, if there had been any,
 06 somebody would have told you, wouldn't
 07 they?

Page 113:10 to 114:03

00113:10 A. Right now I am on the
11 construction side of building the rigs. So
12 it may come out, but I haven't seen it.
13 Q. How long did you continue in
14 your position as a well site leader after
15 April 20th of 2010?
16 A. I'm still in my well site leader
17 position.
18 Q. Still a well site.
19 Well, if there were
20 policies or procedures that had been
21 implemented since the Deepwater Horizon, BP
22 would not have kept them secret from you,
23 would they?
24 A. No. If they've come out, I just
25 haven't seen them. If they're out, I
00114:01 haven't looked for it.
02 Q. If they were out, you would know
03 about it, wouldn't you?

Page 114:06 to 115:14

00114:06 A. It may have been e-mailed out,
07 but I didn't see it if it did.
08 Q. All right. So as we sit here
09 today ten months after the Deepwater
10 Horizon -- and you are a well site
11 leader -- to your knowledge, BP has still
12 not established a written policy and
13 procedure for either conducting or
14 interpreting a negative test, true?
15 MR. COLLIER:
16 Objection to form.
17 A. Not that I know of.
18 Q. So to your knowledge they have
19 not, true?
20 A. To my knowledge, I do not know.
21 Q. Since April 20th of 2010, have
22 you been required to attend any courses or
23 training on the negative test?
24 A. No. Because my training doesn't
25 require negative test for land operations
00115:01 like for deepwater.
02 Q. Well, when's the last time you
03 did a negative test?
04 A. Last time I was in the Gulf was
05 2009.
06 Q. 2009.
07 So are you telling me,
08 then, that if there had been a training
09 regimen established for conducting a
10 negative test, that you wouldn't -- you

11 wouldn't have any reason to know about it
12 because you're not in deepwater right now?
13 A. My VTA calls for basic land
14 operations.

Page 118:17 to 119:08

00118:17 Q. And before 2010, did you ever
18 become aware of BP hiring outside safety
19 consultants to evaluate process safety on
20 their deepwater rigs?
21 A. Not that I'm aware of.
22 Q. It seems like you may have some
23 recollection of something like that?
24 A. I'm trying to think back if I
25 remember them sending somebody out to the
00119:01 rigs to do evaluations, but I can't
02 remember.
03 Q. You don't ever remember anybody
04 doing a process safety evaluation on any
05 rig you were ever on?
06 A. No, sir, I don't.
07 Q. Including Gulf of Mexico, right?
08 A. Gulf of Mexico.

Page 120:01 to 120:20

00120:01 Q. Are you familiar with a company
02 named Boots & Coots?
03 A. Yes, I know them.
04 Q. What -- what do you know about
05 them?
06 A. Well control. Well ops.
07 Q. Do you know what they do? Do
08 you know what it is they do?
09 A. They do quite a few things. My
10 experience with them on my wells is
11 whenever you're in a well control
12 situation, they would send a man out to
13 location --
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. -- and have people in town.
16 Q. Okay. Let me show you what I've
17 marked as Exhibit 100 and get you to leaf
18 through that and tell me if that is the
19 same company we're talking about, Boots &
20 Coots.

Page 120:22 to 121:07

00120:22 Q. Does that look like what you
23 have in mind?
24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. All right. If you look at --
00121:01 these pages are not numbered, but look at
02 the second page.
03 It says, We are the
04 pressure control experts in the oil and gas
05 industry.
06 Is that -- is that the way
07 you understood it?

Page 121:10 to 121:10

00121:10 A. That's what they say they are.

Page 121:15 to 122:07

00121:15 Q. And if you look over at about
16 the third page, fourth page from the end
17 under prevention at the top. Find that
18 section, if you would.
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. They state that Boots & Coots
21 can help you understand your risk and
22 reduce the potential for catastrophe.
23 Do you see that, the first
24 paragraph?
25 A. Yes, sir.
00122:01 Q. Identification of risk
02 associated with any business and the
03 management of those risk are important
04 aspects of business management in today's
05 competitive world.
06 You would agree with that,
07 wouldn't you?

Page 122:10 to 122:10

00122:10 A. Yes.

Page 123:07 to 123:24

00123:07 Q. And did you become aware, during
08 the course of your participation in the
09 investigation, that Boots & Coots was
10 engaged in evaluating the negative test
11 procedures?
12 A. I knew Boots & Coots had people
13 in our office working.
14 Q. And they were in your office
15 working at the same time you conducted your
16 failed search for the procedures for a
17 negative test, weren't they?
18 A. Yes, they were.
19 Q. And the man that was heading the

20 Boots & Coots evaluation of the negative
21 test, did you know him, Mr. John Wright?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Did you meet him?
24 A. I met him.

Page 125:15 to 125:22

00125:15 Q. I'm going to hand you what is
16 Exhibit 102, which is the Boots & Coots
17 investigation of the negative test.
18 I take it you've not seen
19 this before?
20 A. No, I haven't.
21 Q. You note on the second page that
22 it was prepared on May the 21st of 2010?

Page 125:25 to 125:25

00125:25 A. I see the date, yes.

Page 126:08 to 126:15

00126:08 Q. All right. And that's about
09 30 days after the Macondo blowout, correct?
10 A. About that, yes, sir.
11 Q. So if -- without even going into
12 the report, what -- it didn't take
13 Mr. Wright but about 30 days to reach a
14 conclusions that we see in this report,
15 correct?

Page 126:18 to 127:21

00126:18 A. That's how long it took him,
19 yeah.
20 Q. Look, if you would, at Page 7,
21 which is Bates 94102. The executive
22 summary.
23 Do you have that?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. It says, I, John Wright, was
00127:01 asked by Kent Corser, the engineering
02 support leader under the technical and
03 operations branch of the Horizon incident
04 investigation team, to write an assessment
05 of a negative test performed on the
06 Deepwater Horizon prior to the well blowout
07 on April 20th, 2010. My findings are
08 summarized in this document.
09 Did I quote that correctly?
10 A. Yes, you did.
11 Q. And he says in 2.1, Documented

12 negative test procedure assessment. It
 13 appears that there was not a documented
 14 engineered procedure on how the negative
 15 test was to be performed for the given
 16 situation. Correct?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Well, not only was there no
 19 standard published BP procedure, but there
 20 was no specific procedure designed for
 21 Macondo is what he's saying, isn't it?

Page 127:24 to 128:03

00127:24 A. That's what he's saying.
 25 Q. And when he talks about being
 00128:01 engineered, an engineered procedure, it's
 02 the engineers who do the procedure, not
 03 well site leader, isn't it?

Page 128:06 to 129:11

00128:06 A. I can speak to what I do. I
 07 write my own.
 08 Q. You write your own?
 09 A. My own negative test procedures
 10 along with myself, the toolpushers on the
 11 rig, mud engineers, and the cementers.
 12 Q. You get no input from the beach?
 13 A. We write it 'cause it's rig
 14 specific, send to town for approval, they
 15 look it over, and comes back to us.
 16 Q. Okay. So you get it approved by
 17 the beach?
 18 A. We ask them to look it over and
 19 then we discuss if there's any issues they
 20 want to change.
 21 Q. All right. And there's that's a
 22 rig specific procedure you're talking
 23 about?
 24 A. Rig specific.
 25 Q. Okay. Look at Number 2 on the
 00129:01 next page.
 02 Performing and correctly
 03 interpreting a negative test on a deepwater
 04 high flow potential exploration well from a
 05 fifth generation semi-submersible would be
 06 considered a safety critical and high
 07 significant risk activity. Correct?
 08 A. That's what he says.
 09 Q. And that's what you agreed with
 10 me about earlier in this deposition, didn't
 11 you?

Page 129:14 to 129:14

00129:14 A. Yes.

Page 130:21 to 131:13

00130:21 Q. Then in his summation he says,
22 It appears there was not a sense of the
23 significant risk associated with correctly
24 implementing and interpreting the data for
25 the negative test implemented as a step in
00131:01 the temporary abandonment program for the
02 Deepwater Horizon. This is evident from,
03 one, the engineering staff who wrote and
04 approved the program without a detailed
05 procedure and the lack of a formal risk
06 assessment for a safety critical and
07 significant risk activity.
08 Do you see that?
09 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. And the engineering staff that
11 wrote the procedure, we now know -- or the
12 final procedure -- was Mr. Morel who was
13 thinking about quitting, right?

Page 131:16 to 132:09

00131:16 Q. Isn't that right?
17 A. That's what he's talking about.
18 I don't know if he is or not.
19 Q. And then on the final page of
20 the summary he says, If any person in the
21 command chain had understood the
22 consequence of misinterpreting this
23 critical test, the annular would not have
24 been open and the riser circulated to
25 seawater, which ultimately led to the
00132:01 blowout.
02 Did I read that correctly?
03 A. Yes, you did.
04 Q. The truth is that the command
05 chain, the executives up the command chain
06 did understand the consequences of
07 misinterpreting a negative test, because
08 you understand those consequences, don't
09 you?

Page 132:12 to 132:12

00132:12 A. Yes, I do.

Page 132:14 to 132:14

00132:14 I'm sorry, the answer?

Page 132:16 to 132:16

00132:16 Yes, I do.

Page 135:21 to 135:23

00135:21 Q. Good morning, sir. My name is
22 Miles Clements. I represent Transocean in
23 this litigation.

Page 136:03 to 137:01

00136:03 I know you're a well site
04 leader, and an experienced one. And I
05 understand that you write your own negative
06 test as a matter of practice when you are
07 on deepwater rigs; is that correct?
08 A. Yes, sir, it is.
09 Q. Do you position yourself on the
10 drill floor during the performance of a
11 negative test?
12 A. For wells that I have been on?
13 Q. Yes, sir.
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. As a matter of practice?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You interviewed Mr. Vidrine
18 after this casualty of April 20th of 2010,
19 did you not?
20 A. Yes, sir, I did.
21 Q. Did Mr. Vidrine ever provide you
22 with a written negative test that he had
23 formulated for the Deepwater Horizon?
24 A. I didn't ask him for one. I
25 didn't see one.
00137:01 Q. Why didn't you ask him for one?

Page 137:04 to 137:05

00137:04 A. Didn't think it was necessary
05 for me to have it.

Page 137:10 to 137:25

00137:10 Q. You've never seen any written
11 negative test for the Deepwater Horizon on
12 April 20th, have you?
13 A. I have not, no.
14 Q. Well, were you in the presence
15 of other BP employees or representatives

16 when inquiry was made for a written
17 negative test for this particular job?
18 A. No, I wasn't.
19 Q. If there was no written negative
20 test procedure standard for BP and, as far
21 as you know, no negative test -- written
22 negative test procedure for the Deepwater
23 Horizon on April 20th, do you agree that
24 Transocean cannot be accused of not
25 following it?

Page 138:03 to 138:06

00138:03 A. I can't answer to that.
04 Q. You can't expect Transocean to
05 follow a written procedure that does not
06 exist, can you?

Page 138:09 to 138:19

00138:09 A. I can't answer that.
10 Q. Why can't you answer that?
11 A. I wasn't out there what was
12 taking place at the time, whether they had
13 a procedure or not. I don't know what
14 conversation took place.
15 Q. Well, let's assume for a minute
16 that there were no written negative test
17 procedure. Can you -- can you criticize
18 Transocean for not following a written
19 procedure that doesn't exist?

Page 138:22 to 138:25

00138:22 A. Again, I wasn't out there with
23 them. I can't answer to that.
24 Q. You don't have to be out there
25 with them to answer the question.

Page 139:03 to 139:18

00139:03 A. I have to know the scenario,
04 what was taking place, what conversation
05 was going on. I just can't comment on
06 that.
07 Q. We're not talking about an oral
08 procedure. We're talking about a written
09 procedure.
10 A. I don't know if one existed so
11 it may be. Maybe it does, I don't know.
12 Q. All right. Well, you certainly
13 do know, and I think you testified that
14 you're well-aware that BP does not have, as

15 a matter of protocol, a written negative
16 test procedure.
17 Have we established that?
18 A. BP as a company does not.

Page 142:20 to 144:03

00142:20 Q. When you would write your
21 written procedure for a negative test when
22 you were serving as well site leader on a
23 deepwater rig, have you ever also written
24 the criteria for evaluating whether or not
25 the negative test is a good one or a bad
00143:01 one?
02 A. Criteria was zero, zero. Zero
03 pressure.
04 Q. Has that ever been put in
05 writing, either by you or by BP?
06 A. It was on my negative test
07 procedures.
08 Q. Alrighty. Did you ask
09 Mr. Vidrine if on this occasion when you
10 interviewed him whether he had ever written
11 a -- the criteria for interpreting the
12 negative test performed on the Deepwater
13 Horizon?
14 A. No, I didn't.
15 Q. Did anyone ever ask him for that
16 in your presence?
17 A. Not in my presence, no.
18 Q. Have you ever seen such a
19 document?
20 A. No, I haven't.
21 Q. Did Mr. Vidrine determine for
22 himself whether or not whatever criteria he
23 applied had been met with regard to the
24 negative test on the Deepwater Horizon?
25 A. I can't say what Don did.
00144:01 Q. Well, is that a determination
02 you would make as a well site leader on
03 your jobs?

Page 144:06 to 144:11

00144:06 A. For my jobs and my wells, that's
07 a determination I would make.
08 Q. Okay. Because you're the well
09 site leader, and that's the authority that
10 the well site leader has, is it not?
11 A. Along with --

Page 144:14 to 145:09

00144:14 A. We have the authority along with
15 the contractors who was retained. No one
16 man makes a final call.
17 Q. Is that really true, sir? One
18 man does make a final call, and that's the
19 well site leader, is it not?
20 A. No, sir, it's not. Not my
21 right.
22 Q. Well, what if there's some
23 disagreement over what the test is showing?
24 A. Once again, the wells that I'm
25 on, if I ever had a situation where there
00145:01 was pressure and a disagreement how it got
02 there, we'd shut down the test, bottle up
03 the well, and redo it. Right or wrong, if
04 we have to do it over again, it's not a big
05 deal. If we can't come to terms -- the
06 drilling contractor or myself, the
07 leadership team -- for what is taking
08 place, we just redo. That's what I would
09 do --

Page 145:15 to 147:03

00145:15 A. I can't answer what was done
16 there.
17 Q. Well, you know that wasn't done.
18 You know the well wasn't shut down?
19 A. I know it wasn't, yes.
20 Q. Yeah, okay.
21 If you had any uncertainty
22 about whether or not a negative test you
23 were performing was meeting the criteria
24 you required to be a good test, would you
25 call the office?
00146:01 MR. COLLIER:
02 Object to form.
03 A. For the job that I'm running on
04 my rig?
05 Q. Yes.
06 A. Once I -- once I observe there's
07 different pressures that we shouldn't see,
08 the priority is secure the well, put the
09 well back to static condition, and notify
10 the office when all this is taking place.
11 Q. Okay. And who would you notify
12 at the office? What would that individual
13 title and rank be?
14 A. More than likely I would call in
15 to the drilling engineer at the time.
16 Q. Okay. And if he is not
17 available, would you go farther up the
18 line?
19 A. Yes. I take it to the team lead
20 superintendent. I rather go to to get --

21 talk to somebody about what took place.
22 Q. And the e-mails that you have
23 seen and the investigation that you
24 performed, who would those people be with
25 regard to the Deepwater Horizon on
00147:01 April 20th, 2010, that Mr. Vidrine or
02 Mr. Kaluza would have called had they done
03 that?

Page 147:06 to 147:10

00147:06 A. I don't know who they were
07 talking to, as far as their operational
08 engineer.
09 Q. Well, would John Guide have been
10 one of the candidates?

Page 147:13 to 147:17

00147:13 A. He'd been probably second on the
14 list to call.
15 Q. Who would be first?
16 A. The drilling engineer who was in
17 charge of the well.

Page 147:25 to 148:03

00147:25 Q. Would one call Mr. Hafle if
00148:01 Morel and Guide were not available?
02 A. Mark Hafle?
03 Q. Yes?

Page 148:06 to 148:19

00148:06 A. He probably would be one on the
07 list to call.
08 Q. All right. Did you ask
09 Mr. Vidrine when you interviewed him after
10 this incident if he had called anyone
11 ashore on the evening of April 20th, 2010?
12 A. No, I didn't.
13 Q. You didn't ask him that?
14 A. No, I didn't.
15 Q. Did anyone in your presence ask
16 him that?
17 A. No, sir.
18 Q. Did he volunteer it?
19 A. Not to me, he didn't.

Page 149:01 to 150:05

00149:01 Q. And it's your testimony that no

02 one asked him if he had called anyone
03 ashore?
04 A. I didn't ask him if he called
05 anyone.
06 Q. And you're not aware that anyone
07 did?
08 A. Not when I interviewed him, no,
09 sir.
10 Q. Okay. And to your knowledge,
11 nobody asked him if he's formulated a
12 written negative test procedure?
13 A. To my knowledge, I don't know
14 that anybody asked him. I didn't ask him.
15 Q. All right. And he didn't
16 volunteer?
17 A. No, sir.
18 Q. And nobody asked him whether he
19 formulated a written set of criteria for
20 interpreting the negative test as good or
21 bad?
22 A. I didn't ask him.
23 Q. And no one asked him in your
24 presence?
25 A. No, sir.
00150:01 Q. And never volunteered that?
02 A. Not to me, he didn't.
03 Q. Did he give you a recitation of
04 the events of the evening during the
05 negative test?

Page 150:08 to 150:11

00150:08 Q. Which would have included the
09 negative test during that part of the
10 evening?
11 A. No, sir.

Page 156:11 to 156:17

00156:11 Q. What information did Mr. Vidrine
12 give you regarding the negative test when
13 you interviewed him? In as much detail as
14 you can provide.
15 A. Well, any information he gave on
16 the negative test is basic questions that
17 were asked, he answered.

Page 156:22 to 157:01

00156:22 Q. What was the information he
23 imparted to you during the interview with
24 regard to the negative test? I'll limit
25 it. How about with regard to problems

00157:01 incurred during the negative test?

Page 157:04 to 157:15

00157:04 A. Once again, the questions that I
05 see on here that we asked during the
06 negative test. The first one was on a
07 negative test pressure. Bled off. Who
08 bled it off. Started bleeding drill pipes,
09 not sure. When Bob got on the rig floor.
10 Q. Bob Kaluza?
11 A. I guess that's who he's
12 referring to, but I don't know.
13 Q. Okay. So Mr. Kaluza and
14 Mr. Vidrine both would have been on the
15 drill floor?

Page 157:18 to 157:24

00157:18 A. I don't know when it started and
19 had when it finished. There had to be some
20 overlap somewhere, but I don't know when.
21 Q. Alrighty. If there was a
22 problematic negative test, would you expect
23 both of them to be on the drill floor?
24 Would that have been good practice?

Page 158:02 to 158:08

00158:02 A. Not necessarily.
03 Q. Okay. Is it your appreciation
04 that they both were on the drill floor
05 during some portion of the negative test?
06 A. Probably some point in time when
07 they relieved each other, they were on the
08 rig floor at the same time.

Page 162:05 to 164:20

00162:05 your drill pipe or your choke line. The
06 flow path has nothing to do with where your
07 reading pressure at once you bleed
08 everything off.
09 Q. Were there discrepancies on this
10 occasion with the pressure readings on the
11 drill pipe and the kill line during the
12 negative test?
13 MR. COLLIER:
14 Object to form.
15 A. There were some discrepancies
16 noted.
17 Q. Okay. Do you recall what they
18 were?

19 A. I don't remember how much it
20 was, no.
21 Q. Was there a 1400 psi in the
22 drill pipe?
23 A. I don't recall the exact number.
24 Q. If you would have been the well
25 site leader on a deepwater rig during such
00163:01 a negative test, would that have created a
02 problem for you?
03 MR. COLLIER:
04 Object to form.
05 A. For a well that I was on, on a
06 different operation, it throws a red flag
07 to me.
08 Q. Okay. And applying whatever
09 criteria you think is appropriate to
10 evaluating the negative test, would you
11 conclude that this was a good negative test
12 with that level of discrepancy?
13 A. Me personally?
14 MR. COLLIER:
15 Object to form.
16 Q. Yes. You.
17 A. Me personally?
18 MR. COLLIER:
19 Object to form.
20 A. On the wells I was on, no, I
21 wouldn't consider it a good test.
22 Q. All right. Well, what would you
23 do about that?
24 A. The point here -- once again,
25 leaning on the side of caution, the well
00164:01 would be shut in, flow paths would be
02 checked for any possible influx of pressure
03 from someplace else. Discussions --
04 Q. Go ahead.
05 A. Discussions with the cementing
06 lead team, leadership team.
07 Q. Ashore?
08 A. Well, on this rig this time.
09 Q. On the rig?
10 A. Decide which way we're going to
11 go. Everybody come to agreement. Goes
12 back to mud -- or the well go back to
13 static condition. While that's being done,
14 notify the engineers in town what's taking
15 place.
16 Q. Onshore?
17 A. Onshore.
18 Q. These would all be decisions you
19 would make as well site leader, are they
20 not?

00164:23 A. It would be a combination of
24 people -- the rig team, myself, senior
25 toolpusher -- all have to be involved in
00165:01 these decisions that's right there on the
02 rig.
03 Q. Ultimately you are the one in
04 authority on the rig, are you not?
05 MR. COLLIER:
06 Object to form.
07 A. No. They have rig leadership
08 team as an authority, and anybody can step
09 up if they have anything to say.
10 Q. And after they say whatever they
11 had to say and provide whatever information
12 and expertise they have, you, sir, as the
13 well site leader would be the one to decide
14 what to do, would you not?
15 MR. COLLIER:
16 Object to form.
17 A. No. We all come to a mutual
18 agreement. If we agree to disagree, we
19 find out -- go down the path that everybody
20 agree upon.
21 Q. Okay. Well, what if you
22 couldn't agree? Somebody would have to
23 make a decision, and that would be the well
24 site leader, would it not?

Page 166:02 to 166:19

00166:02 A. No, sir, it would not. We would
03 shut down operation and take it to town.
04 Q. Okay.
05 A. And get everybody together.
06 Q. Okay. The well operations don't
07 get shut down unless you say so; isn't that
08 right?
09 A. That's right.
10 Q. All right.
11 A. But also the rig senior
12 management could shut the rig down anytime
13 they want.
14 Q. In a situation where the rig
15 management and the well site leader simply
16 don't agree, the well site leader has
17 ultimately authority -- has ultimate
18 authority to make the decision, does he
19 not?

Page 166:22 to 167:17

00166:22 A. I've never used that authority
23 so I don't really know.
24 Q. You don't know who's in charge?

25 A. I know the rig team's in charge.
00167:01 We work as a team out there, not one man.
02 Q. Sure. But you're the head of
03 the team, are you not, sir?
04 MR. COLLIER:
05 Object to form.
06 A. From the BP side. And there was
07 senior toolpusher as the head on the
08 Transocean side, or whatever contractor
09 you're working with.
10 Q. Must the toolpusher clear any
11 decision he wants to make with you?
12 A. As far as?
13 Q. Such things as shutting down the
14 well?
15 A. If he sees the need to be shut
16 down, he's going to tell me when he's going
17 to do it.

Page 167:22 to 169:03

00167:22 Q. And if you would disagree with
23 him, he would necessarily have to listen to
24 you, would he not?
25 A. If he wants to shut down -- shut
00168:01 it down. He's got a legitimate reason, we
02 discuss it. And if we disagree, the rig go
03 shut down until he can get comfortable with
04 what needs to be done.
05 Q. He defers to you on the
06 interpretation of the negative test, does
07 he not?
08 MR. COLLIER:
09 Object to form.
10 A. Everybody has a look at it to
11 agree that it's good or bad.
12 Q. Sure. But you're the one who
13 determines if it's good or bad, do you not?
14 MR. COLLIER:
15 Object to form.
16 A. Again, both of us have to agree
17 to it.
18 Q. Well, if he agrees and you don't
19 agree, what happens then?
20 A. Once again, we take -- we lean
21 to the caution side. We shut the well in
22 and redo it.
23 Q. Did you interview Lee Lambert?
24 A. Yes, sir, I did.
25 Q. When did you interview him?
00169:01 A. I don't remember the date.
02 Q. Let me show you what I'll mark
03 for identification as Exhibit 104.

Page 169:09 to 169:14

00169:09 Q. Did you interview Mr. Lambert on
10 May 17th?
11 A. I guess that was it. I don't
12 remember the date.
13 Q. Does that sound about right?
14 A. Could be.

Page 170:24 to 170:24

00170:24 Q. What was Mr. Lambert's role?

Page 171:02 to 171:07

00171:02 A. His role as?
03 Q. Deepwater Horizon.
04 A. He was a well site leader out
05 there. I'm not sure what his role was.
06 Q. He had been on the rig?
07 A. Sometime. I don't know though.

Page 172:04 to 172:08

00172:04 Q. Well, as far as what goes on in
05 the normal procedure at BP on deepwater
06 rigs, is there typically a step-by-step
07 procedure handed out on a sheet from the
08 mud engineer?

Page 172:11 to 172:14

00172:11 A. For -- for wells that I do and
12 is involved in, whenever we do a
13 displacement, there is a written up
14 procedure.

Page 175:13 to 175:15

00175:13 Q. What did you learn from
14 Mr. Lambert that you consider to be helpful
15 to the investigation?

Page 175:18 to 176:16

00175:18 A. One thing from my notes was when
19 we asked about the planning of the negative
20 test.
21 Q. Okay. And what did you learn?
22 A. There wasn't much done.
23 MS. KUCHLER:
24 I'm sorry. We didn't hear

25 the answer back here.
00176:01 THE WITNESS:
02 There wasn't much done to
03 it.
04 BY MR. CLEMENTS:
05 Q. There was not much planning on
06 the negative test?
07 A. Yeah.
08 Q. Was a procedure given to the
09 Transocean toolpusher or driller to perform
10 the negative test?
11 I asked you previously
12 about a written procedure, and I think we
13 covered that. But based on your interviews
14 that you conducted, are you aware of
15 whether a procedure at all was -- was given
16 to Transocean to perform a negative test?

Page 176:20 to 176:20

00176:20 A. Not that I'm aware of.

Page 176:23 to 177:03

00176:23 I don't want to go back over that, but let
24 me ask you whether you're aware of any --
25 of whether there was any unwritten criteria
00177:01 imparted to Transocean toolpusher or
02 driller with regard to evaluating the
03 negative test as good or bad?

Page 177:06 to 177:06

00177:06 A. Nothing that I'm aware of.

Page 178:19 to 179:14

00178:19 Q. As a well site leader, have you
20 ever displaced mud to a depth of over
21 3,000 feet below the mud line during a
22 temporary abandonment?
23 A. Yes, I have.
24 Q. Was there a written procedure
25 doing so in the sequence of the temporary
00179:01 abandonment?
02 A. One that I have wrote for the
03 well I was on.
04 Q. The one you did tailored to that
05 particular job?
06 A. Yes, sir.
07 Q. Okay. Does BP have a standard
08 protocol to follow for displacing mud
09 during a temporary abandonment?

10 A. Not that I'm aware of.
11 Q. Does it have -- does BP have a
12 standard written protocol for all of the
13 steps in their sequence to be followed in a
14 temporary abandonment?

Page 179:17 to 180:10

00179:17 A. Not that I know of.
18 Q. How long have you been a well
19 site leader for BP?
20 A. 17 years for BP.
21 Q. And before that?
22 A. Worked on the -- it was Amaco
23 and BP. I was on the contractor side.
24 Q. Okay. What was your highest
25 position on the contractor side?
00180:01 A. Superintendent.
02 Q. As a well site leader, have you
03 ever used a lost circulation material
04 before as a spacer?
05 MR. COLLIER:
06 Objection to form.
07 A. On wells that I have been on and
08 what I've done?
09 Q. Yes.
10 A. No.

Page 180:19 to 181:07

00180:19 Q. Do you have -- let me direct
20 your attention to Exhibit 96, subject to
21 some previous questioning.
22 First page is the one to
23 refresh your recollection uses the words
24 wits' end, flying by the seats of our
25 pants, paranoia, chaos, insanity. Do you
00181:01 recall that e-mail?
02 A. I never seen it till today.
03 Q. What did you determine during
04 the course of your interviews, including
05 the one with Mr. Vidrine, to indicate why
06 the well site leaders had come to their
07 wits' end?

Page 181:10 to 181:16

00181:10 A. I didn't get into any kind of
11 those discussion with him.
12 Q. Were you aware that they were at
13 their wits' end?
14 A. No, sir, I wasn't.
15 Q. Were you aware that they were

16 flying by the seat of their pants?

Page 181:19 to 181:23

00181:19 A. No, I wasn't.
20 Q. If there was no written test,
21 written procedure for the negative test,
22 would that be an indication as to why they
23 were flying by the seat of their pants?

Page 182:01 to 182:01

00182:01 A. I don't know.

Page 184:22 to 184:24

00184:22 Q. Is it your practice as a well
23 site leader to perform a cement bond log to
24 test the adequacy of a cement job?

Page 185:01 to 185:24

00185:01 Object to form.
02 A. Not for the well site leader to
03 determine to run the bond log. We don't
04 determine that.
05 Q. Well, to have it determined, to
06 have the adequacy determined. The well
07 site leader authorizes it. BP pays for it,
08 do they not?
09 A. No, we do not authorize it. The
10 bond log is set up from in town. If they
11 want to run one, they come out to run it.
12 We do not authorize it.
13 Q. In town by BP?
14 A. By BP.
15 Q. And BP pays for it?
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. So BP determines whether or not
18 it's going to be done?
19 A. Not the well site leader.
20 Q. I understand the distinction
21 now.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Okay. In what situations would
24 you do a -- would you not do a CBL?

Page 186:02 to 186:09

00186:02 Q. If there are any?
03 A. Do not run one?
04 Q. Yes.

05 A. If you think you don't need it,
06 if the cement job went well, everything
07 bumped up, cement in place, you saw good
08 lift pressure, may not determine you need
09 one.

Page 187:07 to 188:11

00187:07 Q. Mr. Guillot, you had mentioned,
08 I believe, that you've done some
09 investigation or have been involved to some
10 extent in the blowout preventer; is that
11 right?
12 A. Yes, sir, it is.
13 Q. All right. Could you just tell
14 me what you have done in connection with
15 the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer?
16 A. My part of it is, I went through
17 the Macondo morning reports looking for any
18 documentation for leaks.
19 Q. Okay. Anything else?
20 A. And I put together a function
21 test -- a function spreadsheet, how many
22 times the BOP would function on that well.
23 Q. How many the BOP?
24 A. Were actually functions.
25 Q. Actually put into use?
00188:01 A. Yeah. Testing and for well
02 control on issues.
03 Q. Okay. Anything else?
04 A. I put together receipt of
05 federal regulations and API, as far as
06 testing inspections.
07 Q. All right. Is that it?
08 A. That's it.
09 Q. You did no physical inspection
10 of the BOP?
11 A. None.

Page 190:14 to 190:21

00190:14 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Guillot.
15 How are you, sir?
16 A. Fine, sir.
17 Q. Good. My name is Don Godwin,
18 and I represent Halliburton.
19 We've not met before, have
20 we, sir?
21 A. No, we haven't.

Page 191:09 to 192:10

00191:09 Sir, how was it that you

10 became a member of the investigative team
11 concerning the Horizon blowout?

12 A. I got a call when I was in
13 Anchorage from Steve Robinson to come down.

14 Q. Okay. And did he ask -- when he
15 called you, did you understand the call to
16 be that you were joining an investigative
17 team?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. And at the time when he
20 called you, what was your area of
21 expertise, if any, within BP's
22 organization?

23 A. I'm not an expert.

24 Q. Okay. What would you consider
25 your specialty area within BP at the time
00192:01 that Mr. Robinson called you?

02 A. I don't have a specialty. I'm
03 just a well site leader.

04 Q. Okay. A well site leader?

05 A. Uh-huh.

06 Q. Is there any particular aspect
07 of your business as a well site leader that
08 you think you have more knowledge of than,
09 perhaps, others?

10 A. No.

Page 197:07 to 197:13

00197:07 Q. Okay. Did you at anytime during
08 the investigation, the part you played in
09 it, speak with anyone about Halliburton's
10 cement job?

11 A. No, sir, I didn't.

12 Q. Did not?

13 A. Did not.

Page 201:09 to 203:07

00201:09 Q. Okay. Did you have -- as a
10 member of the investigative team, the role
11 you played in, the role you played, did
12 you -- did you have meetings from time to
13 time with others on the -- with other
14 members of the investigative team?

15 A. We were briefed every morning to
16 what was taking place around through the
17 team and across the street on the
18 operations side.

19 Q. Briefed every morning?

20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. And you said the operation side?

22 A. I was on the BOP team.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. But our team lead would brief us
 25 on what was taking place as far as the well
 00202:01 kill and things coming up that day for us.
 02 Q. Where would that -- where would
 03 that briefing take place every morning?
 04 A. In our conference room.
 05 Q. And was that in Houston?
 06 A. In Houston.
 07 Q. Okay. And was that meeting --
 08 did it occur every day, five days a week,
 09 or more or less frequently?
 10 A. It was every day.
 11 Q. Every day.
 12 Monday through Friday -- or
 13 Monday through Sunday?
 14 A. Monday through Sunday.
 15 Q. Okay. And would you attend all
 16 of those meetings, either in person or by
 17 phone?
 18 A. I attended most of it but missed
 19 some.
 20 Q. Okay. Did -- was anybody there,
 21 to your knowledge, who was recording the
 22 comments and statements that were being
 23 made by those in attendance?
 24 A. No, sir.
 25 Q. Nobody took notes, to your
 00203:01 knowledge?
 02 A. No.
 03 Q. Okay. During any of the
 04 meetings that you participated in, was the
 05 subject of Halliburton cement job mentioned
 06 by anyone in the meetings?
 07 A. Not that I recall.

Page 204:11 to 204:20

00204:11 Q. And say how many weeks were you
 12 on the investigative team?
 13 A. Maybe five weeks.
 14 Q. So you're looking at five weeks
 15 times seven, about 35 meetings?
 16 A. About that.
 17 Q. At anytime in any of those 35
 18 meetings, did anybody with BP ever say
 19 anything that you believe to be critical of
 20 Halliburton cement job?

Page 205:01 to 205:10

00205:01 A. I can't say -- I wasn't aware of
 02 anything.
 03 Q. Okay. Sir, and what I'm not
 04 asking -- I'm asking you not what you're

05 aware of. But did you hear any person
06 employed by BP in any of the almost 35
07 meetings that you attended say anything
08 that you thought was critical of
09 Halliburton cement job?
10 A. Not that I recall.

Page 217:19 to 217:22

00217:19 Q. Okay. Sir, do you -- you're
20 familiar with, as a well site leader, with
21 the monitoring of pit volumes, are you not?
22 A. Yes, sir, I am.

Page 218:02 to 218:16

00218:02 Q. Are you familiar with a company
03 by the name of Sperry-Sun?
04 A. Yes, I am.
05 Q. And who is Sperry-Sun so far as
06 you know?
07 A. A mudlogging company.
08 Q. Okay. Your logging company?
09 A. Yes.
10 Q. And have you worked with the
11 Sperry-Sun organization with those folks
12 from time to time on various rigs?
13 A. Yes, I have.
14 Q. And what's been your experience
15 with the Sperry-Sun organization in the
16 times you dealt with the company?

Page 218:19 to 218:20

00218:19 A. The one -- the gentlemen that I
20 worked with on my rigs been fine.

Page 224:11 to 224:14

00224:11 Q. My name is Deb Kuchler. I
12 represent Anadarko and Moex Offshore 2007,
13 LLC, which I will just call Moex from here
14 on, okay?

Page 232:02 to 232:21

00232:02 Q. All right. If you would turn to
03 an exhibit that you have already seen,
04 which was labeled Exhibit 104, but I have a
05 copy here in the binder at Tab 18 for ready
06 reference.
07 And about a third of the

08 way down, in these typewritten notes in the
 09 interview of Lee Lambert on May 17th, 2010,
 10 it says, quote, Why using LCM as
 11 spacer-leftover heavy LCM fill instead of
 12 dumping it, use as a spacer.

13 I wanted to follow-up with
 14 the comment that you said earlier that you
 15 didn't know why the Deepwater Horizon used
 16 the LCM as a spacer.

17 Do these notes from
 18 Mr. Lambert's interview refresh your
 19 recollection that the spacer was run down
 20 the hole so that it could be disposed of
 21 overboard?

Page 232:24 to 233:13

00232:24 A. I knew they pumped the first
 25 spacer. I'm not sure why -- why they say

00233:01 to dump it.

02 Q. In your experience as a well
 03 site leader, are you aware of the
 04 regulations that would require that LCM to
 05 be disposed of as hazardous waste if it had
 06 not been run down the hole?

07 A. I don't know if it's hazardous
 08 waste, but it has to go in the disposal.

09 Q. It couldn't be dumped overboard
 10 unless it had come through the hole,
 11 correct?

12 A. Right. It has to be an EMP
 13 waste.

Page 239:13 to 240:06

00239:13 Q. Okay. So since the weekend, you
 14 weren't provided with another copy of your
 15 handwritten notes and asked to be able to
 16 read them to us?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay. Besides the handwritten
 19 note -- questions that are included in your
 20 notes, did you ask follow-up questions,
 21 depending on the information that you got
 22 from the people who were being interviewed?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So all you did was run through
 25 the list of questions in your notes and get
 00240:01 the answers, and that was it?

02 A. That was it.

03 Q. So if they said anything that
 04 led to further investigation, you didn't
 05 explore those issues with follow-ups?

06 A. No, I didn't.

Page 241:08 to 241:11

00241:08 Q. What efforts, if any, did you
09 make to resolve discrepancies in the
10 information provided from one interviewee
11 to another?

Page 241:14 to 241:21

00241:14 A. None.
15 Q. Did anybody, to your knowledge,
16 that you were working with for these
17 interviews make an attempt to rectify any
18 discrepancies or get to the bottom of the
19 information that may have been different
20 from one to the other in the interviews?
21 A. Not that I'm aware of.

Page 242:01 to 242:18

00242:01 Q. And compare them with Tab 9,
02 which are Norman Wong's notes of the same
03 interview with Ronnie Sepulvado on May 3rd,
04 2010.
05 You wrote down that
06 Mr. Sepulvado had 35 years experience near
07 the top of your notes, and he wrote that
08 Mr. Sepulvado had 40 years oil field
09 experience. Was there any effort to
10 reconcile those kind of factual pieces of
11 information?
12 A. Not that I know of.
13 Q. Can you give us any explanation
14 for how listening to the same interview you
15 came away thinking Mr. Sepulvado had
16 35 years experience and Mr. Wong came away
17 thinking he had 40?
18 A. No.

Page 242:21 to 242:21

00242:21 A. I can't.

Page 246:11 to 246:24

00246:11 In the course of your work,
12 as part of the BP investigative team, did
13 you ever communicate with anybody from
14 Anadarko Petroleum Corporation or any
15 entity that you knew to be affiliated with
16 Anadarko regarding the Macondo well?

17 A. No.
18 Q. During the course of your
19 investigation with the BP investigative
20 team, did you ever communicate with anyone
21 at Moex Offshore 2007, LLC, or any company
22 that you knew to be affiliated with Moex
23 regarding the Macondo well?
24 A. No, I didn't.

Page 247:10 to 250:20

00247:10 Q. Were you aware of the existence
11 of Moex before starting your role in this
12 investigation?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Did any of the people you
15 interviewed state that they had
16 communicated with anybody from either
17 Anadarko or Moex while they were working on
18 the Macondo well or the Deepwater Horizon?
19 A. No communications. No
20 communications with me.
21 Q. So none of the people you
22 interviewed told you that they had
23 communicated with Anadarko or Moex about
24 that well or the rig?
25 A. No.
00248:01 Q. Did any of the people you
02 interviewed state that they had gotten any
03 instructions from Anadarko or Moex while
04 they were working on the Macondo well or
05 the Deepwater Horizon rig?
06 A. No, they did not.
07 Q. Did any of the folks you
08 interviewed state or otherwise suggest that
09 anybody from Anadarko or Moex participated
10 in any way in designing the Macondo well?
11 A. Not that I'm aware of.
12 Q. Did any of the people you
13 interviewed state or otherwise suggest that
14 anyone from Anadarko or Moex controlled or
15 conducted any of the operations having to
16 do with the Macondo well or the Deepwater
17 Horizon rig?
18 A. Not that I'm aware of.
19 Q. As a member of the BP incident
20 investigation team, were you given any
21 instructions about Anadarko's or Moex's
22 role with respect to the Macondo well?
23 A. No, I wasn't.
24 Q. Were you given any questions to
25 ask those that you were going to interview
00249:01 that dealt specifically with Anadarko or
02 Moex?
03 A. No.

04 Q. Did any of the folks you
05 interviewed mention Anadarko or Moex in any
06 way?
07 A. No, they didn't.
08 Q. Do you know what information was
09 provided by BP to Anadarko about the
10 Macondo well before the incident?
11 A. No, I don't.
12 Q. Do you know what, if any,
13 information about the Macondo well was
14 supplied by BP to Moex before the incident?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. Do you have any information
17 suggesting that Anadarko or Moex ever made
18 any operational decisions about activities
19 on the Deepwater Horizon?
20 A. No, I don't have any.
21 Q. And do you know whether BP ever
22 solicited any input from Anadarko or Moex
23 about operations or activities on the
24 Deepwater Horizon?
25 A. I have no knowledge of that.
00250:01 Q. All right. If you would turn to
02 Tab 9, which we've marked as Exhibit 113,
03 in the binder. These are the Mr. Wong's
04 notes of the interview with Ron Sepulvado
05 on May 3rd, 2010.
06 If you look on Page 2. At
07 the bottom of the -- near the bottom of the
08 notes it says, Never heard of, quote,
09 bladder effect, close quote, or, open
10 quote, annular compression, close quote.
11 Do you recall Mr. Sepulvado
12 saying that he had never heard of a bladder
13 effect or annular compression?
14 A. I don't recall it.
15 Q. Would -- as part of the team
16 that interviewed Mr. Sepulvado and looking
17 at Mr. Wong's notes, would you suppose that
18 this note reflects a statement made by
19 Mr. Sepulvado during that telephone
20 interview?

Page 250:23 to 252:08

00250:23 A. Could be but I don't recall it.
24 Q. Don't recall it.
25 Have you ever heard of
00251:01 something called the bladder effect or
02 annular compression?
03 A. Not until I became part of the
04 investigation team.
05 Q. So in your work as a well site
06 leader over the past, I think you said
07 20 years, you have not run across either of

08 those terms in the kind of context that
 09 you've seen it used in this case?
 10 A. No, ma'am, I haven't.
 11 Q. And then if you look a little
 12 bit higher in Mr. Wong's notes on that
 13 page, it says -- pretty much the middle of
 14 the page -- Rig hands, line up for negative
 15 test. Usually the AD leads the effort.
 16 Would you take that to mean
 17 assistant driller?
 18 A. Yes, ma'am.
 19 Q. And the assistant driller would
 20 be a Transocean employee; is that right?
 21 A. Yes, he would be.
 22 Q. Okay. So the next line says,
 23 WSL.
 24 That would be the well site
 25 leader; is that right?
 00252:01 A. Yes.
 02 Q. Is the lead for the negative
 03 test.
 04 Did I read that correctly?
 05 A. That's what's wrote there.
 06 Q. So this is information that
 07 Mr. Wong recorded from the interview with
 08 Mr. Sepulvado; is that right?

Page 252:11 to 252:12

00252:11 A. I'm assuming it is. I can't
 12 recall but he was there.

Page 253:03 to 253:06

00253:03 Q. In your experience as a well
 04 site leader, would you agree that the BP
 05 well site leader on site would be in the
 06 lead for a negative test?

Page 253:14 to 254:07

00253:14 Q. You would both be part of it.
 15 But where someone has to make a final
 16 decision, wouldn't that be you as the BP
 17 well site leader on site?
 18 A. During --
 19 MR. COLLIER:
 20 Object to form.
 21 A. During the negative test for the
 22 wells that I've been on, when it was
 23 complete, we'd both agree on the numbers
 24 that was seen. Everybody has to come to
 25 terms if this is right, this is wrong. And

00254:01 if it is wrong, what we would do.
02 Q. So the notes reflecting that
03 Mr. Sepulvado said the well site leader is
04 the lead for the negative test, do you
05 disagree with that statement?
06 A. From jobs that I've been
07 associated with, yes, I do.

Page 255:10 to 255:12

00255:10 Q. Okay. Turn over to Page 10,
11 which we will -- Tab 10, which we'll list
12 as Exhibit 114.

Page 255:14 to 256:25

00255:14 Q. These appear to be the notes of
15 Jim Wetherbee of the discussion with Ronnie
16 Sepulvado?
17 A. Uh-huh.
18 Q. Right at the top there it says,
19 Leaks in BOP stack, question mark. Check
20 morning reports. John Guide may be, Cheree
21 Douglas, an arrow to MMS regularity.
22 Do you have any
23 recollection of that portion of the
24 discussion with Mr. Sepulvado?
25 A. Yes.
00256:01 Q. Tell us what you remember about
02 that.
03 A. We were asked -- on the morning
04 reports we found a statement about a -- a
05 one gallon minute leak on a pod, didn't
06 specify what pod it was on or what function
07 it was. But -- so we asked Ronnie what
08 they were, what leak it was, and he just
09 told us there was a leak. Then his
10 response was maybe Guide would know or talk
11 with Cheree Douglas, if she had filed for
12 dispensation or something with MMS.
13 Q. And did you talk to Cheree
14 Douglas?
15 A. I did.
16 Q. Did she file for dispensation
17 with the MMS?
18 A. No.
19 Q. So was this leak ever reported
20 to the MMS, as far as you can determine
21 based on your work in the investigation?
22 A. As far as I know, no.
23 Q. Are leaks like this supposed to
24 be reported to the MMS, based on your
25 experience as a well site leader?

Page 257:03 to 257:06

00257:03 A. From my experience on the wells
04 and the rigs, we reported everything in.
05 Now, whether it goes to MMS or not, I
06 don't -- I can't answer that.

Page 260:21 to 261:21

00260:21 Q. If you turn over to Tab 13,
22 which was previously marked as Exhibit 103,
23 there's a reference at the bottom of
24 Mr. Anderson's typed notes of this Vidrine
25 interview that says, quote, Crew change
00261:01 during negative test-correct.
02 Do you recall a discussion
03 with Mr. Vidrine to the effect that there
04 was a crew change during the negative test?
05 A. Yes, I do.
06 Q. Tell me what you remember about
07 that part of the discussion.
08 A. We just asked him if they -- the
09 drill crew's crew changed during the
10 process during of the negative test.
11 Q. And his answer was?
12 A. Yes, they did.
13 Q. Okay. Did he mention whether or
14 not that crew change impacted the negative
15 test in any way?
16 A. No, he didn't.
17 Q. Did he explain to you how, if at
18 all, he or Mr. Kaluza ensured that the new
19 people coming on shift were informed of
20 what the folks going off shift had done?
21 A. No, he didn't mention it.

Page 263:19 to 265:22

00263:19 Q. Yes, sir. So these then would
20 be notes of the discussion of Mr. Vidrine
21 on May 12th though?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay. If we look about
24 two-thirds of the way down the page it
25 says, Who called to say they were closing
00264:01 in well? Toolpusher, Jason Anderson. What
02 did he say he was closing? Annular.
03 Closing diverters or anything else? Said
04 he would divert returns gas buster.
05 Did I read that correctly?
06 A. Yes, ma'am, you did.
07 Q. So does this mean, then, based
08 on your participation in this interview

09 that Mr. Vidrine were told they were going
10 to divert to the gas buster?

11 MR. COLLIER:

12 Object to form.

13 A. Yeah. Basically they called Don
14 said they were closing the well in. And we
15 were trying to figure out if it was going
16 to diverter or we were closing the annular,
17 which one would they close at the time.

18 Q. Mr. Vidrine was told, though,
19 that they were going to divert to the mud
20 gas separator?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So Mr. Vidrine knew that they
23 were going to divert to the mud gas
24 separator at the time the incident was
25 occurring --

00265:01 MR. COLLIER:

02 Object --

03 Q. -- is that right?

04 MR. COLLIER:

05 Object to form.

06 Q. Based on your discussion with
07 him?

08 A. Yeah. They were closing the
09 diverter and the annular probably at the
10 same time.

11 Q. Okay. And if we turn to the
12 next tab, Tab 15, which appear to be notes
13 by Jim Wetherbee of that same discussion
14 with Don Vidrine. And we'll mark those as
15 Exhibits 116.

16 (Exhibit Number 116 marked.)

17 Q. Under Number 1 it says, Negative
18 pressure, lower annular, not sure.

19 Does this refer, based on
20 your participation in this interview, to
21 the question of whether the lower annular
22 was closed?

Page 265:25 to 266:21

00265:25 A. Yeah. We were asking him what

00266:01 annular they were using during the negative
02 test, upper or lower.

03 Q. Okay. And I understand from
04 your discussion with Mr. Vidrine, he wasn't
05 sure?

06 A. He wasn't sure.

07 Q. Okay. And based on all of the
08 investigation you did and all of the folks
09 you spoke with, did you ever come to find
10 information that supported the fact that
11 the lower annular was the one that was
12 closed?

13 A. Nothing concrete.
14 Q. Okay. Did you look into what
15 the capabilities of the lower annular
16 versus the higher annular, the upper?
17 A. The lower annular on the rig was
18 a stripping annular so it's rated at, I
19 think, 5,000 psi.
20 Q. And it had been used before so
21 it was worn; is that your understanding?

Page 266:24 to 267:22

00266:24 A. I can't say if it was worn until
25 I -- I'd have to see it. I mean, I know
00267:01 they used it, and that's all I know.
02 Q. The upper annular, though, was
03 rated for 10,000 pounds; is that right?
04 A. Yes, ma'am.
05 Q. Does BP have a standard policy
06 for closing the lower annular first?
07 MR. COLLIER:
08 Object to form.
09 A. No, they don't.
10 Q. Does BP have a standard policy
11 on which annular should be closed first?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Okay. Who makes the decision of
14 which one to close?
15 A. Usually the contractor decides
16 which one to close.
17 Q. And if you turn to the next page
18 of those notes, which we've marked as
19 Exhibit 116. It's under the negative test
20 section. It says, Bob on adjustable choke.
21 Do you take that mean to
22 Bob Kaluza was on the adjustable choke?

Page 267:25 to 268:07

00267:25 A. I don't know who that could be.
00268:01 I mean, you would think it would be, but I
02 don't know for sure.
03 Q. The next line says, Bob got a
04 call. Wanted to do with per APD on kill.
05 Based on your discussion
06 with Mr. Vidrine that day, do you recall
07 this discussion?

Page 268:10 to 268:23

00268:10 A. Yes. We did talk about this,
11 how they were going -- they said to do it
12 on the drill pipe but they had to go to the

13 kill line, per the APD, to do it.
 14 Q. Okay. And -- and based on your
 15 own recollection, then, you know that the
 16 Bob on the rig during the negative test was
 17 Bob Kaluza; isn't that right?
 18 A. At this point right here, yeah.
 19 Bob got the call, but Bob want to adjust
 20 the choke.
 21 Q. So Bob Kaluza got the call?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Who did he get the call from?

Page 269:01 to 269:10

00269:01 A. I don't know.
 02 Q. Did you ask him?
 03 A. No, I didn't. I didn't talk to
 04 Bob Kaluza.
 05 Q. And did you ask Mr. Vidrine who
 06 Bob Kaluza got the call from?
 07 A. No, I didn't.
 08 Q. And did he -- he didn't mention
 09 it during the interview?
 10 A. No, he didn't.

Page 270:05 to 270:12

00270:05 Q. Gotcha.
 06 Okay. Let's talk about
 07 your interview with Lee Lambert.
 08 Oh, I'm sorry. Let's go
 09 back on Don Vidrine's 5-12 notes, your
 10 handwritten note on 10438 under Number 3.
 11 Can you read Number 3 for
 12 us?

Page 270:16 to 272:04

00270:16 A. How did he or you know that the
 17 60 barrels had been bled off the drill
 18 pipe? Driller had a record of recorded
 19 data -- bled data, excuse me.
 20 Q. Did Mr. Vidrine say that they
 21 were going to circulate that spacer out
 22 before going forward?
 23 A. I don't remember.
 24 Q. Do you recall any discussion
 25 about the impact of that 60 barrels of
 00271:01 spacer on the negative test?
 02 A. No, I don't. I don't remember
 03 that.
 04 Q. If it wasn't circulated out,
 05 then there would be 60 barrels of this

06 spacer below the high drill; isn't that
07 right?

08 A. Yes. 'Cause the it was high
09 drill annulus was leaked down below it.

10 Q. And based on your experience in
11 well site leader activities, 60 barrels of
12 a heavy spacer like this can have a
13 significant impact on the hydrostatic
14 pressure, can't it?

15 MR. COLLIER:

16 Object to form.

17 A. The wells that I have been
18 associated with, when your annulars leak,
19 if it's a lot, usually you would have to
20 redo the test.

21 Q. Right. You redo the test after
22 you circulated out the material that was
23 below the high drill?

24 A. You have to.

25 Q. Right. And in this situation
00272:01 based on all the interviews you've
02 conducted, you found no indication that
03 that had been done here; is that right?

04 A. Right.

Page 272:07 to 272:11

00272:07 Q. Would you agree with me that
08 1500 feet, which is equivalent of
09 60 barrels, of 16-pound fluid would exert
10 more than 600 psi of pressure differential
11 here?

Page 272:14 to 272:19

00272:14 A. I haven't run the numbers so I
15 can't argue with it. I can't say.
16 Q. And that kind of differential
17 would so disrupt the potential integrity of
18 the test that, in your experience, you
19 would have redone it --

Page 272:22 to 272:23

00272:22 Q. -- in that situation; is that
23 right?

Page 273:01 to 273:06

00273:01 A. It's going to show you some
02 different numbers.
03 Q. It's going to show you some
04 different numbers so that you can't rely on

05 the pressure reading to tell you that the
06 negative test is successful; is that right?

Page 273:09 to 273:12

00273:09 A. Well. Basically it negates
10 the -- the under balance you were looking
11 for from the hydrostatic pressure on the
12 backside so you have to start over.

Page 273:24 to 274:15

00273:24 Q. Mr. Guillot, first I want to
25 turn your attention to Exhibit Number 112.
00274:01 My first question is just housekeeping.
02 Is everything in
03 Exhibit 112 your handwriting?
04 A. Yes, it is.
05 Q. All right. Number 2, did you
06 make those handwritten responses? The
07 question you've already testified were your
08 questions, correct?
09 A. Yes.
10 Q. And the answers you wrote down
11 at the time you were doing the interviews?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. Okay. Did you try to make the
14 answers as accurate, or did you not hear
15 whether the answers were accurate?

Page 274:18 to 274:24

00274:18 A. Tried to make them as close as
19 accurate as I could.
20 Q. Okay. Did you try to paraphrase
21 it when a witness says a lot things and
22 then you just put it in your own words, or
23 do you try to put down what the witness
24 actually said?

Page 275:02 to 275:03

00275:02 A. I did my best to put down what
03 he said.

Page 275:12 to 275:14

00275:12 Q. My name is Jimmy Williams. I'm
13 with the PSC, the Plaintiffs' Steering
14 Committee, okay? So I'm on the same side

Page 276:04 to 277:10

00276:04 Q. Okay. For example, we will turn
05 to your interview with Ronnie Sepulvado.
06 May 3rd, 2010. 4365 is the Bates stamp.
07 Do you see that?
08 A. Yes, sir.
09 Q. Do you know of any hydraulic
10 leaks or other issues with the BOP stack.
11 That was your question,
12 right?
13 A. Yes, it was.
14 Q. What was Mr. Sepulvado's answer?
15 A. Small leak in the pilot valve
16 stack. Stop the function in the block, any
17 information on the amount of hydraulic
18 fluid that was being delivered to the rig.
19 He didn't know.
20 Q. Okay. So he reported to you
21 that there was a leak in the BOP stack
22 pilot valve?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay. You've been a well site
25 manager before?
00277:01 A. Still am.
02 Q. Many years?
03 A. Yes.
04 Q. Okay. What's a BOP?
05 A. It's blowout preventer.
06 Q. And what's a blowout preventer?
07 A. It's a well control equipment.
08 Q. Okay. And when you say well
09 control equipment, what's the purpose of a
10 BOP?

Page 277:13 to 277:15

00277:13 A. To control the well.
14 Q. Is it sometimes the word that's
15 used as barrier?

Page 277:18 to 277:18

00277:18 Q. It is a barrier?

Page 277:21 to 278:04

00277:21 A. For when it comes to using
22 your -- to -- I'm not sure. LMRP per a
23 reason can be a barrier. Your shear rams
24 can be a barrier.
25 Q. Just like a mud stack can be a
00278:01 barrier?

02 A. Mud column, yes.
03 Q. Yes. Just like the cement job
04 at the bottom of the hole can be a barrier?

Page 278:07 to 278:09

00278:07 A. Yes. It can be, yes.
08 Q. Just like the top plug can be a
09 barrier?

Page 278:12 to 278:15

00278:12 Q. If the top plug had ever been
13 set in this well, it would have been a
14 barrier?
15 A. Yes.

Page 278:22 to 279:02

00278:22 Q. Okay. You don't think the float
23 collar is a barrier?
24 A. Huh-uh.
25 Q. You don't think the float collar
00279:01 is supposed to prevent the flow of
02 hydrocarbons into the wellbore?

Page 279:05 to 279:14

00279:05 A. They're there to prevent cement
06 U-tube and back up the side of the casing
07 job on the cement job. They're not part of
08 the -- of a well control equipment.
09 Q. Okay. So you would not rely
10 upon the float collar to prevent the flow
11 of hydrocarbon into the well?
12 A. No, sir.
13 Q. You would rely on the cement
14 job?

Page 279:17 to 279:24

00279:17 A. The cement job, once you get it
18 in place, once the cement job is in place
19 your plugs are closed, it would hold the
20 cement in place.
21 Q. Perhaps a way to say it is once
22 you have a good cement job, it will be a
23 barrier?
24 A. The cement will be a barrier.

Page 280:02 to 280:08

00280:02 Q. And the blowout preventer will
 03 be a barrier?
 04 A. Yes, it will.
 05 Q. Okay. The blowout preventer,
 06 does it help you find hydrocarbons or oil
 07 and gas?
 08 A. No.

Page 280:15 to 280:16

00280:15 Q. So its sole purpose of the
 16 blowout preventer is safety?

Page 280:19 to 280:20

00280:19 A. Well control, yes.
 20 Q. Right. Well control safety?

Page 280:23 to 280:25

00280:23 A. I just call it well control.
 24 Q. Okay. Don't you think safety is
 25 a component of well control?

Page 281:03 to 281:08

00281:03 A. I guess it is.
 04 Q. You guess it is. You don't
 05 know? You don't know whether the
 06 prevention of human -- loss of human life,
 07 you don't know if that's a safety issue or
 08 not?

Page 281:11 to 281:16

00281:11 A. I control the BOPs as well
 12 control equipment, is to stop well from
 13 flowing or for me to kill it. That's what
 14 I use it for.
 15 Q. All right. And is that for
 16 safety?

Page 281:19 to 282:01

00281:19 A. It's used for killing the well
 20 so it doesn't blow out so, yeah, I guess
 21 you can say back in safety.
 22 Q. I would definitely say that, but
 23 I'm asking you what you say. Do you say,
 24 the person who runs wells for BP, do you
 25 say the blowout preventer is a safety
 00282:01 device?

Page 282:04 to 282:15

00282:04 A. Safety valve, I guess you'd call
05 it.
06 Q. Okay. All right. Now, one of
07 the safety valves that's on the BOP is the
08 blind shear rams, true?
09 A. Yes, sir. It's by the blind
10 shear.
11 Q. Okay. By the way, in addition
12 to preventing people from getting hurt or
13 killed, another reason you don't want a
14 blowout is you don't want damage to the
15 environment, correct?

Page 282:18 to 283:05

00282:18 A. It's true.
19 Q. You don't want hydrocarbons to
20 escape a wellbore and go into the Gulf of
21 Mexico, just to put it bluntly, correct?
22 A. True.
23 Q. And you want the blowout
24 preventer as one way to try to prevent
25 that, correct?
00283:01 A. Yes.
02 Q. As a matter of fact, in this
03 particular case, you were 5,000 feet below
04 sea level, correct?
05 A. That's where the stack was, yes.

Page 283:16 to 283:17

00283:16 Q. Do you know of any equipment
17 that exist like that?

Page 283:20 to 284:07

00283:20 A. I don't know of anything.
21 That's out of my area of my expertise, but
22 I don't know of any equipment.
23 Q. Okay. But BP, in the many years
24 you have been running their wells, has
25 never said, Don't worry about it if we get
00284:01 oil in the Gulf of Mexico, because we have
02 equipment that will stop it. No one's ever
03 said that to you, have they?
04 A. No.
05 Q. And you've never seen such a
06 piece of equipment, have you?
07 A. No, I haven't.

Page 285:20 to 285:24

00285:20 Q. Okay. Therefore, it's pretty
21 important that we not let oil leak into the
22 Gulf of Mexico at the mud level. You
23 certainly would agree with that, wouldn't
24 you?

Page 286:02 to 286:04

00286:02 A. Yeah, I agree with that.
03 Q. Okay. Therefore, it's pretty
04 important that the BOP work, right?

Page 286:08 to 286:23

00286:08 A. It needs to be functioning.
09 Q. Okay. One of the things that's
10 in a BOP is a blind shear ram. You've
11 heard that term?
12 A. Yes, sir, I have.
13 Q. Please tell me what a blind
14 shear ram is.
15 A. To be able to cut and seal --
16 cut a drill pipe and seal a well.
17 Q. Okay. So if a blind shear ram
18 works appropriately, it's going to cut and
19 seal and prevent that oil and gas from
20 going into the Gulf of Mexico?
21 A. It should.
22 Q. Okay. And quite frankly, it's
23 our last line of defense on that, right?

Page 287:01 to 287:06

00287:01 A. To hold the well, yes, sir.
02 Q. Okay. If hydrocarbons get all
03 the way to the blowout preventer, then our
04 other barriers have already failed,
05 correct?
06 A. Yes, they have.

Page 287:16 to 288:02

00287:16 Q. Okay. In a blowout situation
17 like the one we had here, surely you would
18 agree it is an emergency?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. Okay. All right. So what you
21 have now is you have the final barrier,
22 which is the BOP, correct?
23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And the final barrier that's the
25 BOP, is -- the consequence of it failing is
00288:01 you're going to have massive environmental
02 problems, right?

Page 288:05 to 288:16

00288:05 A. If you got oil flow behind it,
06 yes.
07 Q. Okay. And so it's absolutely
08 imperative that the blind shear rams, in an
09 emergency situation, close and seal the
10 well, correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. And you only get to that
13 point where you're going to close the BSRs,
14 you're only going to get to that point when
15 you're already in a lot of trouble,
16 correct, just like this one?

Page 288:19 to 288:23

00288:19 A. You'd get to that point when
20 everything else on the stack failed.
21 Q. Right. When you've already had
22 multiple problems?
23 A. Yes.

Page 291:21 to 291:25

00291:21 shear rams -- your sworn testimony that you
22 want the jury to hear, is that you don't
23 know if the blind shear rams sealed this
24 well?
25 A. I don't know --

Page 292:03 to 292:04

00292:03 A. I don't know if they functioned
04 all the way.

Page 292:10 to 292:25

00292:10 Q. All right. Weren't you involved
11 in the BOP team and looked at the issue
12 after April 20th?
13 A. I was part of the BOP team, but
14 I did not look at the BOP stack.
15 Q. Okay. But didn't you stay
16 abreast of the efforts to use an ROV to
17 close the blind shear rams?
18 A. Yes, I was. Let's back up

19 there. That -- that procedure for the ROVs
20 and all was across the street with the
21 intervention team. That was not the BOP
22 team.
23 Q. Okay. So you weren't involved
24 in it?
25 A. None of that.

Page 299:24 to 299:25

00299:24 Q. Is the EDS operable if you lose
25 communication through the MUX cables?

Page 300:03 to 300:08

00300:03 A. I don't think so.
04 Q. Okay. So once the EDS is
05 inoperable, that leaves you with what
06 emergency functions to close the blind
07 shear rams?
08 A. Maybe your deadman will fire.

Page 300:22 to 301:14

00300:22 Q. What's the criteria for the auto
23 shear?
24 A. When LMRP lifts off the stack,
25 your auto shear can fire.
00301:01 Q. Okay. But the LMRP didn't lift
02 off the stack here, did it?
03 A. No, it did not.
04 Q. Okay. Therefore, the auto shear
05 didn't fire, right?
06 A. Not the way it cut it.
07 Q. All right. So when you have a
08 MUX cable lost, the EDS system won't help
09 you close the blind shear rams, correct?
10 A. I don't think so.
11 Q. And when you have a MUX system
12 lost and the LMRP stays on the stack, the
13 auto shear will not close the blind shear
14 rams, correct?

Page 301:17 to 301:24

00301:17 A. That's true.
18 Q. Okay. So we're down to one
19 system that I think is called the AMF. Is
20 that the system you're referring to as the
21 deadman?
22 A. Deadman.
23 Q. And what do you think is the
24 criteria for the deadman to fire?

Page 302:02 to 302:17

00302:02 A. You have to lose -- on the rigs
 03 that I've worked on in the past, you have
 04 to loss communications -- two forms of
 05 communications with the pods.
 06 Q. Okay. And if that's true, the
 07 pods have to have batteries in them, have
 08 to be operable, have to fire the solenoid
 09 that would fire the shuttle valve, correct?
 10 A. Yes, it does.
 11 Q. If that does not work, then the
 12 blind shear rams will not close?
 13 A. True.
 14 Q. So if you have an accident that
 15 where the MUX cable were lost, but the LMRP
 16 stays on, you have one emergency system,
 17 correct, namely the deadman system?

Page 302:20 to 303:05

00302:20 Q. Right?
 21 A. Yes, that's the only one you
 22 have left.
 23 Q. And if you have that one, you
 24 only have that one if you have the pods
 25 working?
 00303:01 A. The pods have to be working,
 02 right.
 03 Q. Okay. Is there any way to
 04 check -- are those batteries that are in
 05 those pods rechargeable?

Page 303:08 to 305:09

00303:08 A. Not that I know of.
 09 Q. Is there any way to see from the
 10 rig floor -- when you have those pods
 11 5,000 feet below sea level, is there any
 12 way to see whether those batteries are
 13 insufficiently charged?
 14 MR. COLLIER:
 15 Object to form.
 16 A. I don't know.
 17 Q. Okay. No one at BP's ever
 18 talked to you about that?
 19 A. No.
 20 Q. No one's ever trained you about
 21 that?
 22 A. No. It goes back to the subsea
 23 for the contractor side, so.
 24 Q. Okay. On subsea for your side

25 too, isn't it?

00304:01 MR. COLLIER:
 02 Object to form.
 03 A. To maintain their stacks, so.
 04 Q. Okay. So it's not your -- BP's
 05 problem.
 06 MR. COLLIER:
 07 Object to form.
 08 A. Today it is, yeah.
 09 Q. No. Just today?
 10 A. Not today. At the end of the
 11 day we're responsible, I guess.
 12 MR. COLLIER:
 13 Object to form.
 14 Q. Yeah. That's my point exactly.
 15 You -- BP wants to know about that BOP
 16 stack being reliable and there and having
 17 emergency mode operation, just like
 18 Transocean does, doesn't it?
 19 MR. COLLIER:
 20 Object to form.
 21 A. Yes, it does.
 22 Q. Just for starters, it's your
 23 hydrocarbons in the well, right?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. You don't want to lose the
 00305:01 hydrocarbons, just on the business side of
 02 the business, right?
 03 A. Yeah, I guess so.
 04 Q. You guess so?
 05 A. I don't...
 06 Q. You don't know?
 07 A. All I do is drill them.
 08 Q. Okay. You don't care if you
 09 lose hydrocarbons from the well?

Page 305:12 to 306:10

00305:12 A. I don't want to lose
 13 hydrocarbons from the well, no.
 14 Q. Okay. Let's just be clear about
 15 this, and not flippant.
 16 A. I'm not.
 17 Q. If you lose hydrocarbons, people
 18 can die?
 19 A. I'm well aware of that fact.
 20 Q. Okay. If you lose hydrocarbons,
 21 people can get injured?
 22 I'm just not trying to be
 23 flippant. I'm trying to make sure I'm
 24 not -- that you're not being flippant on
 25 me.
 00306:01 A. I'm not. Believe me.
 02 Q. Okay. Am I right about that?
 03 A. Yeah, you're right.

04 Q. And if you lose hydrocarbons,
05 you can also cause a tremendous amount of
06 damage on the environment?
07 A. You can, yes.
08 Q. Okay. And if you lose
09 hydrocarbons, that's just production that
10 BP will never get ahold of?

Page 306:13 to 306:16

00306:13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. Okay. So for all those reasons,
15 BP wants the BOP to work just as bad as
16 Transocean does, doesn't it?

Page 306:18 to 306:19

00306:18 Object to form.
19 A. Yes, of course we do.

Page 308:05 to 308:07

00308:05 Q. Okay. Well, tell me why they
06 would want a test ram instead of an
07 addition variable bore ram?

Page 308:10 to 308:17

00308:10 A. They test the BOPs easy is the
11 only thing I can see.
12 Q. Sorry?
13 A. Making the testing of BOPs
14 easier.
15 Q. Okay. Does it increase the
16 safety profile, or does it decrease the
17 safety profile?

Page 308:20 to 308:24

00308:20 Q. To get rid of a VBR, a pipe ram?
21 A. You would take some of your
22 redundancy out.
23 Q. Right. So therefore, it
24 increases your risk of profile?

Page 309:02 to 309:02

00309:02 A. I guess it could.

Page 309:17 to 310:19

00309:17 Q. Okay. Did you discover, while
18 you were on the BOP team, any action that
19 BP took to increase the reliability of the
20 blowout preventer?
21 A. I don't know anything that was
22 done to it.
23 Q. Okay. And I assume the same
24 thing. Did you find out that some of the
25 hydraulic lines when the test ram was set
00310:01 up, that some of the hydraulic lines were
02 not switched so that the ROV hot stab port
03 did not -- still continued to activate the
04 bottom ram? Did you find out about that
05 problem?
06 A. I found out about it from a guy
07 across the street, yes. But I didn't find
08 out about it.
09 Q. The reason I'm trying to sum it
10 up very simply, if I start asking you about
11 that as part of investigation that you had
12 or looked into, or was that someone else?
13 A. That was someone else.
14 Q. Do you know who?
15 A. No, I do not.
16 Q. Okay. So if I ask that --
17 questions about that part of the report,
18 that's not something you really know about?
19 A. No, sir, it's not.

Page 311:06 to 312:01

00311:06 Q. Okay. And I think you've
07 already told me, then, in terms of the BOP
08 function cycles, you weren't looking at
09 that, right? You weren't seeing what
10 history of test they had or what history of
11 their function test; that wasn't something
12 you relied on?
13 A. I did put the cycles together,
14 the testing and all that.
15 Q. We're going to mark this as an
16 exhibit then. Let me show it to you and
17 see if this is a document that you put
18 together.
19 You think you're the one
20 that assembled that document?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. All right. Give it back to me.
23 Let me mark it as an exhibit and identify
24 it for our gallery. It's
25 BP-HZN-BLY00104402. It's going to be
00312:01 marked as Number 118.

Page 312:03 to 313:10

00312:03 Q. Could you please tell me what
04 Exhibit Number 118 is?
05 A. This is a -- set up as all the
06 functions every time the BOPs were cycled,
07 whether it was for well control, testing,
08 casing, or just normal use all through the
09 Macondo well for the reports that I had
10 dates for.
11 Q. Okay. So you went through and
12 put together where you looked at the
13 maintenance history on this particular BOP
14 on this -- on the Deepwater Horizon, and
15 you put together this chart?
16 A. This came -- all these
17 information came from the morning reports.
18 Q. Fair enough. That's what I
19 anticipated.
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. What you're trying to do is just
22 put down what the morning reports
23 reflected, but you just assembled it into
24 one document?
25 A. One document.
00313:01 Q. As far as you know it's
02 accurate?
03 A. As far as I know, yes, sir.
04 Q. Okay. So the morning reports
05 February 6th, 2010. Test shear and pipe
06 rams to 15,000 psi. Upper annular tested
07 to 10,000 psi. Lower annular tested at
08 5,000 psi. Pod used not indicated. Did I
09 read that correctly?
10 A. Yes, sir, I did.

Page 315:02 to 315:08

00315:02 A. Yes. Even when you do your
03 stump test you tie it into your surface
04 system.
05 Q. Is this a stump test?
06 A. Yes, this is a stump test.
07 Q. So this is testing before the
08 BOP is loaded?

Page 315:14 to 316:10

00315:14 Q. Okay. All right. Is it not
15 common that you do not say which pod you're
16 testing?
17 A. No. It states what pod you're
18 functioning on it, but it isn't here.
19 Q. Okay. So someone -- and of
20 course the reason you want to know which

21 pod you're functioning is, you want an
22 accurate record to make sure both pods are
23 functioning?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. But apparently here -- whose
00316:01 records are these? Are these Transocean's?
02 A. These are the morning reports
03 typed by the well site leaders, on the DIMS
04 reports.
05 Q. Okay. So these are BP records
06 you pulled these off of?
07 A. These are BP records.
08 Q. Okay. And the BP people should
09 reflect that they -- which pod is being
10 used on which days?

Page 316:13 to 316:15

00316:13 A. But they get their information
14 off the IADC reports, so. Maybe it wasn't
15 listed there either. I don't know.

Page 320:04 to 320:18

00320:04 Q. I've handed you Page 138 of the
05 Bly report. Do you see it?
06 A. Yes, sir.
07 Q. The last paragraph of 138 says,
08 Modeling analysis suggest had if the rig
09 crew had identified that the well is
10 flowing and it caused the BOP to seal
11 around the drill pipe anytime before
12 approximately 21:38 hours, hydrocarbons
13 would probably not have entered the riser.
14 Did I read it correctly?
15 First question.
16 A. Yes, sir, you did.
17 Q. Okay. Do you have any reason to
18 disagree with that?

Page 320:21 to 320:21

00320:21 A. No.

Page 321:22 to 322:06

00321:22 Q. Okay. It's obvious that if
23 hydrocarbons do not enter the riser, then
24 they don't make it to the rig floor,
25 correct?
00322:01 A. It's true.
02 Q. And if hydrocarbons don't make
03 it to the rig floor, it is also equally

04 obvious that there's no explosion, no loss
05 of the rig, no fire, and no environmental
06 damage, correct?

Page 322:09 to 322:15

00322:09 A. Yes.
10 Q. Okay. And it's also true that
11 even if hydrocarbons were at the BOP, in
12 other words, they were below the BOP, the
13 truth of the matter is there are procedures
14 and methods to make sure the well can be
15 controlled from that point forward, right?

Page 322:18 to 322:18

00322:18 A. Yes, it can.

Page 323:23 to 324:10

00323:23 Q. Okay. Is there a way -- is it
24 true that the well could be controlled from
25 that point forward using appropriate
00324:01 techniques?
02 A. That point, the only thing you'd
03 be able to do would be bullhead.
04 Q. What do you mean by the term
05 "bullhead"?
06 A. From the top forcing everything
07 back down.
08 Q. Okay. But that's an accepted
09 technique that could be used?
10 A. Depending on pressures, yes.

Page 325:05 to 325:22

00325:05 Q. Okay. I'd like to turn back to
06 your notes now and go over your notes to
07 make sure I'm reading them correctly.
08 Okay. If Exhibit Number 112. Please turn
09 the Page 4378.
10 I believe these are notes
11 of your interview with Don Vidrine on
12 May 7th, 2010, correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. Second page, 4378 of that
15 interview.
16 When you got to the bridge,
17 what light on the rig control panel was
18 red?
19 What was his answer?
20 A. Which question?
21 Q. The bottom of the page.

22 A. I think the lower annular.

Page 328:07 to 328:14

00328:07 Q. Okay. So you don't find that
08 as -- that's -- it doesn't cause you a
09 problem for BP, the head BP guy on the rig
10 does not know how the emergency disconnect
11 system, the sole way to engage the blind
12 shear rams on the rig floor, he doesn't
13 know how it's set up. You think that's in
14 accordance with BP corporate policy?

Page 328:17 to 328:21

00328:17 A. I don't know if it's in
18 accordance with BP policy.
19 Q. It's not unusual, the way you
20 see it?
21 A. No.

Page 331:12 to 332:09

00331:12 Q. Right. One more question on
13 your note, Page 4387. You have a BOP
14 meeting.
15 Do you see the BOP meeting
16 you're referring to?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is that on May 15th, 2010?
19 A. Yes, sir, it is.
20 Q. Okay. Down there on Number 6 in
21 your list you have deadman not a
22 requirement. And then you have a bunch of
23 exclamation marks after it. Correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What did you mean by that
00332:01 notation?
02 A. There was a discussion in the
03 room about whether the deadman was required
04 or not required. That's all it was.
05 Q. Okay. Who said a deadman system
06 is not required?
07 A. I don't remember who said it.
08 Q. Do you think a deadman system is
09 not required?

Page 332:15 to 333:03

00332:15 A. I don't know if it's required.
16 I've never seen it in the regs.
17 Q. Okay. So based on the training
18 that you've been given by British

19 Petroleum, you don't know if a deadman
 20 system on a blowout preventer stack is
 21 required or not?
 22 A. It's true.
 23 Q. Okay. And you don't know of any
 24 other well site leader that British
 25 Petroleum management has trained as to
 00333:01 whether a deadman system is required or
 02 not?
 03 A. I don't know.

Page 338:03 to 339:02

00338:03 BY MR. COLLIER:
 04 Q. Mr. Good afternoon, Mr. Guillot.
 05 A. Good afternoon.
 06 Q. As you know, my name is Paul
 07 Collier, and I'm counsel for BP. And I'll
 08 be asking you a few questions.
 09 Do you recall answering
 10 questions about an exhibit -- Exhibit 96?
 11 If you can find that in the stack before
 12 you.
 13 A. It's right here.
 14 Q. Okay. If you can review that
 15 document for me.
 16 And the second page of
 17 Exhibit 96 has an e-mail from John Guide to
 18 David Sims. It's dated April 17, 2010.
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A. Yes, I do.
 21 Q. Prior to today's deposition, had
 22 you ever seen this e-mail before?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. As part of your role with the
 25 Bly team investigation, you never reviewed
 00339:01 this e-mail?
 02 A. No.

Page 339:06 to 340:18

00339:06 Q. Have you ever had any
 07 conversations with John Guide in your role
 08 on the Bly team?
 09 A. No.
 10 Q. You never had any conversations
 11 with John Guide prior to April 20th
 12 regarding the Macondo well?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Have you ever had any
 15 conversations with David Sims as -- in your
 16 role as a Bly team member?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. Have you ever had any

19 conversations with David Sims prior to
20 April 20th regarding the Macondo well?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Were you involved at all in any
23 of the operations relating to the Macondo
24 well prior to April 20th?
25 A. None at all.
00340:01 Q. And were you at all copied on
02 any communications or received any
03 communications relating to the Macondo well
04 operation?
05 A. No.
06 Q. As part of your role with the
07 Bly team, did you review any of the
08 communications relating to the Macondo well
09 operations?
10 A. No.
11 Q. In this e-mail you were asked a
12 number of questions about certain comments
13 that were made within this e-mail. Do you
14 recall that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And do you know specifically
17 what is being referenced in this e-mail, as
18 far as those particular issues?

Page 340:21 to 341:06

00340:21 A. No, I don't.
22 Q. The last sentence in the first
23 paragraph of this e-mail reads: This
24 morning Brian called me and asked my advice
25 about exploring opportunities both inside
00341:01 and outside the company.
02 Do you see that?
03 A. Yes, I do.
04 Q. Do you have any firsthand
05 knowledge as to what is meant by that
06 particular statement?

Page 341:09 to 342:07

00341:09 A. No, I don't.
10 Q. And do you know -- have you ever
11 had any conversations with Brian Morel
12 about what he meant in that e-mail?
13 A. No, I haven't.
14 Q. Or by that statement?
15 A. No, I haven't.
16 Q. And do you know -- have you ever
17 had any conversation with Brian Morel,
18 either as part of Bly team investigation or
19 previously?
20 A. No.

21 Q. If you can turn to the next
 22 page. And this is an e-mail from David
 23 Sims to John Guide. It's dated April 17th,
 24 2010.

25 Do you see that?

00342:01 A. Yes, I do.

02 Q. Prior to today's deposition, had
 03 you ever seen this e-mail?

04 A. No, I haven't.

05 Q. In your role with the Bly team
 06 investigation, had you received this
 07 e-mail?

Page 342:10 to 343:03

00342:10 A. No.

11 Q. Do you have any firsthand
 12 knowledge as to the events that were being
 13 discussed in this e-mail between David Sims
 14 and John Guide?

15 A. No, I don't.

16 Q. And do you know what, if any,
 17 actions were taken by either David Sims and
 18 John Guide with respect to the issues that
 19 are discussed in this e-mail?

20 A. No, I don't.

21 Q. Mr. Guillot, you were asked a
 22 number of questions relating to the BOP; do
 23 you recall that?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. In your role with the Bly team
 00343:01 investigation, was it your responsibility
 02 to draw conclusions about why the BOP
 03 failed?

Page 343:06 to 344:09

00343:06 A. Not my part of it, no.

07 Q. And were you part of any
 08 discussions with the Bly team regarding why
 09 the BOP failed?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Those discussions were held
 12 after you left; is that your understanding?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. During your time with the Bly
 15 team, did you reach any conclusion as to
 16 why the BOP failed?

17 A. No, I didn't.

18 Q. And have you reached any
 19 conclusions as to when the -- the blind
 20 shear rams and the BOP closed?

21 A. No.

22 Q. In your experience as a well

23 site leader -- as a well site leader, who
 24 is responsible for BOP maintenance on a
 25 rig?
 00344:01 A. The drilling contractor.
 02 Q. And in your experience as a well
 03 site leader, who would be responsible for
 04 the testing of the BOP?
 05 A. The drilling contractor.
 06 Q. In your experience as a well
 07 site leader, who would be responsible for
 08 maintenance of the BOP?
 09 A. The drilling contractor.

Page 344:18 to 345:20

00344:18 Q. With respect to the Deepwater
 19 Horizon, did you do any analysis to
 20 determine who was responsible for
 21 inspecting and testing the BOP?
 22 A. No, I didn't.
 23 Q. Did you review the Deepwater
 24 Horizon contracts between BP and
 25 Transocean?
 00345:01 A. No.
 02 Q. Mr. Guillot, you were asked a
 03 number of questions about your notes, which
 04 I believe were Exhibit 112. If you can
 05 just pull that exhibit for me.
 06 And in Exhibit 112, you, I
 07 think, testified previously that you have
 08 notes in there from interviews that you
 09 conducted with certain individuals; is that
 10 correct?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Your processes as far as taking
 13 those notes relating to those interviews,
 14 did you -- and I think you testified that
 15 you took those notes to the best of your
 16 ability; is that correct?
 17 A. To the best of my ability, yes.
 18 Q. Were your notes intended to be a
 19 verbatim transcript of what was said during
 20 that interview?

Page 345:23 to 348:12

00345:23 A. I tried to get as close as I
 24 could.
 25 Q. But was it intended to be a
 00346:01 verbatim transcript?
 02 A. No.
 03 Q. Now, you were asked a number of
 04 questions this morning about the negative
 05 pressure test; do you recall that?

06 A. Yes.
07 Q. Now, I think we've fairly
08 established that you weren't on the
09 Deepwater Horizon on April 20th; is that
10 correct?
11 A. I was not.
12 Q. And you were not present, then,
13 during any of the activities associated
14 with the negative pressure test on
15 April 20th; is that correct?
16 A. Right. I was not.
17 Q. What, if any, involvement did
18 you have with respect to the negative
19 pressure test on April 20th relating to the
20 Deepwater Horizon?
21 A. None.
22 Q. Were you involved in any of the
23 conversations relating to the negative
24 pressure test on April 20th onboard the
25 Deepwater Horizon?
00347:01 A. No, I was not.
02 Q. As a member of the Bly team,
03 were you responsible for investigating what
04 occurred with respect to the negative
05 pressure test on the Deepwater Horizon?
06 A. No, I wasn't.
07 Q. Do you know who on the Bly team
08 was responsible for that investigation?
09 A. I do not.
10 Q. Did you contribute at all to the
11 investigation relating to the negative
12 pressure test?
13 A. No, I didn't.
14 Q. Are you aware of all of the
15 circumstances surrounding the activities
16 with the negative pressure test that was
17 performed on the Deepwater Horizon on
18 April 20th?
19 A. Some of them, yes.
20 Q. Are you aware of all of those
21 circumstances?
22 A. I don't think so.
23 Q. Are you in a position to be able
24 to evaluate what occurred on the Deepwater
25 Horizon with respect to the negative
00348:01 pressure test?
02 A. I wasn't out there with them, so
03 I couldn't evaluate it.
04 Q. Does every safety critical
05 operation that BP conducts in a deepwater
06 well operation have a standard written
07 procedure?
08 A. Not that I know of.
09 Q. Is there a requirement that
10 every safety critical operation for

11 drilling a deepwater well have a
12 standardized procedure?

Page 348:23 to 349:04

00348:23 Q. And is there a requirement that
24 in every instance you have them?
25 A. No, sir.
00349:01 Q. Is it possible to conduct a risk
02 assessment with respect to a safety
03 critical operation without doing it in
04 writing?

Page 349:07 to 349:10

00349:07 A. I haven't been able to do one
08 without putting it in writing.
09 Q. Is it possible to do a risk
10 assessment verbally?

Page 349:13 to 349:15

00349:13 A. It's possible.
14 Q. Does BP have any requirement
15 that a risk assessment be done in writing?

Page 349:18 to 351:06

00349:18 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
19 Q. I think earlier you testified
20 that you've conducted a number of negative
21 pressure test as a well site leader; is
22 that correct?
23 A. I have.
24 Q. And you've successfully
25 performed those negative pressure test; is
00350:01 that right?
02 A. Yes, I have.
03 Q. And in conducting those negative
04 pressure test, have you ever had the --
05 have you ever had a standardized written
06 procedure from BP for conducting that
07 negative pressure test?
08 A. No, I haven't.
09 Q. And for how many years now have
10 you conducted negative pressure test?
11 A. All total, probably 20 years.
12 Q. And have you ever had a failure
13 associated with a negative pressure test?
14 A. No, I haven't.
15 Q. Now, earlier today you testified
16 about the way that you conduct your
17 operations as a well site leader; do you

18 recall that?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Is the way the well site leaders
 21 conduct their operations the same for every
 22 well?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. Why is that the case?
 25 A. Everybody works different.
 00351:01 Q. And is every well the same?
 02 A. Oh, no. No two wells are the
 03 same.
 04 Q. And so the behavior of a well
 05 site leader may change depending on the
 06 well?

Page 351:11 to 352:05

00351:11 A. I don't think it would be -- the
 12 way the well is, you have to understand the
 13 way he works, whether it's an easy well or
 14 hard well and if he would operate the same.
 15 Q. In your role with the Bly team,
 16 were you requested to evaluate the -- the
 17 conduct of either Don Vidrine or Bob Kaluza
 18 on the date of April 20th?
 19 A. No, I wasn't.
 20 Q. And did you -- did you conduct
 21 that analysis, however?
 22 A. No, I did not.
 23 Q. And did you compile enough
 24 information in your role on the Bly team to
 25 form any opinions as to the Macondo as to
 00352:01 Don Vidrine or Bob Kaluza?
 02 A. No, I didn't.
 03 Q. If a negative pressure test is
 04 misinterpreted, does that mean that there
 05 will be a blowout of the well?

Page 352:08 to 352:16

00352:08 A. No. Until you actually know
 09 what the -- where the pressure's coming
 10 from, you're not sure what's it's going to
 11 be.
 12 Q. So there are other things that
 13 may be implied other than a potential
 14 blowout; is that right?
 15 A. Displacements of heavy fluids,
 16 improper lineup can change things.